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ABSTRACT
This dissertation comprises three essays on the movements of workers into and
out of employment and unemployment—in other words, the composition of the
labor market. The rst provides an overview. It describes the US economy’s abil-
ity to create new hires from unemployment and vacancies and some implications
for labor–macro models. The second considers shery management plans in a
two-sector, random search environment, where one sector harvests sh. The op-
timal composition of jobs is described. The third investigates how labor-market
composition aects the cyclical behavior of wages informed by random search
models and data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, the Cur-
rent Population Survey, and the Current Employment Statistics program.
vii
CHAPTER 1
Estimates of Matching Technology under
Constant Returns to Scale with Implications
for Fundamental Surplus
I estimate two constant-returns-to-scale matching technologies that summarize how an
economy creates new matches from vacancies and unemployment. Using monthly data
on matches and vacancies from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey and data on
unemployment from the Current Population Survey that is corrected for time aggregation,
both the log-linear Cobb–Douglas and nonlinear paramterizations accurately account for
the variation over time in new matches. The nonlinear paramterization has the added ben-
et of constraining job-nding and job-lling probabilities to be between 0 and 1. I show
how the nonlinear parameterization aects the elasticity of matches with respect to un-
employment and show how this elasticity aects interpretations of fundamental surplus
in labor–macro models that feature random search. The constrained, nonlinear parame-
terization increases the cyclicality of job nding and therefore unemployment, a desirable
feature for labor–macro models.
1.1 Introduction
Each month workers actively search for jobs and rms actively recruit workers. Workers
go on job interviews, contact potential employers, submit resumes to employers and job
websites, use services like those at university employment centers, contact job recruiters,
and seek assistance from friends, relatives, and other members of the social networks.
And to recruit workers, advertise in newspapers, on television, and on radio; post Inter-
net notices; post “help wanted” signs; network with colleagues or make word-of-mouth
announcements, including on platforms like Twitter; accept applications; interview can-
didates; contact employment agencies; and solicit employees at job fairs. Nevertheless,
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despite these eorts and despite workers’ availability for jobs that are ready to start, work-
ers cannot nd jobs and rms cannot recruit workers. At almost any time some people
are unemployed and some vacancies are unlled.
“Workhorse” macroeconomic models capture this essential dynamic with a search fric-
tion that prevents rms from immediately hiring available works.1 The search friction is
modeled as a matching technology, which characterizes the cyclical behavior of the labor
market in terms of unemployment and vacancies. But despite the centrality of match-
ing technology to labor–macro models, nearly all empirical evidence on matching uses a
Cobb–Douglas parameterization. And it is unclear how alternative parameterizes aect
labor–macro modeling.
Here I report the results of estimating an alternative, nonlinear parameterization cal-
ibrated in a model by den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), using data from the Current
Population Survey and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. The alternative param-
eterization ts the data as well as the Cobb–Douglas parameterization. Additionally, the
nonlinear parameterization can be specied to have job-nding and job-lling probabili-
ties fall within 0 and 1.
To assess how the alternative parameterization aects labor–macro models, I report
the impact on a key statistic: the elasticity of labor-market tightness with respect to pro-
ductivity, where labor-market tightness refers to the ratio of vacancies to unemployed
persons. Tightness captures labor demand (vacancies) relative to labor supply (unem-
ployed persons). I show that the nonlinear parameterization that species job nding to
fall within the unit interval increases the cyclicality of job-nding and therefore unem-
ployment.
To estimate the two parameterizations I correct the data for time aggregation. Matches
or new hires as measured by the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey are the total
number of new hires made throughout the month. Attributing all new hires to a point in
time biases job nding upward. The correction I make suggests the bias is large.
The usefulness of modeling unemployment with a matching friction is well estab-
lished. Part of that usefulness is based on the robust empirical support for constant re-
turns to scale. Doubling the number of unemployed persons and number of vacancies
appears to double the number of matches. Empirical support is documented by Blan-
chard and Diamond (1989), Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), Blanchard et al. (1990),
Bleakley and Fuhrer (1997), Bleakley, Ferris, and Fuhrer (1999), and Petrongolo and Pis-
sarides (2001).2 Recent estimates that support the Cobb–Douglas parameterization in-
1The term “workhorse” is used, for example, in Shimer (2005) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017).
2See Elsby, Michaels, and Ratner (2015) for a recent review.
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clude Borowczyk-Martins, Jolivet, and Postel-Vinay (2013), who account for the idea that
shifts in the matching technology may induce workers to strategically vary search, and
Lange and Papageorgiou (2020), who account for rms’ search intensity over the business
cycle in addition to workers’. Both Borowczyk-Martins, Jolivet, and Postel-Vinay (2013)
and Lange and Papageorgiou (2020), however, do not correct for time aggregation.
This empirical evidence posits that the log of matches is linearly related to a linear
combination of the log of vacancies and the log of unemployment. The Cobb–Douglas
parameterization can lead to trouble for labor–macro models. A simple example illustrates
why.
I letM (u,v) denote the number of matches as a function of the level of unemployment,
u, and vacancies,v . The constant-returns-to-scalle Cobb–Douglas parameterization spec-
ies that
M (ut ,vt ) = Au1−αt vαt ϵt ,
where A models matching eciency (and is often associated with long-run, exogenous
shifts in the Beveridge curve) and εt is an iid random disturbance that shifts matching
eciency. The implied job-nding probability, M (ut ,vt ) /ut , is A (vt/ut )α . Taking A =
1, the ratio of vacancies to unemployment to be .25, and α = .5 implies that the the
probability a worker nds a job is (1/4).5 = .5. These are realistic numbers: α = .5 is close
to the estimate I report using data adjusted for time aggregation, the ratio of vacancies to
unemployment hovered around .25 between 2009 and 2011, and it is not unreasonable to
for a worker to face a fty percent chance of nding a job within a month.3
Unfortunately these parameters imply an unreasonable job-lling probability. The
probability a vacancy is lled, M (ut ,vt ) /vt = A (ut/vt )1−α , is (4).5 = 2. This simple
example motivates estimation of the nonlinear technology.4
In this paper I provide nonlinear least-squares estimates of parameterizations ofM and
compare them to Cobb–Douglas estimates. One parameterization species that the job-
nding and job-lling fall between 0 and 1. To my knowledge, this is the rst empirical
estimate of this parameterization. These estimates are important because they have im-
plications for understanding “fundamental surplus,” which Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017)
3Figures 1.5 and 1.1 support these empirical claims.
4Labor–macro models could useA to match a steady-state job-nding probability and therefore a steady-
state unemployment rate. For example, the steady state of the model in Gertler and Trigari (2009) implies a
job-lling rate of above 1. Gertler and Trigari (2009) show how staggered wage setting, instead of period-
by-period wage renegotiation under Nash bargaining, aects unemployment dynamics, which seems really
important given what is known about how often wages are reset in the data (Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk,
2014). Whether a steady-state job-lling rate above 1 matters for dynamics is an open question. Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2017) suggest getting around this by calibrating a model to a daily frequency.
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use to interpret many variants of labor–macro models’ ability to match the elasticity of
tightness with respect to productivity.
The elasticity of tightness with respect to productivity, ηθ,y , is a key statistic. It is a
fundamentals-rooted statistic for how well labor–macro models match the cyclical behav-
ior of labor markets. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017) show that, without the inuence of
stochastic uctuations in productivity in a model with exogenous separations, this elas-
ticity can be decomposed into two factors
ηθ,y = ϒ
y
y − c <
1
ηM,u
y
y − c . (1.1)
The second factor, y/(y − c), or the inverse of the fundamental surplus fraction, is the
focus of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017). I establish that the rst factor, ϒ, is bounded
above by 1/ηM,u , the inverse of elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment.
The inequality in (1.1) is based on a minor extension of Ljungqvist and Sargent’s (2017)
framework.
In the Cobb–Douglas framework, ηM,u , is constant, whereas the elasticity depends on
tightness in the nonlinear framework. Evaluated at the average level of tightness in the
US economy from December 2000 through December 2019, however, the bound is nearly
twice as large using the nonlinear framework compared to the Cobb–Douglas framework.
While it is possible to evaluate ηθ,y directly, providing a bound avoids the murky issue
of choosing parameters. This is more of a conceptual exercise and a rst step of eval-
uating the consequences of using dierent parameterizations of matching technologies
in labor–macro models. The bound in (1.1) is nearly twice as large using the nonlinear
parameterization. As I show in section 1.4.1, empirically ηθ,y is very large, so the larger
bound should be welcome because it puts a little less pressure on the ability of funda-
mental surplus to explain everything about the cyclical behavior of labor markets, an
interpretation pushed in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data
used to estimate matching technology under constant returns to scale, including the bias
correction associated with time aggregation. Section 1.3 reports estimates of of dierent
parameterizations of the matching technology. These estimates are discussed in the con-
text of canonical search model in section 1.4.2 and how fundamental parameters relate to
data described in section 1.4.1.5 Section 1.5 concludes.
5The canonical model is based on Pissarides (1985) using Ljungqvist and Sargent’s (2017) framework.
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1.2 Data
This section uses data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey and the Current
Population Survey to estimate two parameterizations of constant-returns-to-scale match-
ing functions. Before turning to the estimation, I describe the matching technologies and
the data requirements.
1.2.1 Cobb–Douglas
Time is discrete and indexed by t . Data are available at a monthly frequency. LetMt denote
the number of matching occurring in month t . Let ut denote the number of unemployed
workers in month t . Letvt denote the number of vacancies posted in month t . The Cobb–
Douglas matching technology is parameterized as
Mt = Au
1−α
t v
α
t ϵt , (1.2)
where the time-invariant parameter A describes the eciency with which the economy
produces matches and ϵt stochastically shifts matching eciency. This matching technol-
ogy implies
Ft =
Mt
ut
=
Au1−αt vα
ut
= Au−αt v
α
t = Aθ
α
t ϵt , (1.3)
where θ = vt/ut denes tightness. This relationship can be written
log Ft = a + α logθt + εt , (1.4)
which says that the log of the job-nding probability is linearly related to the log of the
ratio of vacancies to unemployed. Equation (1.4) shows how powerful the Cobb–Douglas
framework is, but it is not the only framework.
1.2.2 A Nonlinear Matching Technology
A nonlinear matching technology was suggested in an impressive, early calibration by
den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000). This parameterization has subsequently been used
in calibrated models (Ravenna and Walsh, 2012, 2008; Walsh, 2003). This matching tech-
nology is parameterized as
Mt = A utvt(
u
γ
t +v
γ
t
)1/γ ϵt .
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This matching technology exhibits constant returns to scale inut andvt and it is increasing
in both its arguments.
Under this parameterization the job-nding rate is
Ft = A
θt
(1 + θγ )1/γ ϵt
∴ log Ft = a + logθt − 1
γ
log
(
1 + θγt
)
+ εt .
(1.5)
The series for Ft and θt can be constructed using data from the Job Openings and Labor
Turnover Survey program and the Current Population Survey.
The JOLTS program collects data from approximately 16,000 business establishments
to provide measures of labor demand as measured by the number of job openings or va-
cancies a rm is actively looking to ll. Data on the number of unemployed workers come
from the Current Population Survey. The CPS asks about 60,000 households every month
about information on the labor-force status of people age 16 and older, including whether
a person was employed, whether they were available to work, and whether they actively
searched for a job to determine whether a person was unemployed. The ratio of total non-
farm vacancies, vt , to the number of unemployed persons, ut , denes tightness in period
t .6
While the Bureau of Labor Statistics began tracking unemployment much earlier, the
JOLTS program only began publishing data on vacancies in December 2000. The only
widely available data on vacancies before this is the Conference Board’s help-wanted ad-
vertising index. Even though it is possible that this index is related to the true number of
vacancies, the mode of making vacancies has surely changed—for example, the shift from
advertising vacancies in newspapers to advertising online—and I only consider the JOLTS
data.7
Each month JOLTS also provides data on the number of matches, Mt . The number
of matches refers to the number of new hires and includes all additions to the payroll
during the month. In other words, matches refers to the cumulative number of new hires.8
Attributing the cumulative number of new hires to created jobs at the beginning of the
month will therefore bias the rate of job nding upward. The next section corrects for
this type of time aggregation using a method similar to the time-aggregation adjustment
Shimer (2012) uses to adjust short-term unemployment.
As an alternative to short-term unemployment and CPS transitions, the JOLTS pro-
6All series are seasonally adjusted by either the CPS or the JOLTS program.
7See Abraham (1987) for more information on the help-wanted index.
8The BLS provides a denition at https://www.bls.gov/jlt/jltdef.htm#3.
6
gram publishes data on new hires that can be used to measure job nding. While this
new, time-aggregation-adjusted measure of job nding should be a welcome alternative,
the measure nevertheless relies on the assumptions that the labor force is constant within
a month and workers transition between employment and unemployment. I leave a com-
parison to measures constructed using CPS data for future research.
1.2.3 A New Measure of Job Finding Using JOLTS data
In this section I derive a measure of job nding that corrects for the fact that time is
continuous but data are available only at discrete dates.
Workers are either employed or unemployed, transitioning between labor-market states.
Time is continuous, while data are available only at discrete dates. Following Shimer
(2012), refer to the interval [t, t + 1), for t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }, as “period t .” Within the interval
[t, t + 1) workers neither exit or enter the labor force.
I dene the following quantities:
• Ft ∈ [0, 1] is the job-nding probability in period t ,
• St ∈ [0, 1] is the separation probability in period t ,
• ft ≡ − log (1 − Ft ) ≥ 0 is the arrival rate of the Poisson process that changes a
worker’s state from unemployment to employment, and
• st ≡ − log (1 − St ) ≥ 0 is the arrival rate of the Poisson process that changes a
worker’s state from employment to unemployment.
To be clear, Ft and St are probabilities, while ft and st are rates. Ft is the probability that a
worker who begins period t unemployed nds a job during period t ; St is the probability
that a worker who begins period t employed loses a job during period t . I am interested
in uncovering St and Ft .
For any t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . } I let τ ∈ [0, 1] be the elapsed time since the start of the period.
I dene the following stocks:
• et+τ is the number of employed workers at time t + τ ,
• ut+τ is the number of unemployed workers at time t + τ , and
• eht (τ ) is the number of workers who are employed at time t+τ but were unemployed
at some time t ′ ∈ [t, t + τ ); that is, the number of new hires or matches.
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The number of new hires is zero at the start of the period:
eht (0) = 0 for all t .
The number of new hires at the end of the period is dened as
eht+1 ≡ eht (1)
as the number of new hires at the end of the period, as measured by the JOLTS program.9
Employment within the period evolves according to
Ûet+τ = ftut+τ − stet+τ (1.6)
Ûeht+τ = ftut+τ − steht+τ . (1.7)
Equation (1.6) states that the change in employment equals the workers who nd jobs out
of unemployment less the workers who separate from employment to unemployment.
Equation (1.7) states that this same dynamic holds for new hires. Random search implies
all workers separate at the same rate.10
Solving equation (1.7) for ftut+h and substituting this into equation (1.6) yields
Ûet+τ = Ûeht+τ + steht+τ − stet+τ for τ ∈ [0, 1) .
This is a linear rst-order equation for Ûet+τ with τ ∈ [0, 1).
The generation solution is
et+τ =
[
c +
∫ τ
0
(
Ûeht+z + steht+z
)
estzdz
]
e−stτ . (1.8)
The rst integral on the right-hand size of the latter equation can be integrated by parts.
Integrating by parts and substituting the result into (1.8) yields
et+τ = ce
−stτ + eht+τ .
9The series for new hires published by the JOLTS program measures all additions to the payroll dur-
ing the month. Adding a worker to payroll requires a duration of employment beyond being hired and
immediately red. I therefore model new hires as workers employed at the end of the month who were
not employed at the beginning of the month. This is a behavioral model of respondents. Alternatively, a
behavioral model could specify that new hires refers to all new hires, including those workers to are hired
and let go within the month.
10See footnote 9 for a description of an alternative model.
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The determination of c comes from evaluating the latter at τ = 0. Doing so yields c = et ,
as there are no new hires at the beginning of the period and eht (0) = 0. Therefore
et+τ = ete
−stτ + eht+τ .
Evaluating the latter at τ = 1 yields
et+1 = et (1 − St ) + eht+1, (1.9)
which indicates that the level of employment in the following survey period equals the
employed who do not separate from their jobs plus new hires. Solving this expression for
St yields
St = 1 −
et+1 − eht+1
et
. (1.10)
To solve for the nding rate, which is the point of interest, solve equation (1.6) forward.
Dene lt = ut + et as the labor force. The labor force is assumed to be constant during
that period; that is, ut+τ + et+τ = lt for all τ ∈ [0, 1). Using this assumption implies
Ûet+τ = ftlt − (st + ft ) et+τ .
This is a linear dierential equation for Ûet+τ with constant coecients. I solving this dier-
ential equation and evaluate the solution at τ = 0 to solve for the constant of integration.
The result evaluated at τ = 1 is
et+1 =
(
1 − e−st−ft ) ft
(st + ft ) lt + e
−(st+ft )et . (1.11)
I am interested in uncovering Ft and St . The separation probability, St , is calculated using
(1.10). The nding probability Ft is dened implicitly in equation (1.11). I solve equation
1.11 using a bisection method to uncover ft and then compute Ft = 1 − e−ft . Details are
provided in an appendix.
Figure 1.1 compares the job-nding probability corrected for time aggregation with the
nding rate constructed as F˜t = Mt/ut . The correction is meaningful. The uncorrected
series, for example, implies a job-nding probability above 1 in several months. While
the features of data collection make this possible—for example, workers can hold multiple
jobs—the uncorrected levels seem unreasonably high. The job-nding series corrected for
time aggregation provides more reasonable levels.
Subsequent sections compare the results based on both the corrected and uncorrected
9
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Figure 1.1: Comparison of uncorrected and time-aggregation corrected job-nding prob-
abilities, 2000m12–2019m12.
series for job nding.
1.2.4 The Constructed Series
The relationship between nding and tightness is depicted in gure 1.2, which depicts a
scatter plot of θt on the horizontal axis and log Ft on the vertical axis. The color of the
points represents time, which provides an assessment of how the relationship shifted. The
early part of the sample comprises the upper collection of points in dark blue. From those
early observations, the economy transitions to the lower collection of points in light blue
that compose the later sample. The shift through time is consistent with earlier shifts
in the Beveridge curve identied by Bleakley and Fuhrer (1997) and Elsby, Michaels, and
Ratner (2015).
Figure 1.3 classies the points in gure 1.2 by recessions and data collected during
the COVID-19 pandemic. The COVID-19 period, when the unemployment rate shot up
to 14.7 percent, may have aected the March and April 2020 relationships, denoted by
the yellow and green circles. I take these to be an uninformative outliers and drop all
data beginning in 2020 from the subsequent statistical analysis. The other data can be
understood in terms of before, during, and after the Great Recession.
10
Prior to the Great Recession, data are grouped into the pre–Great Recession and 2001
Recession periods. These periods are represented by dark or light purple and are nearly
indistinguishable from on another. From the two early periods, however, the economy
transitioned to the dates colored in blue and green, which are labeled Great Recession
and Post Great Recession. The transition occurs during the Great Recession and depicted
in blue. The Great Recession period comprises the collection of points that connects the
two major collections of points. The Great Recession is associated with a shift in the e-
ciency with which workers are rms matched—a given level of vacancies per unemployed
workers led to fewer matches after the Great Recession. I model this shift in matching ef-
ciency as an exogenous shift in a in equation (1.4) and consider shifts in α during the
Great Recession.
In summary, as the theory of matching technology suggests, there is a strong relation-
ship between tightness and job nding. This relationship is analyzed statistically in the
next section.
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Figure 1.2: Scatter plot of job nding versus tightness, 2000m12–2020m4. The color of
points denotes time.
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Figure 1.3: Scatter plot of job nding versus tightness, 2000m12–2020m4.
1.3 Estimation of Matching Technologies
This section reports the results of estimating the statistical relationships in (1.4) and (1.5)
for both the time-aggregation-corrected and uncorrected series. I rst report estimates
based on the uncorrected series to compare results found in the literature.
Turning to the Cobb–Douglas model in (1.4), to make the model operational, I allow
for the possibility that both the intercept and the slope shift after the Great Recession
based on gure 1.3. I estimate statistical models with the general form
log Ft = a + α logθt + β1trendt + β21 (t > 2009m6) + β31 (t > 2009m6) × θt + εt .
The sample includes data from 2000m12 through 2019m12. Table 1.1 reports the results
for the job-nding series uncorrected for time aggregation.
The rst column of table 1.1 pools the entire sample, ignoring the shifts depicted in
gure 1.3. The coecient on logθ is .694. The estimate implies that a 1 percent increase
in tightness predicts that job nding increases by .694 percent. Alternatively, looking at
(1.13), the statistical model implies that the elasticity of matching with respect to vacancies
is .694 and the elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment is .306.
This estimate is similar to existing estimates. For instance, using a similar specica-
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tion and similar data through January 2012, Borowczyk-Martins, Jolivet, and Postel-Vinay
(2013) estimate the elasticity of matching with respect to vacancies as .842. These num-
bers are consistent with those in Pissarides (1986), who uses UK data, and in the range of
estimates reported in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
Importantly, with anR2 of .910, this simple matching function is able to explain over 90
percent of the variation over time in job nding. The matching function, in other words,
accurately accounts for the movement over time in new hires. This holds for all estimated
versions of the statistical model in (1.13) and is yet another statement of the power of the
matching models to explain the cyclical behavior of the labor market.
The second column of table 1.1 investigates the deterioration of matching eciency
through time by adding a linear trend. The coecient on the linear trend is negative and
signicant at the 1-percent level, suggesting that matching eciency has decreased over
the sample. The third column shows that the signicant trend estimate in the second col-
umn is well approximated by a shift in matching eciency that occurred after the Great
Recession. The coecient on the post–Great Recession indicator implies that matching
eciency fell over 20 percent after 2009m6. This number quanties the fall in eciency
depicted in gure 1.3. The fourth column allows allows for a fall in eciency after the
Great Recession and a shift in the elasticity of matching with respect to vacancies and un-
employment. Allowing for these shifts implies that matching eciency fell 24 percent and
the elasticity of matching with respect to vacancies increased. The elasticity of matching
with respect to vacancies prior to the Great Recession in the specication of column 4
comes closer to the estimates in Borowczyk-Martins, Jolivet, and Postel-Vinay (2013).
Table 1.2 repeats this analysis for the job-nding series corrected for time-aggregation.
The results are meaningfully dierent. The general time-series pattern is the same—there
is a fall in matching eciency—but the magnitude of that change is less. Columns (3) and
(4) of table 1.2 imply matching eciency fell by 15.8 and 19.1 percent.
But the main takeaway is that the elasticity of matching with respect to unemploy-
ment increased meaningfully. For example, using the corrected job-nding series and
allowing for a shift in matching technology, the elasticity of matching with respect to va-
cancies is .536 and the elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment is .464. These
estimates are more in line with those in Blanchard and Diamond (1989) who use US data.
Importantly, the inverse of the elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment is
signicantly less. Here the bound is 1/ηM,u = 1/(1 − .536) = 2.155; whereas for the un-
corrected series, the bound is 1/(1 − .700) = 3.333. These two values have implications
for the bound in (1.1).
Turning to the estimation of the matching technology in (1.5), analogous to the sta-
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Table 1.1: Cobb–Douglas matching technology
Dependent variable:
Log(nd)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(tight) .694??? .771??? .700??? .738???
(.015) (.007) (.007) (.015)
Trend −.002???
(.0001)
Post GR −.209??? −.243???
(.007) (.014)
Post GR X log(tight) −.046???
(.017)
Constant −.081??? .169??? .038??? .066???
(.013) (.010) (.007) (.012)
Observations 229 229 229 229
R2 .908 .982 .981 .982
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1.2: Cobb–Douglas matching technology using adjusted job nding
Dependent variable:
Log(nd)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(tight) .531??? .591??? .536??? .573???
(.012) (.006) (.006) (.014)
Trend −.001???
(.00005)
Post GR −.158??? −.191???
(.007) (.013)
Post GR X log(tight) −.046???
(.016)
Constant −.464??? −.270??? −.374??? −.347???
(.010) (.009) (.007) (.011)
Observations 229 229 229 229
R2 .902 .977 .972 .973
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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tistical model in (1.13), I consider a trend and shift in matching eciency after the Great
Recession. The statistical model is
log Ft = a + logθt − 1
γ
log
(
1 + Θγt
)
+ β1trendt + β21 (t > 2009m6) + εt . (1.12)
In general this model can be written log Ft = д (xt , β) + εt , where
xt = (1, trendt , 1 (t > 2009m6) , θt , logθt )′ and β = (a,γ , β1, β2)′ .
I postulate that E [εt |xt ] = 0 and cov [εtεs |xt ] is σ 2 if s = t and 0 if s , t . I estimate the
nonlinear semiparametric model in (1.12) with nonlinear least squares to minimize the
sum of squared errors. I use a Gauss–Newton algorithm to estimate the parameter vector
β . Again, the sample uses data from 2000m12 through 2019m12. Table 1.3 reports the
results.
Table 1.3: Nonlinear matching technology
Dependent variable:
Log(nd)
(1) (2) (3)
γ 1.183??? 1.466??? 1.052???
(.097) (.076) (.054)
Trend −.001???
(.0001)
Post GR −.175???
(.009)
Constant .473??? .527??? .632???
(.041) (.020) (.031)
Observations 229 229 229
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The rst column of table 1.3 is analogous to the rst column of table 1.1, ignoring the
shifts in matching eciency. The second column estimates a trend. The coecient on the
trend variable indicates that matching eciency fell, on average, by .1 percent each month
throughout the sample. The third column, which is analogous to column (3) of table 1.1,
implies that matching eciency fell by 17 percent after 2009m6. This result is comparable
to the prediction based on the OLS estimates reported in table 1.1. The estimates for γ in
table 1.3 provide a range from 1.052 to 1.466. This range contains the number 1.27, which
is used in the linearized simulations reported in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000).
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Table 1.4: Nonlinear matching technology using adjusted job nding
Dependent variable:
Log(nd)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
γ .301??? .420??? .204??? 1.893???
(.055) (.029) (.030) (.099)
Trend −.001???
(.00005)
Post GR −.150??? −.019
(.006) (.019)
Constant 1.850??? 1.338??? 3.018???
(.416) (.112) (.495)
Observations 229 229 229 229
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Columns 1 through 3 of table 1.4 repeat the nonlinear analysis for the job-nding
series corrected for time aggregation. The qualitative picture is similar. For example, the
fall in matching eciency after the Great Recession is estimated to be 15 percent using
the adjusted data, whereas the fall is estimated by be 17.3 percent using the unadjusted
data. Nevertheless, the adjusted job-nding series implies signicantly dierent levels of
γˆ . Column 4 of table 1.4 species a matching technology that requires job-nding and
job-lling probabilities to fall within the unit interval. Here γˆ = 1.893. The implication of
these estimates is taken up in the following section.
Table 1.5 compares the estimated statistical models in terms of how well they t the
adjusted data. For each model the table reports the standard error of the regression, which
is the square root of the sum of squared error divided by the same size minus 2.11 Because
the models are all estimated using the same sample, the statistic essentially compares the
sum of squared errors produced by the model estimates. In the rst column of table 1.5, the
model labeled “All” allows for no shifts in matching eciency after the Great Recession
or trend component in matching eciency and corresponds to the rst columns of tables
1.2, 1.1, 1.4, and 1.3. Looking at the data in gures 1.2 and 1.3, it is no surprise that these
models produce the worst t. The model labeled “Linear trend” allows for a trend and
11That is, for model j,
standard error of the regression =
[
1
T − 2
∑
i
(
εˆ ji
)2]1/2
where T is the sample size.
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corresponds to the second columns of the tables listed above. The models that include a
trend provide a better t with the Cobb–Douglas specication providing a slightly better
t than the nonlinear specication. On the other hand, for the models that allow for a
shift in matching eciency after the Great Recession, labeled “Great Recession shift,” the
nonlinear specication provides a better t. Finally, the 0−−1 model, which corresponds
to column 4 of table 1.4, reports the sum of squared error for the nonlinear model that
species job-nding to fall within 0 and 1. Importantly, this number does not adjust for
this statistical model having one fewer parameter to match the data. When compared to
the nonlinear models with an overall level shift, the 0 − −1 model increases the sum of
squared error by a factor of over 3, with the benet of specifying a matching technology
with desirable theoretical properties.
Table 1.5: Standard error of the regression
Model Cobb–Douglas Nonlinear
Linear trend .0450 .0452
Great Recession shift .0495 .0481
All .0927 .0882
0–1 constraint .1561
Figure 1.4 shows the t of the models that allow for a shift in matching eciency after
the Great Recession. Both models that estimate over all matching eciency in addition to
the shift t the data well. The ts are nearly indistinguishable to the eye and both models
are precisely estimated. The nonlinear model that constrains matching eciency to equal
1, labeled “Nonlinear, 0–1”, illustrates the error reported in the last row of table 1.5.
The appeal of the Cobb–Douglas specication partly lies in its interpretation. Inter-
pretations of γ in (1.12) are much less apparent. To understand the implications of the
nonlinear parameterization, the next section investigates an implication of matching tech-
nology for labor–macro models that feature random search. Figure 1.4 foreshadows the
discussion. The nonlinear technology that constrains matching eciency to be 1 increases
the variation in job nding and thus the variation in unemployment.
1.4 Implications of Estimates for Fundamental Surplus
This section aims to describe how dierent parameterization of matching technology
inuence labor–macro models that feature random search. A key statistic of matching
models is the elasticity of tightness with respect to productivity. Shimer (2005), for ex-
ample, discussed this elasticity in addition to a follow-up investigation in Hagedorn and
17
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Figure 1.4: Comparison of model ts for data adjusted for time aggregation. Both the
nonlinear and Cobb–Douglas models allow for a shift in matching eciency after the
Great Recession.
Manovskii (2008), which, among other things, adds taxes paid by rms and workers. The
elasticity has been discussed by many others in the literature. Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2017) unify the literature by writing several models in terms of fundamental surplus.
They emphasize fundamentals, which include parameters associated with matching tech-
nology.
Section 1.4.1 rst describes how incredibly cyclical tightness is over the business cycle
and then section 1.4.2 discusses how parameters in the matching function aect interpre-
tations of fundamental surplus, using a variation of a canonical search model discussed
in Pissarides (1985) and re-examined by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017).
1.4.1 The Cyclicality of Tightness
This section describes the cyclicality of tightness over the business cycle. Figure 1.5 de-
picts tightness from December 2000, when the JOLTS program rst publishes data, to De-
cember 2019. Data from 2020 are signicantly aected by COVID-19 and therefore left for
future analysis. The average level of tightness over the period is .56, indicating that there
were, on average over the period, two people looking for work for every posted vacancy.
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Shaded regions in gure 1.5 indicate NBER recession dates.12 In recessions, tightness falls
because both labor demand falls, a drop in vt , and unemployment increases, an increase
in ut .
To assess how cyclical tightness is over the business cycle, I relate θt to measures of
business-cycle variability. Measures of the business cycle are indexed by j. I estimate
regressions of the form
logθ t = β0 + β j log (measure of the business cycle)jt + εt , (1.13)
where ˜logθ t is either the series log (θt ) itself or the cyclical component of log (θt ) ex-
tracted with a Hodrik–Prescott lter.13 The estimated βˆ j from (1.13) indicates how tight-
ness varies with the business cycle, providing an empirical counterpart of ηθ ,y in (1.1).
I consider three measures of the business cycle based on series for real GDP, industrial
production, and personal consumption expenditures. For each of these series I take their
log and then take their cyclical component using a Hodrik–Prescott lter and smoothing
parameter 129,600. Consumption and industrial production are both available from FRED
at a monthly frequency, whereas real GDP is available at a quarterly frequency. To gen-
erate a monthly series for the log of real GDP, I linearly interpolate the values. Real GDP
is an empirical counterpart to the elasticity statistic in (1.1) but not the only one.
I consider the series for industrial production, which is an index of real output pro-
duced by the manufacturing, mining, electric utilities, and gas utilities because it is avail-
able at a monthly frequency. I consider the series for personal consumption expenditures
because matching models often feature linear preferences with the implication that all
output is consumed. Figure 1.6 depicts the cyclical component of these series.
Figure 1.6 also depicts the cyclical component of tightness in panel A. Panel B depicts
the cyclical component of industrial production; panel C depicts the cyclical component
of real output; and panel D depicts the cyclical component of real personal consumption
expenditures. All series display common signicant procyclical patterns.
This common cyclicality is conrmed in the cyclical regressions. Table 1.6 reports the
cyclical coecients in (1.13). The rst group of models in columns (1)–(3) use log (θt ) as
the dependent variable in (1.13). The rst column says indicates that when output is 1
percent above trend, tightness increases 30 percent. This is an important statement of
why the elasticity in (1.1) is so important.
12See https://www.nber.org/cycles.html for NBER dates.
13I use a smoothing parameter of 129,600.
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Figure 1.5: Tightness, θ , 2000m12–2019m12.
−0.50
−0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Tightness
2000m12−2019m12
A
−0.10
−0.05
0.00
0.05
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
ProductionB
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
OutputC
−0.02
0.00
0.02
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
ConsumptionD
Figure 1.6: Measures of the business cycle, 2000m12–2019m12.
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Table 1.6: Cyclicality of tightness
Dependent variable:
log(tightness) cyclical log(tightness)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output 29.804??? 20.711???
(2.901) (.653)
Industrial production 8.525??? 6.580???
(1.040) (.269)
Consumption 23.299??? 17.247???
(2.543) (.595)
Observations 229 229 229 229 229 229
R2 .317 .228 .270 .816 .724 .787
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
1.4.2 A Model of the Elasticity of Tightness with Respect to Pro-
ductivity
1.4.2.1 Economic Environment
This section describes a canonical search model that undegirds the analysis in Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2017).14 I show how this framework provides the bound for the elasticity of
tightness with respect to productivity. An appendix provides further details and includes
conditions for existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. Existence and uniqueness is
not discussed in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017).
Time is discrete. But because I am interested in a stationary equilibrium, I make no
reference to time. A unit measure of identical, innitey-lived workers populates the econ-
omy. Workers are risk neutral with a discount factor of β = (1 + r )−1. A worker aims to
maximize the expected discounted sum of labor income plus leisure. Employed workers
earn labor income. Unemployed workers experience the value of leisure z > 0 and no
labor income.
The economy is also populated my a large measure of rms. Firms are either active or
inactive. Inactive rms become active by posting a vacancy. A matching friction, which
causes unemployment, prevents a rm from immediately hiring a worker searching for a
job. An active rm not in a productive match with a worker incurs a vacancy cost c each
period it recruits.
14Elsby, Michaels, and Ratner (2015) provide an exposition of a continuous-time version, which simplies
Pissarides (1985) by modeling all rm–worker pairs as having the same level of productivity.
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Once matched with a worker, a rm operates a production technology that converts
an indivisible unit of labor into y units of output. This production technology exhibits
constant returns to scale in labor. Each active rm matched with a worker employs a
single worker. While matched with a worker, a rm earns y − w , where w is the per-
period wage paid to the worker. Wages are set through Nash bargaining.
All matches are exogenously destroyed with per-period probability s . Free entry by
the large measure of rms implies that a rm’s expected discounted value of a posting a
vacancy equals zero.
A matching function M (u,v) determines the measure of successful matches in a pe-
riod, where u and v are aggregate measures of unemployed workers and vacancies. The
function M is increasing in both its arguments because more vacancies for a given level
of unemployment leads to more matches and more workers searching for jobs for a given
level of vacancies leads to more matches. Additionally, M exhibits constant returns to
scale in u and v .
Dene tightness, θ , as the ratio of vacancies to unemployed, v/u. The probability that
a rm lls a vacancy is given by q (θ ) = M (u,v) /v = m (θ−1, 1) . The probability that
an unemployed worker matches with a rm is given by θq (θ ) = M (u,v) /u = m (1, θ ).
Each unemployed worker faces the same likelihood of nding a job because rms lack a
recruiting technology that allows them to select a particular candidate for a job.
I letJ denote the present discounted value of an active rm in a productive match with
an employee and I let V denote the present discounted value of an active rm engaged in
recruiting a worker. The key Bellman equations for rms are
J = y −w + β [sV + (1 − s)J ] (1.14)
V = −c + β {q (θ )J + [1 − q (θ )]V} . (1.15)
Equation (1.14) species that the value of a productive match equals the value of output
less the wage, y − w , plus the discounted future value. The future value equals J with
probability 1 − s , for the case where the match does not end through separation; plus
V with probability s , for the case where the match ends in separation. Equation (1.15)
species that the value of recruiting equals the ow cost of posting a vacancy, c , plus
the discounted future value. The future value equals J with probability q (θ ), for the
case where the vacancy is lled; plus V with probability 1 − q (θ ), for the case where the
vacancy is unlled. Free entry means V = 0.
I let E denote the present discounted value of employment for a worker and I let U
denote the present discounted value of unemployment for a worker. The key Bellman
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equations for workers are
E = w + β [sU + (1 − s) E] (1.16)
U = z + β {θq (θ ) E + [1 − θq (θ )]U } . (1.17)
Equation (1.16) species that the value of employment equals the earned wage,w , plus the
discounted future value. The future value equals U with probability s , for the case where
employment ends in separate; plus E with probability 1−s , for the case where employment
does not end in separation. Equation (1.17) species that the value of unemployment
equals the value of non-employment, z, plus the discounted future value. The future value
equals E with probability θq (θ ), for the case where the worker nds a job; plus U with
probability 1 − θq (θ ), for the case where the worker does not nd a job.
The unknowns are (1) J , (2) E , (3) U , (4) V , (5) w , and (6) θ . Equations (1.14)–(1.17)
along with V = 0 and a Nash bargaining rule for wages allow me to solve for the un-
knowns. In appendix A.3, proposition 9 establishes the exitence and uniqueness of an
equilibrium provided that it is marginally protable to post an initial vacancy. This equi-
librium result allows me to consider the elasticity of tightness with respect to productivity
in the next section.
1.4.2.2 How Matching Technology Aects Interpretations of Tightness
Re-arranging the equilibrium expressions and a simple extension of the baseline model
discussed in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017) yields the following result:15
ηθ,y = ϒ
y
y − c <
1
ηM,u
y
y − c .
This expression says that in a matching model that features random search and exogenous
separations, the elasticity of tightness with respect to productivity is bounded by 1/ηM,u .
Under the Cobb–Douglas parameterization, this elasticity is constant withηM,u = 1−α .
Turning to column 3 in table 1.1, which allows for a shift in matching eciency after the
Great Recession, the bound is 1/(1 − αˆ) = 1/(1 − .700) = 3.333. Using the adjusted job-
nding series from table 1.2, the analogous result is 1/(1 − .536) = 2.155.
Under the nonlinear parameterization, the elasticity ηM,u is nonconstant. This may
well be a desirable feature because the percent increase in matches for a given percent
increase in unemployment may well depend on whether the economy is near full em-
ployment.
15These details are covered in the appendix.
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But the fact that the elasticity is nonconstant makes a direct comparison with α unfea-
sible. Instead, I report the inverse of elasticity evaluated at the average level of tightness,
.56, using γˆ = 1.064, which is reported in column 3 of table 1.3. Using these values, the
bound is 2.842. Using the analogous estimate based on the time-aggregation-corrected
series reported in table 1.4 implies that the bound is 2.2126. Using the nonlinear match-
ing technology that constrains matching eciency to be 1 and reported in last column of
table 1.4, however, implies that the bound rises to 4.003. This suggests there is some hope
in matching the elasticities reported in section 1.4.1.
My point is that the choice of matching technology may be important. And estimates
of the fundamental parameters associated with the choice need to be estimated carefully.
The second result of this section is that the choice of matching technology puts less pres-
sure on fundamental surplus to explain the cyclical variation of the labor market. How
the choice of matching technology aects all dynamics in nonlinear labor–macro models
is a question that I plan to explore in future research.
1.5 Conclusion
The choice of matching technology matters for matching models that aim to capture the
cyclical behavior of the labor market. Labor–macro modelers have overwhelmingly used
a Cobb–Douglas technology, sometimes calibrated to empirical estimates that use data
unadjusted for time aggregation. In this paper I 1) showed how adjusting the data for
time aggregation may signicantly aect estimates, 2) provided updated estimates of two
constant-returns-to-scale matching functions and 2) suggested how parameterizations af-
fect labor–macro modeling.
While the Cobb–Douglas choice is convenient—and ts the data well—it does raise
some thorny issues. Namely, the elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment is
constant over the business cycle and may easily imply that the probability a rm lls a va-
cancy is above 1. An alternative parameterization is available. This alternative, nonlinear
parameterization allows the elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment to vary
over the business cycle; additionally, this parametrization can constrain the probability a
worker nds a job within a given month and the probability a rm lls a vacancy within
a given month to stay within the unit interval. While the constrained parameterization
does not t the data on job nding equally well because it has one less parameter, the
constrained parameterization does increase the cyclicality of job nding. If the interest
in a labor–macro model that features employment and unemployment is matching the
cyclicality of unemployment, then the nonlinear parameterization is superior.
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CHAPTER 2
On the Tension between Maximum
Sustainable Yield and Maximum Economic
Yield
A typical shery management plan focuses on the cost–benet structure of a particular
shery to maximize prots but ignores linkages to the macroeconomy. This creates a ten-
sion between the objectives of a hypothetical sole owner and what is preferred economy-
wide. To gauge the benets of recognizing these ignored linkages, I compare harvest pat-
terns targeted by a sole owner to harvest patterns that maximize economy-wide surplus
in a two-sector, dynamic general-equilibrium model. I show that maximum economic
yield delivers prots to the shery, but maximum sustainable yield can deliver greater
economy-wide surplus when regulation constrains harvest capacity. In a calibration ex-
ercise that matches the 2015 Alaskan economy and increases eet harvest from MEY to
MSY, I nd that economy-wide employment increases by 1,300 jobs. These ndings might
explain why real-life sheries are often managed at MSY as opposed to MEY.
2.1 Introduction
Commercial shery management is characterized by the decisions of a hypothetical sole
owner. The sole owner’s goal is prot maximization. They maximize prots by accounting
for the externalities of harvesting sh, which include crowding, stock, and ecosystem
externalities (Ryan, Holland, and Herrera, 2014). These externalities arise because of the
common-property nature of shing. But the sole owner cannot control all economic and
technological features of shing. In most models of commercial shing the sole owner
focuses on the costs and benets of a particular harvest pattern for a particular shery.
Additionally, the sole owner views linkages between the shery and the macroeconomy
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as beyond their range of control.1 Ignoring macroeconomic linkages will potentially leave
economic benets unrealized. To gauge these potential benets, I present and calibrate an
operational general-equilibrium model of a two-sector economy where one of the sectors
is a commercial shery regulated by a sole owner.
To frame the issue in this paper, consider that the sole owner might want to account for
the entire value chain of shing. The value chain not only depends on the eet’s harvest,
but also includes the processing, distribution, and marketing of sh. By accounting for
more and more economic linkages, an argument can be made that the sole owner aects
economy-wide welfare. A potential tension, therefore, might exist between the harvest
pattern preferred economy-wide and the harvest pattern preferred by a sole owner con-
cerned only with a particular shery.
The existing literature is divided on the issue of expanding the scope of shing to
include more of the value chain. Christensen (2010) agrees with the above sentiment,
saying that “we are missing part of the picture when equating the sheries sector with
shing boats” (107), emphasizing all the links along the value chain that get sh “from
sea to plate” (107). Taking the value-chain perspective, Christensen (2010) nds that, us-
ing simulations, maximum economic yield (MEY) is close to maximum sustainable yield
(MSY). Sumaila and Hannesson (2010) respond to Christensen (2010) by replacing prots
with consumer surplus to represent the benets of shing. They show in a static model
that the marginal benets of catching a sh equal the marginal costs at a point where
MEY harvest is always less than MSY harvest. The benets accrue to the consumer, while
the costs reect the entire value chain. Sumaila and Hannesson (2010) take a traditional
perspective.2
These two papers, though meant to be at loggerheads, mostly agree with one another.
Both highlight the need to expand the role that commercial shing plays in an economy.
Doing so, the papers agree, might signicantly change the targeted stock levels for certain
sheries.
A further characterization of combined ecosystem and value-change management is
provided by Squires and Vestergaard (2016). They extend MEY beyond a particular harvest
for a particular species in a dynamic model, emphasizing the role of prices or shadow
price, if prices are not directly observable. Their work points toward microfounding the
1In fact, shery management plans typically ignore linkages between interdependent sheries, like be-
tween the lobster and herring sheries in the Gulf of Maine, where nearly 90 percent of lobster bait is
herring and roughly 60 percent of the herring catch is purchased by the lobster shery (Ryan, Holland, and
Herrera, 2010).
2Christensen (2010) and (Sumaila and Hannesson, 2010) provide synoptic perspectives and nicely sum-
marize the literature. Squires and Vestergaard (2016) provide another excellent overview.
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problem and making prices determined within the model economy.
These papers share a common approach to expanding the role of commercial shing:
prots are replaced with a benets function or consumer surplus represented by the area
under a demand curve. This theory has been nearly universally characterized in partial
equilibrium. It has not been fully characterized 1) when acknowledging linkages between
shers and the macroeconomy; and 2) when prices are determined in general equilibrium.
To accomplish these two tasks and to explore the gains of recognizing macroeconomic
linkages in shery management plans, I add a commercial shing sector to a dynamic
general-equilibrium economy that features unemployment. The commercial shing sec-
tor uses labor and a stock of sh as inputs to catch sh. The stock is regulated by a sole
owner that cannot control all margins of shing—essentially the commercial shing sec-
tor operates under a formulation of regulated open access (Homans and Wilen, 1997). The
second sector uses only labor as an input. These sectors are part of a value chain that pro-
duces a homogeneous nal good sold to consumers who purchase nal goods using labor
income.
The microfounded model allows me to compare the economy-wide surplus generated
by a prot-maximizing sole owner to the economy-wide surplus generated by a welfare-
maximizing social planner. Unlike the sole owner concerned with harvest patterns that
maximize shery prots, the social planner is concerned with harvest patterns that max-
imize economy-wide surplus, or welfare.
The model describes an equilibrium in which the social planner prefers a constant
escapement policy where harvest is maximized, a level associated with MSY, rather than
MEY, or the level of harvest associated with maximum shery prots—but only when the
sole owner regulates the shing capacity of vessels. When vessels are forced to operate
below full capacity, increasing harvest to the MSY level acts like a positive productivity
innovation. Fishers are allowed to catch more initially, which makes shing more prof-
itable. As vessels enter the shery, pushing out the supply of sh, the price of sh falls,
which raises the relative price of the good produced by the non-shery sector. Because it
is now more protable to operate in, the non-shery sector grows. Both sectors expand
and workers take advantage of these employment opportunities. When vessels operate
at full capacity, however, the social planner prefers managing the shery at MEY because
they cannot engineer a positive productivity innovation.
The equilibrium result described in the previous paragraph points out the harmony
between advocates of MSY and advocates of MEY: When the social planner can engineer a
positive innovation to productivity, there are gains to be had from managing the economy
at MSY as opposed to MEY. But when vessels operate at maximum capacity, that produc-
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tivity gain cannot be engineered and consequently MEY produces greater economy-wide
surplus. The model I present, in other words, provides grounds for Christensen (2010) and
Sumaila and Hannesson (2010) to be right.
While simple, the model I use lies at the center of many richer models. Its features
should facilitate normative analysis because the shery management plan implemented
in equilibrium turns out to be a target stock level. This aligns with typical management
plans implemented by the National Marine Fisheries Service and regional councils. On
the other hand, the analysis abstracts from transition dynamics and stochasticity, which
may be relevant for many shery managers.
Nevertheless, the model incorporates the ready employment opportunities available
to shers. Ready employment opportunities were identied in survey evidence (Wilen,
Chen, and Homans, 1991) and are apparent in labor-market data from the Current Popula-
tion Survey. These data are explored in the following section. Using data matched across
months, half the time a sher leaves unemployment, they transition to a non-shery job.
Importantly, the value of unemployment to a worker reects labor-market opportunities
in both sectors. Strong linkages between sectors mean there are potentially large gains to
acknowledging macroeconomic linkages in shery management plans.
And because most commercial sheries in the United States operate under signicant
regulation, the model predicts there are gains to managing a shery at MSY as opposed to
MEY. To explore this prediction, I calibrate the model to match the Alaskan economy in
2015. I consider expanding the total allowable catch by about 18 percent, consistent with
management of the groundsh complex in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands, which
operates at 85 percent of historical MSY estimates. Doing so reduces the unemployment
rate by 0.36 percentage points and increases economy-wide employment by 0.4 percent,
or roughly 1,300 jobs. The results suggest there are meaningful gains to expanding sh-
ers’ productivity in certain cases and explain why sheries are often managed at MSY as
opposed to MEY.
Much is at stake. Arnason, Kelleher, and Willmann (2009) give a headline number
of 50 billion dollars lost annually in global sheries due to “mismanagement” associated
with MSY as opposed to MEY. That number rises to 2 trillion over the past 3 decades.
But their work starts from the perspective of prot maximization within a representative
shery. The conclusions of this paper, based on a dynamic general-equilibrium approach,
suggest a dierent reading of their result. Evaluating shery management plans may
mean specifying more complete models of shing within the macroeconomy. Thinking
outside the current framework of optimal shery management serves as good preparation
for challenges going forward.
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2.2 Facts about the Labor Market of US Fishers
In this section, I look at employment in US commercial sheries, make comparisons to
broad employment categories, and explore the frequency with which unemployed shers
switch occupations when leaving unemployment. Doing so allows me to gauge what
labor-market options are available to shers. Declining opportunities to sh and readily
available employment opportunities demand that shers and shery managers consider
employment outside of commercial shing.
The data come from the Current Population Survey (CPS), which is the primary source
of labor-force statistics for the United States. The CPS is one of two major surveys pub-
lished by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics concerning labor-market conditions. The other
is the Current Employment Statistics survey, which collects data from roughly 160,000
business establishments. The establishment survey, however, varies in its coverage of
small rms. For example, in Rhode Island, a crew of less than 10 shers whose remuner-
ation is a share of the catch is not surveyed. Thus, I use the CPS to look at employment
in US commercial sheries.
Each month the CPS surveys roughly 60,000 households to determine who is em-
ployed, unemployed, and not in the labor force. The survey additionally collects infor-
mation about workers’ current occupations. And while the CPS has adopted dierent
occupational classication systems used by the US Census Bureau, a consistent occupa-
tional title denes shers.
Table 2.1 lists the dates associated with occupational classication systems and rel-
evant occupational titles. I use these titles to create a time series of employment in US
commercial sheries. The individual-level data can be used as a representative sample
of the civilian population of the United States by using cross-sectional weights provided
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Fortunately, the data are published beginning in 1976.
This oers a description of the shery since the passage of the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (FCMA).3
The CPS interviews an address for four consecutive months, leaves the address unsur-
veyed the following eight months, and then surveys the address for the next four months.
This panel aspect of the survey means people can be matched across months. Addition-
ally, the CPS asks unemployed respondents what their last occupation was. I use this
feature of the data to see what jobs unemployed shers take to gauge their occupation
mobility.
3Alaska and Hawaii were added to the CPS in January 1960, ensuring that the results are not driven by
expansion of the sample (Current Population Survey, 2006).
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I next describe employment in US commercials sheries before turning to the occupa-
tional mobility of shers.
2.2.1 Employment in US Commercial Fisheries
Two facts stand out in the employment series of shers. The rst is the boom–bust pattern
in the data, consistent with narratives about the passage of the FCMA. The second is the
declining employment opportunities in commercial sheries.
Figure 2.1 depicts the three-year moving average of the number of shers employed
in the US economy from 1976 through 2018. From the start of the sample, employment
increased steadily for roughly a decade. That increase coincides with the passage of the
FCMA of 1976, or the Magnuson–Stevens Act, which brought waters within 200 miles of
the shore under jurisdiction of the United States and intentions of modernizing the US
commercial shing eet (Apollonio and Dykstra, 2008; Weber, 2002; Acheson and Gard-
ner, 2011).
Prior to the FCMA of 1976, US shery management could be described as “nonmanage-
ment rather than mismanagement” (Magnuson, 1977, 428). Foreign eets dominated catch
o the coast of the United States during the 1960s, harvesting three times the amounts
taken by domestic eets (Anthony, 1993). And because the FCMA of 1976 meant exclud-
ing foreign eets, stakeholders felt that a “bonanza” awaited them (Anthony, 1990, 178).
Their optimism was buoyed by aberrant record landings (Schrank, 1995) and backed by a
favorable tax system (Weber, 2002; Apollonio and Dykstra, 2008; Dewar, 1983).
US sh stocks were overshed. After 1986, employment in US commercial sheries
declined steadily for the next quarter century. This coincides with the “bust” part of the
boom–bust narrative.
To gauge the decline in employment opportunities available in commercial sheries,
gure 2.2 shows indexed employment series. The indexed series give an indication of
broad trends. The solid black line shows the time series used in gure 2.1, but with 1976
employment indexed to 100. As a comparison, overall employment, similarly indexed
with a dotted red line, increased 87 percent from 1976 to 2018. Employment of shers, on
the other hand, decreased 5 percent. That gure would be worse except for the expanded
opportunities in commercial sheries after 2009.
The indexed series for manufacturing employment, depicted in gure 2.2 with a dashed
blue line, gives a sense of the decline. Manufacturing employment declined 28 percent
from its 1976 level, a decline that has been well documented.4
4For a recent discussion, see Charles, Hurst, and Schwartz (2018). The decline in manufacturing has
also attracted much recent popular attention. For example, in an article for the New York Times, Tavernise
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The next section uses individual-level longitudinal data to look at shers’ labor-market
options.
2.2.2 Occupational Mobility of Fishers
Ready labor-market alternatives are available to shers. This is best seen in matched
data: About half the time someone previously employed as a sher left unemployment,
they took a job outside of commercial shing. The occupational titles of these jobs were
varied. This fact is corroborated with survey data.
The matched data provide a sample of unemployment-to-employment (UE) transi-
tions. I take UE transitions where the unemployed person in the rst month of the match
reports that their job title was listed in the second column of table 2.1. The second month
of the match then provides data on what jobs were taken. The third column of table 2.1
lists the fraction of unemployed shers that remained shers upon transitioning to em-
ployment.
Over the dierent periods associated with classication schemes, unemployed shers
were consistently able to nd employment inside and outside of commercial shing. This
fact is seen in rows 1–5 of table 2.1. For example, from 1976 to 1982, the fraction of people
remaining shers coming from unemployment was 0.468. From 2011 to 2018 the fraction
changes very little and was 0.459. Over the entire 1976–2018 time frame, unemployed
shers found a job outside the shery roughly half the time. This statistic is listed in the
bottom row of table 2.1.
Occupations taken by unemployed shers are listed in table 2.2. Column 1 of table 2.2
reports the occupational title associated with the employment part of the UE transition.
The fraction listed in the second column is calculated by looking at all UE transitions
where the person found a job outside the shery; that is, conditional on taking a non-
shery job. The table lists the top-three occupations taken in each occupational coding
scheme.
Unemployed shers took a wide array of jobs when leaving the shery. While the
majority of transitions involved taking a job that requires manual labor, such as a janitor
or construction worker, this is a small fraction of transitions overall. The top occupations
in each coding scheme only make up between 6 and 20 percent of transitions.
These facts are consistent with survey evidence. Wilen, Chen, and Homans (1991)
conducted a survey of Pacic Coast shers, reporting that over half earned income from
outside the shery, exclusive of spousal and other family income. When faced with a
quotes an autoworker who lost their job as saying “it’s literally in your face — the decline of manufacturing”
(Tavernise, 2019).
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hypothetical 2-week closure of the shery, 30.6 percent of respondents said they would
switch to a non-shing job (as opposed to switching to a dierent shery or nonwork).
For a hypothetical 1-year closure, 46.4 percent would switch to a non-shing job. Of
those 46.4 percent leaving, 68.9 percent would expect to transition to a non-shery job
within a month and 82.2 percent would expect to transition to in a non-shery job within
two months. Respondents also felt they would earn only marginally less if hypothetically
forced to leave. For example, skipper/owners who reported mean shery earnings of
$33,225 believed they could either switch to another shery or take another job and earn
$30,000. “Answers to several of [their] questions suggest that [shers] perceive that they
have ready alternatives to shing, much as one would expect” (Wilen, Chen, and Homans,
1991, 30).
The responses of the Pacic Coast shers in Wilen, Chen, and Homans’s survey cor-
roborate the facts from the CPS. And herein lies the basis of the model economy explored
in the following section: The value of unemployment to a worker depends on future em-
ployment opportunities. From the perspective of a worker who was previously employed
as a sher, employment opportunities come from an array of occupations—not only op-
portunities in commercial sheries. These macroeconomic linkages mean decisions made
in either sector will spill over to the other. In the next section, I describe a model economy
where increased demand for non-shers raises wage rates paid by vessel owners. And ef-
fort controls set by a sole owner aect economy-wide employment dynamics. I illustrate
a potential tension between what is preferred by the sole owner and what is optimal from
an economy-wide perspective.
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 Economic Environment
The economic environment is a random search-and-matching model of the labor market.
The economy is populated by a unit measure of agents who make up the labor force.
Agents are either employed and unemployed. They seek to maximize utility by earning
labor income. Employed agents go to work at rms, while unemployed agents look for
work. Agents consume a nal consumption good whose price is normalized to 1. The nal
consumption good is produced in a competitive market using two intermediate goods.
Each intermediate good is produced by a particular type of rm. The rst type uses
only labor as an input in production. They make up the non-shery sector of the economy.
A second type is a vessel in the commercial shery. They harvest sh and use both labor
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and a stock of sh regulated by a sole owner as inputs.
The sole owner maximizes prots in the commercial-shery sector. They are granted
exclusive control over vessels’ harvest policies. But regulation set by the sole owner can-
not control all margins of harvesting sh, resembling Homans and Wilen’s (1997) formu-
lation of regulated open access (Smith, 2012). The unaccounted for margins, like wage
rates paid to shers, depend on economy-wide conditions. Thus the harvest patterns pre-
ferred by the sole owner in the decentralized economy dier from what is preferred from
an economy-wide perspective.
A fundamental part of the economic environment is the value of unemployment,
which, based on the previous section, should reect labor-market options in both sectors.
I use a search-and-matching model of the labor market because this framework clearly
denes the value of unemployment. By using the structure Acemoglu (2001) built within
this framework, I allow job creation to depend on the relative demands between the two
sectors.
In the remainder of this section I lay out the basic building blocks of the the model.
2.3.1.1 Preferences
Time is continuous and indexed by t . A continuum of innitely lived agents populate
the economy. At any point in time, agents consume and either go to work or look for
work. Agents consume a homogeneous nal good and value consumption according to
the period utility function u (c) = c . They are risk neutral and discount the future at rate
r . Each agent is endowed with an indivisible unit of labor, which is applied to either work
if employed or looking for work if unemployed.
2.3.1.2 The Value Chain
The value chain consists of rms that produce a nal good using the two intermediate
goods as inputs. These two intermediate goods are sh, denoted by Xχ , and the good
produced in the non-shery sector, denoted by Xφ . Final-good producers have access to a
Cobb–Douglas production technology that bundles Xχ and Xφ to produce the nal good
consumed by agents. Because both intermediate goods are perishable and the economy
does not have access to a technology that allows either good to be stored, each period nal-
good producers demand levels of sh and the non-shery good to maximize XαχX 1−αφ −
pχXχ − pφXφ .
Prices are pφ(t) = (1−α)Xχ (t)αXφ(t)−α and pχ (t) = αXχ (t)α−1Xφ(t)1−α . Going forward
the subscript φ denotes values outside the shery and the subscript χ denotes values
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associated with the shery.
2.3.1.3 Matching
At time t , there are 1 − u(t) employed agents and u(t) agents looking for work. These
statistics can be interpreted as rates because of the normalization.
The key friction that gives rise to unemployment is the inability of rms looking to
hire workers to instantaneously match with agents looking for work. This friction is
captured by a matching function dened over the unemployment rate and the vacancy
rate,m(u,v), where the vacancy rate is the ratio of open vacancies to the sum of open and
lled vacancies. More matches occur the higher the unemployment rate and when there
are more open vacancies, making m increasing in both its arguments. It is assumed that
m is homogeneous of degree one.
A vacancy is lled at rate q(θ ) := m(u,v)/v = m(θ−1, 1), where θ := v/u is the mea-
sure of tightness in the labor market and q(θ ) is a dierentiable, decreasing function. It
is harder for rms to ll vacancies when the number of vacancies increases relative to
the number of unemployed persons. An unemployed person becomes employed at rate
f (θ ) := m(u,v)/u = m(1, θ ) = θq(θ ), which is referred to as the job-nding rate and is
a dierentiable, increasing function. It is easier to nd a job when the number of vacan-
cies increases relative to the number people looking for work. Tightness summarizes the
condition of the labor market.
I assume q and f map the positive real numbers onto themselves, with limθ→0 q =
limθ→∞ f = ∞ and limθ→∞ q = limθ→0 f = 0. Therefore q are f are not truly prob-
abilities. Instead, if there are very few unemployed workers per vacancy, workers nd
jobs arbitrarily fast and rms nd it arbitrarily dicult to hire workers. And when there
are very many unemployed workers per vacancy, workers cannot nd jobs and rms ll
vacancies arbitrarily fast.
Within the owner–worker relationship, occasionally a disruption occurs, forcing work-
ers to separate from jobs. This disruption arrives via a Poisson process with arrival rate λ.
A disruption causes the rm to close and the worker becomes unemployed. Job separation
and job nding govern the evolution of unemployment:
Ûu(t) = λ(1 − u(t)) − f (θ (t))u(t). (2.1)
At any time t , 1−u(t) employed workers separate into unemployment at rate λ and agents
leave unemployment at rate f (θ (t)). In steady state there is equilibrium unemployment:
u = λ/[λ + f (θ )]. This relationship traces out the Beveridge curve in v–u space, a down-
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ward sloping relationship between vacancies and unemployment. When there are many
vacancies, rms are aggressively recruiting workers, which causes unemployment to fall.
At the other extreme, when rms nd recruiting too costly and do not post vacancies,
unemployment rises. Figure 2.3 depicts this relationship.
The Beveridge curve traces out the relationship between labor supply and aggregate
labor demand. Aggregate labor demand is the sum of vacancies across both sectors. Rel-
ative demand is denoted by ϕ(t), the share of vacancies in the shery. ϕ(t) links the two
sectors by determining the likelihood that unemployed persons become shers.
2.3.1.4 Decisions of Workers
Employment is a more productive option than unemployment and therefore agents main-
tain the match to their employer until they are forced to separate into unemployment.
Let Wφ(t) and Wχ (t) be the present discounted values of being employed outside the
shery and being employed as a sher. When employed, workers earn wages wi , i ∈
{φ, χ }. Let U (t) be the present discounted value of being unemployed. r is the required
rate of return on assets.
EachWi satises the Bellman equation:
rWi(t) = wi(t) + λ [U (t) −Wi(t)] + ÛWi(t) for i ∈ {φ, χ }. (2.2)
Having a job is an asset to the worker. The return on the assetWi , the interest rate times
the asset value, equals the current return (or dividends), wageswi , plus the expected cap-
ital gains or the value of switching states in the future weighted by the likelihood of
switching plus the change in Wi . The likelihood that a worker transitions from work to
unemployment is the job-separation rate, λ.
The focus is on steady-state equilibrium and the time-t steady-state version of equa-
tion (2.2) is simply rWi = wi + λ(U −Wi).
The value of unemployment to the worker hinges on their behavior towards work.
Based on the reported ability of shers to take jobs outside the shery, workers do not
actively seek employment in a particular sector; in other other words, there is no directed
search. Unemployed workers accept any available job oer that generates a productive
match. Although the assumption is stark, assuming people are only shers feels equally
unappealing and inconsistent with the evidence on the labor market of shers presented
in tables 2.1 and 2.2.
Let z denote the value of nonmarket activity, which includes unemployment benets
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and leisure. The value of unemployment is
rU = z + f (θ ) [ϕWχ + (1 − ϕ)Wφ −U ] . (2.3)
While unemployed, a worker receives the ow value of nonwork. They nd a job as a
sher with probability f (θ )ϕ and a job outside the shery with probability f (θ )(1 − ϕ).
Through unemployment, a worker transitions to either sector depending on the relative
demand for labor.
2.3.1.5 Decisions of Firm Owners Outside the Fishery
Firms post vacancies to recruit workers. Recruiting eorts continue until the expected
value of posting a vacancy is driven to zero. A lled vacancy is a protable match and the
rm maintains this relationship until a disruption occurs.
Let Jφ andVφ denote the present discounted values of a productive match and a posted
vacancy for rms outside the shery. Each rm employs a single worker who is paid a
wage wφ . The output of a worker in this sector is normalized to one, making the value of
output equal to pφ . The present discounted value of a working rm equals:
r Jφ = pφ −wφ + λ(Vφ − Jφ). (2.4)
The rm makes ow prots p−wφ and faces a hazard of having the employment relation-
ship end, which occurs at rate λ.
The present discounted value of a vacancy after the initial startup costs are incurred
is
rVφ = q(θ )(Jφ −Vφ). (2.5)
Free entry drives the expected net prots of posting a vacancy to zero, making the value
of a vacancy to a rm equal to the startup costs: Vφ = kφ . The startup costs can be
interpreted as purchasing a single unit of capital, which is combined through Leontief
production with the worker (Acemoglu, 2001).
2.3.1.6 Decisions of Firm Owners in the Fishery, Regulated by a Sole Owner
The sole owner regulates vessel-level harvest to maximize prots, taking eet size and
prices as given. Additionally, the sole owner does not interfere with wage rates negotiated
between vessel owners and shers. I focus on steady state to get around a richer model
with transition dynamics, which would quickly become intractable. Although the sole
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owner contemplates dynamics, they inherit a shery that they have optimally managed
up to that point in equilibrium.
In steady state, there are ϕ(1 − u) vessels, each operated by a single sher engaged in
harvesting sh. Each vessel has a capacity to harvest 0 ≤ h(τ ) ≤ h sh per period, where
h represents maximum capacity. Each sher earns wage rate wχ . And each vessel owner
in the shery faces the ow cost of capital equal to rk . Flow prots are pχϕ(1−u)h(τ ) less
the ow costs of wχϕ(1 − u) − ϕ(1 − u)rk .
Let s(τ ) denote the stock of sh and д(s(τ )) denote density-dependent stock growth,
which is concave in s(τ ). The stock of sh evolves according to growth less harvest.5
At any time t , the sole owner maximizes prots by regulating vessel-level harvest
along the optimal trajectory of the shery:
max
{h(τ )}
∫ ∞
t
e−r (τ−t)ϕ(1 − u) [pχh(τ ) −wχ − rk] dτ (2.6)
subject to ds/dτ = д(s(τ )) − ϕ(1 − u)h(τ ) and h(τ ) ∈ [0,h] with s(t) = s0 given.
Letting Λ(τ ) be the current-value costate variable associated with the stock of sh,
standard arguments in dynamic programming lead to the following characterization of
the problem. Linearity of the control implies a bang–bang solution. When pχ > Λ(τ ), the
price of sh is greater than the value of leaving the sh in the sea, directing the sole owner
to set h = h. Conversely, when pχ < Λ(τ ), the price of sh is less than the value of leaving
the sh in the sea, directing the sole owner to set harvest to zero. When pχ = Λ(τ ), the
sole owner is directed to harvest sh at the steady-state level: ϕ(1 − u)h = д(s?).
To maintain s?, recruitment is divided among the ϕ(1 − u) vessels. This pattern of
harvest is achievable, for example, with a tradable quota system: since the eet is homo-
geneous, all vessels will end up harvesting the same amount in equilibrium through cost
minimization. In summary, the sole owner moves the shery as rapidly as possible to s?
and then sets vessel-level harvest to hˆ = д(s?)/[ϕ(1 − u)] to maintain the targeted stock
level, assuming the eet is capable of harvesting д(s?).
The target stock level is determined by the necessary condition associated with s(τ )
in the optimal-control problem: д′(s(τ )) = r − dΛdτ /Λ(τ ). In steady state, where the shadow
value of sh is unchanging, the necessary condition becomes д′(s?) = r , which provides
an implicit characterization of the target stock level, s?. The sole owner regulates the
shery at the required rate of return of all other assets in the economy, a feature that
undergirds the discussion in Clark and Munro (2017).
5See Ryan, Holland, and Herrera (2014) for a discussion of the eects harvest can have on density-
dependent stock growth.
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Figure 2.4 illustrates the sole owner’s choice of regulation. To keep the shery at
s?, total allowable catch (TAC) is set to д(s?). The constant escapement policy preferred
by the sole owner is less than a constant escapement policy that maximizes catch. That
management plan would keep the shery at sMSY, allowing the shery to harvestд(sMSY) >
д(s?) (see gure 2.4).
In steady state, the sole owner inherits a shery they have previously managed up to
that point, which involves two scenarios. The rst is a shery at s? where the equilibrium
eet is capable of harvesting the TAC. The sole owner divides the TAC among the vessel
owners. The second is a eet in equilibrium that is incapable of harvesting the TAC (recall
that s? depends on r , the required rate of return on assets in the economy, and certain
parameter values can make shing very unprotable). In this scenario the sole owner
directs shers to harvest h and maintains a stock level above sMSY.
The equilibrium vessel-level harvest rule is therefore summarized as hˆ = min
{
h,
д(s?)
ϕ(1−u)
}
,
or
hˆ =

д(s?)
ϕ(1−u) if ϕ > ϕˇ(θ )
h if ϕ ≤ ϕˇ(θ ),
(2.7)
where ϕˇ = д(s?)/h/(1 − u) depends on density-dependent growth, vessels’ harvest ca-
pacity, and employment. The critical value is increasing in density-dependent growth
and decreasing in vessels’ harvest capacity and employment. Herein lies the notion of
regulated open access: the sole owner cannot control eet size, taking ϕ(1 − u) as given.
Crowding and stock externalities aect vessel-level harvest or “productivity.” Holding
θ constant, which xes employment, vessel-level productivity falls as ϕ increases. For
low enough ϕ the eet is incapable of harvesting д(s?), but eventually the eet is large
enough so that it can. Each vessel is allowed to harvest less as the number of shers
increases to maintain the constant escapement policy. Panel (a) of gure 2.5 depicts this
dynamic with the solid black line. For values of ϕ below ϕˇ• each vessel harvests h, but as
ϕ → 1 vessel-level productivity decreases.
Panel (b) of gure 2.5 depicts the eect of increasing employment while holding the
share of shers constant. When θ is near 0, the majority of the labor force is unemployed
and the small eet is directed to harvesth. As θ →∞, the eet expands through expanded
employment and vessel-level harvest must decrease to maintain a constant escapement
policy.
Finally, the equations that correspond to equations (2.4) and (2.5) in the shery are
r Jχ = pχhˆ −wχ + λ(Vχ − Jχ ) with hˆ given in equation (2.7) and rVχ = q(θ )(Jχ −Vχ ), where
expansion of recruiting eort drives Vχ to equal kχ as before.
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Lastly, I describe a behavioral rule for wage determination.
2.3.1.7 Wage Determination
In search models, where matching frictions give rise to ineciencies, there are rents to
split between rms and employees. But how these rents are split still lacks a unied
approach. Following the literature, workers and rm-owners split the surplus from a
productive match through Nash wage bargaining. While this may be controversial in
macroeconomics, each side taking a fraction of net prots holds precedence in commercial
shing, where it is convention for vessel owners to split net prots with crew under a lay
system.6
The Nash wage bargain formalizes how the surplus is split. Each person earns an
amount commensurate to the other based on the bargaining parameter, β , and their out-
side option—either unemployment or having a vacancy posted: (1−β)(Wi−U ) = β(Ji−Vi)
for i ∈ {φ, χ }, assuming that the bargaining parameter is equal throughout the economy.
Under Nash bargaining the surplus a worker gains from switching from unemployment
to work is proportional to the surplus a rm owner gains from switching from a vacancy
to a productive match.
Using expressions forWi, Ji, Vi , and the fact that recruiting eort expands until Vi =
ki , wages are
wφ = β(pφ − rkφ) + (1 − β)rU and wχ = β
(
pχhˆ − rkχ
)
+ (1 − β)rU . (2.8)
Workers earn a fraction of the net ow of prots—productivity minus the ow cost of
capital—plus a fraction of the ow value of their outside option, rU . Wages, in both sec-
tors, are increasing in own price and the value of unemployment.
2.3.2 Characterization of Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of prices; wages, determined by Nash bargaining; regulation set
by the sole owner; tightness in the labor market, which determines equilibrium unem-
ployment; the share of employment devoted to commercial shing; and market clearing.
I will look for equilibria where the cost of capital is the same in both sectors and it is
relatively more productive to sh from an unexploited stock than it is to produce in the
non-shery sector. Positing kχ = kφ = k maintains the startup costs are the same in both
sectors of the economy. Positing that shing is more productive than production in the
6Studies discussing lay systems include Sutinen (1979); Davis, Gallman, and Hutchins (1990); Hannesson
(2000); and McConnell and Price (2006)
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non-shery sector when the stock is near carrying capacity, h > 1, is based on reports of
early American colonists about the abundance of natural resources.
To nd an equilibrium, I combine the value functionsWχ ,Wφ , andU with expressions
for wages to write the equilibrium value of unemployment in terms of prices, θ , and ϕ.
I combine the equilibrium value of unemployment with the rms’ value functions Jχ , Jφ ,
Vχ , and Vφ to write two job-creation conditions in terms of prices, θ , and ϕ. To close the
model, I use market clearing to write prices in terms of θ and ϕ.
Prices depend on the relative levels of output produced in the two sectors. Output
depends on the level of employment and sectoral composition. The equilibrium level of
employment, in terms of θ , is determined by the Beveridge-curve relationship in (2.1):
1 − u = f (θ )/[λ + f (θ )]. There are 1 − u workers engaged in production, of which ϕ are
shers and 1 − ϕ are employed in the non-shery sector. Total non-shery production
is Yφ = (1 − ϕ)(1 − u). Total catch in the shery depends on ϕˇ(θ ). If the ϕ(1 − u) shers
maintain the stock level s?, then total catch in the shery is Yχ = д(s?). On the other
hand, if the eet size is relatively small, then total catch is Yχ = ϕ(1 − u)h.
Using the two market-clearing conditions, Yχ = Xχ and Yφ = Xφ , the price of sh in
terms of θ and ϕ is
pχ =

α
[ (1−ϕ)(1−u)
д(s?)
]1−α
if ϕ > ϕˇ(θ )
αh
α−1 ( 1−ϕ
ϕ
)1−α
if ϕ ≤ ϕˇ(θ ),
(2.9)
and the price of non-shery output in terms of θ and ϕ is
pφ =

(1 − α)
[
д(s?)
(1−ϕ)(1−u)
]α
if ϕ > ϕˇ(θ )
(1 − α)hα
(
ϕ
1−ϕ
)α
if ϕ ≤ ϕˇ(θ ).
(2.10)
Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium then depend on the properties of the two
job-creation conditions, written only in terms of θ and ϕ. The remainder of this section
explores the value of unemployment and properties of the two job-creation conditions.
2.3.2.1 The Value of Unemployment
Labor-market options in both sectors add value to unemployment. The value of unem-
ployment therefore reects crowding and stock externalities, depending on regulation set
by the sole owner. Regulation aects the value of unemployment in a nonstandard way.
When employment is low and there are few shers, vessels operate at maximum capacity
with h > 1. But as employment expands and the eet grows, vessels are forced to curtail
production to maintain the TAC. The value of unemployment rst increases along with
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a tighter labor market, but can then decrease as crowding and stock become increasingly
meaningful.
To see the eects of crowding and stock externalities, write the value of unemployment
in terms of θ and ϕ using equation (2.2) in equation (2.11) and the expressions for wages
in equation (2.8):
Γ(θ ,ϕ) := rU =
(r + λ)z + β f (θ )
[
ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk
]
r + λ + β f (θ ) , (2.11)
where prices are given in (2.9) and (2.10) and the equilibrium level of unemployment comes
from (2.1).
Unlike standard search-and-matching models, the value of unemployment cannot be
shown to be everywhere increasing in tightness. Typically this is true: a person can more
easily transition from unemployment to work the higher the job-nding rate, which itself
is increasing in tightness. The unemployment rate is lower and the worker expects to
spend, on average, less time in unemployment; the bargaining position of the worker
improves, thereby raising wages that a worker is more likely to earn.
For the same reasons, when crowding and stock externalities have no eect on the
value of average productivity the value of unemployment is increasing in tightness. When
ϕ < ϕˇ, shers operate at full capacity, harvesting h and adding an additional sher at
the margin does not aect vessel-level harvest. But when externalities are meaningful,
when ϕ > ϕˇ, the value of unemployment may decrease in tightness. While increasing
tightness makes it more likely for a worker to nd a job, the value of average productivity,
ϕ(pχhˆ−kχ )+ (1−ϕ)(pφ−kφ), might fall—people nd jobs more quickly but are more likely
to be less productive shers. As the number of shers increases, vessels are directed to
harvest less through the regulation set in (2.7) and depicted in gure 2.5. Vessel-level
harvest is falling in the level of employment, 1 − u.
The relationship between Γ and ϕ is similar: The value of unemployment is rst in-
creasing and then decreasing in the share of shers. When ϕ is small, productivity in the
shery is h > 1 and shifting work to this sector increases the value of unemployment;
but as ϕ increases and the eet is capable of harvesting д(s?), vessels are forced to harvest
less according to the regulation in (2.7) and depicted in gure 2.5. This causes the value
of unemployment to fall.
The results of this section are summarized in proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Because of crowding and stock externalities associated with harvesting sh,
the value of unemployment given in (2.11), for a given level of tightness, is rst increasing
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and then decreasing in the share of shers. Similarly, for a given share of shers, the value of
unemployment is rst increasing in tightness, but is then dragged down by the eect crowding
and stock externalities have on average productivity. The value of unemployment can even
decrease with tightness if the eect is strong enough.
Details of proposition 1 are provided in sections B.1.4 and B.1.5 of the appendix.
Because all workers have a chance of experiencing unemployment, proposition 1 es-
tablishes that crowding and stock externalities have economy-wide eects. Regulation
set by the sole owner aects everyone, foreshadowing the dierences in preferred har-
vest patterns between the sole owner and a social planner. But before these comparisons
can be made, I need to establish existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the de-
centralized economy, the subject of the following section.
2.3.2.2 Existence and Uniqueness of the Equilibrium
Job creation in the non-shery sector is determined by the value functions for rms. Com-
bining the value functionsVφ and Jφ with the expression for Nash-bargained wages in (2.8)
leads to the job-creation condition in the non-shery sector:
pφ − Γ(θ,ϕ) = rk + rk(r + λ)(1 − β)q(θ ) (2.12)
Combining the value functions Vχ and Jχ with the expression for Nash-bargained wages
in (2.8) leads to the job-creation condition in the shery:
pχhˆ − Γ(θ,ϕ) = rk + rk(r + λ)(1 − β)q(θ ) . (2.13)
A steady-state equilibrium is characterized by the intersection of the two job-creation
conditions given in equations (2.12) and (2.13). Investigating the properties of these two
loci leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2 A unique steady-state equilibrium, (ϕ?, θ?), always exists in the decentral-
ized economy with ϕ? = α ∈ (0, 1), where prices are given in equations (2.9) and (2.10),
wages are given in equation (2.8), and equilibrium unemployment is u? = λ/[λ + f (θ?)].
Some intuition for the result is provided in gure 2.6. The curve labeled φ depicts
θφ(ϕ) dened implicitly in equation (2.12) and the curve labeled χ depicts θχ (ϕ), dened
implicitly by equation (2.13).
When ϕ is near 0, few sh are caught and it is very protable to create jobs in the
shery since the price of sh is high. Firms respond by purchasing a vessel and expanding
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recruiting eort, causing a rise in θχ . As ϕ → 1, however, more sh are caught and the
low price of sh makes it unprotable to purchase a vessel and post a vacancy with the
hope of shing. By this logic, job creation in the shery, the χ locus, is downward sloping.
Conversely, the φ locus is upward sloping, reecting low prices when ϕ is near 0 and
high prices when ϕ is near 1. Low prices mean recruiting eort is low, pushing down θφ ;
when prices are high, recruiting eort expands, increasing θφ .
Because one curve slopes upward and the other downward, an equilibrium is guaran-
teed.
To establish the result more formally, combine the two job-creation conditions in equa-
tions (2.12) and (2.13). Because the right-hand sides are the same and Γ is common to both,
pφ = pχhˆ. Using this result, straightforward algebra establishes that ϕ? = α . The two job-
creation conditions reduce to a single equation in θ alone.
One can write this as T (θ?) = 0, where
T (θ ) := (pφ(θ ) − rk − z)(r + z)
r + λ + β f (θ ) −
rk(r + λ)
(1 − β)q(θ ) (2.14)
with pφ(θ ) given in (2.12), using ϕ = α . Using the fact that T is continuous in θ , an
application of the intermediate value theorem establishes existence of a θ? ∈ (0,∞) such
that T (θ?) = 0. Uniqueness follows from T being monotonically decreasing in θ . Section
B.1.9 in the appendix provides the details.
The next section explores how T varies with respect to biological parameters.
2.3.2.3 The Eect of Biological Parameters on Unemployment
So far no mention has been made of biological parameters other than using density-
dependent growth for the evolution of the stock. To explore the eects of biological pa-
rameters on macroeconomic variables, parameterize д by K , where д is increasing in K .
The parameter K can stand for any number of biological uctuations. Within the context
of logistic growth, for example, it could represent the growth rate of the stock or carrying
capacity. While all that matters is that д is increasing in K , to be concrete I consider an
increase in carrying capacity.
An increase in carrying capacity directly aects vessel-level harvest. Because ϕˇ is
increasing inK , more vessels can operate at full capacity. Moreover, vessel-level harvest is
weakly increasing inK , a result that comes directly from the harvest rule in (2.7). Consider
K• < K••. Panel A of gure 2.5 depicts vessel-level harvest holding θ xed and increasing
ϕ. Initially vessels are directed to harvesth, but as the eet expands, the sole owner directs
vessels to harvest less in order to maintain s?. Increasing carrying capacity to K•• shifts
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the entire prole of vessel-level harvest upward. The upward shift also happens when the
share of shers is held xed and θ shifts, which is shown in panel B of gure 2.5. The
horizontal line in gure 2.5 indicates that a larger carrying capacity expands the region
over which nominal productivity in the shery is above nominal productivity in the non-
shery sector.
Figure 2.5, though, is a description of partial equilibrium—it does not reect prices.
The macroeconomic eects of increased carrying capacity come through T . T depends
positively on pφ , which depends positively on д and therefore K . Thus T depends pos-
itively on K . Starting from T (θ? (K) ,K) = 0, for any θ? ∈ [0,∞), increasing carrying
capacity weakly increases T . Because T depends negatively on θ , θ?(K) must therefore
weakly increase to maintain T (θ? (K) ,K) = 0. The eect is weak because increasing car-
rying capacity when shers are directed to harvest h may have no eect on vessel-level
harvest.
The result is summarized in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Increasing carrying capacity has no eect on the equilibrium share of shers
and lowers equilibrium unemployment; that is, for K• < K••, θ?(K•) ≥ θ?(K••).
The eect of increasing carrying capacity from K• to K•• is depicted in gure 2.3 for
the case where the inequality in proposition 3 is sharp. The Beveridge curve relationship
that comes from (2.1) is independent of K . The eect of increasing K lowers the level
of unemployment and lifts the number of vacancies as the economy moves along the
Beveridge curve.
2.4 On the Optimal Composition of Jobs and Socially
Preferred Harvest Pattern
The previous section described a benchmark economy that featured commercial sh-
ing regulated by a sole owner and productive options outside shing. This section asks
whether there are potential economy-wide gains from implementing a dierent harvest
policy than the one set by the sole owner in (2.7).
I consider two versions of a hypothetical social planner who wants to maximize economy-
wide surplus. The rst starts from the decentralized equilibrium and contemplates real-
locating labor across the two sectors and implementing a dierent level of total allowable
catch by targeting a dierent steady-state level of stock. The second is an oracle social
planner with control of shery management and job creation in both sectors. The ora-
cle planner implements the full dynamic program by taking into account stock dynamics
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and frictions in the labor market. Along the trajectory of the economy the oracle plan-
ner chooses the share of shers in the economy, vessel-level harvest, and the vacancy–
unemployment ratio, which is isomorphic to choosing the level of vacancies as u is pre-
determined.
My main result is that economy-wide surplus can be increased by managing the sh-
ery at MSY as opposed to MEY. This result holds when shery management plans cannot
control job-creation policies. which seems to be case with the most real-world relevancy.
When shery management plans are designed in conjunction with job-creation policies
by the oracle planner, economy-wide surplus is maximized at MEY in the stationary equi-
librium.
2.4.1 Starting from the Decentralized Equilibrium
The convention in search-and-matching models is to discuss welfare in terms of labor-
market tightness. Since wages are determined after a match, the agreed-upon wages do
not internalize the eects of matches on workers and rms still searching (Pissarides,
2000, chapter 8). The economy will be suboptimal unless the Hosios (1990) condition is
satised, which allocates in a socially optimal way the surplus captured by rms, deter-
mining the protability of job creation and thus the socially optimal level of job creation.
This condition, however, is unlikely to hold in practice.7
Instead of focusing on a labor-market policy that aects wage setting over the business
cycle, there are two margins that a social planner might consider adjusting. The rst
margin is the composition of jobs (Acemoglu, 2001). In this scenario the social planner
adjusts ϕ, controlling the entry–exit margin of the shery subject to economy-wide job
creation and destruction to maximize surplus in equilibrium. The sole owner still regulates
the shery, but they inherit the number of shers from the social planner. The social
planner determines number of shers in a socially optimal way.
The second margin of adjustment worth considering is the choice of s? with economy-
wide welfare in mind instead of shery prots. The choice of s? determines the constant
escapement policy and therefore total harvest or productivity.
2.4.1.1 The Optimal Composition of Jobs
The social planner is interested in maximizing equilibrium surplus. Surplus equals the net
value of output plus the ow value of nonwork benets less the ow costs of job creation
in both sectors. Total output is produced by 1−u workers. There are (1−u)(1−ϕ)workers
7See Pissarides (2000, chapter 8) for further discussion.
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outside the shery, producing a good valued at pφ , where pφ is given in equation (2.10).
The (1−u)ϕ shers catch hˆ, determined by the sole owner, with valuepχ given in equation
(2.9). The ow cost of capital to all rms is rk . The ow value of nonwork experienced
by unemployed persons is z. There are v = θu rms engaged in job creation, making the
ow cost of job creation equal to θurk .
Surplus is S = (1−u)[ϕ(pχhˆ−rk)+(1−ϕ)(pφ−rk)]+zu−θurk . Can the social planner,
in terms of the composition of jobs, do better than the decentralized equilibrium? Notice
that
∂S
∂ϕ

dec. eqm.
=

f (θ )
λ+f (θ ) (pχh − pφ) = 0 if ϕ ≤ ϕˇ(θ )
− f (θ )λ+f (θ )pφ < 0 if ϕ > ϕˇ(θ )
. (2.15)
First consider the case where ϕ < ϕˇ(θ ). In the decentralized equilibrium the value of
catching an additional sh, pχh, equals the value of producing one more unit of the second
good, pφ . This fact can be seen in equations (2.12)) and (2.13. In equilibrium the right-hand
sides are equal and since Γ(θ ,ϕ) is common to both, pχh = pφ . Starting from a decentral-
ized equilibrium the social planner can do no better—the decentralized equilibrium directs
shers to operate at maximum capacity.
Now consider the case where ϕ > ϕˇ(θ ). In this case the decentralized economy still
balances the value of catching an additional sh with the value of producing one more unit
of the second good, but this is achieved by reducing the productivity of shers. When the
stock of sh is maintained at s? and vessel-level harvest is regulated to be д(s?)/[ϕ(1−u)],
the social planner can increase equilibrium surplus by reducing the number of shers. The
ineciency arises because once the eet is capable of catching enough sh to maintain
the target stock level, adding shers only reduces productivity—total catch is the same.
The value of the marginal product of these excess workers would be higher outside the
shery; in other words, there is high opportunity cost the sole owner is not considering.
2.4.1.2 The Optimal Target Stock Level
Turning to the target stock level, can the social planner do better than the decentralized
equilibrium by targeting a dierent stock level than the one chosen by the sole owner?
The question can be answered by checking whether surplus can be increased:
∂S
∂s

dec. eqm.
=

0 if ϕ ≤ ϕˇ(θ )
pχд
′(s?) > 0 if ϕ > ϕˇ(θ )
. (2.16)
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The latter term is positive because the resource is being exploited at rate r , makingд′(s?) >
0, depicted in gure 2.4.
When vessels are harvesting h there are too few shers to maintain the stock at s?.
It is just not protable enough for potential vessel owners to post vacancies and recruit
workers into the shery, despite the generous harvesting policy. Targeting a dierent
stock level would either have no eect or reduce potential prots in the shery. The
social planner, therefore, can do no better than the decentralized equilibrium.
But when the eet is capable of catching the desired harvest level there is room for
the social planner to intervene by pushing д′ to 0. From gure 2.4 it can be seen that
this is achieved by targeting sMSY. Total harvest increases from д(s?) to д(sMSY), which
allows each vessel to harvest more (the total number of vessels is xed in the thought
experiment). The economy-wide eect is like a positive productivity shock or an increase
in carrying capacity.
The following proposition summarizes these two ndings.
Proposition 4 Let ϕS(θ ) be the value of ϕ that the social planner would choose at labor
market tightness θ and let sS(θ ) be the stock level the social planner would choose. Comparing
these to ϕ?(θ ) and s?(θ ), the values in the decentralized equilibrium,
ϕS(θ ) = ϕ?(θ ) and sS(θ ) = s?(θ ) when hˆ = h
and
ϕS(θ ) < ϕ?(θ ) and sS(θ ) > s?(θ ) when hˆ = д(s?)/ϕ?(1 − u).
The algebra that establishes proposition 4 is contained in sections B.1.10 and B.1.11,
which are contained in an appendix.
Whenever the eet is capable of catching more than the desired stock level either re-
ducing the number of shers or increasing the target stock level will increase equilibrium
surplus. Even if the shery is over-capitalized, in other words, in this economy targeting
MSY will increase economy-wide welfare. Either management objective increases steady-
state surplus.
Sustainability is not at issue. First, as gure 2.4 illustrates, MSY is associated with a
larger stock level. In order to harvest more sh while maintaining a target stock-level,
more sh need to be in the sea to increase recruitment, which in turn requires larger
harvest levels to maintain the target stock-level. This feature of the model, though, is
mechanical and might depend crucially on density-dependent growth.
A second issue is that MSY requires more “eort” and if catch is stochastic, then by
chance greater levels of eort might push the stock too low. In unfettered sheries this
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might be a major concern, but as Homans and Wilen (1997) emphasize, most sheries
do not fall under this rubric. Which is the case here—holding the eet size constant,
increasing vessel-level harvest leads to higher steady-state surplus. Associated with MSY,
in other words, is not a larger eet with overshing proportional to eet size.
What is most important to the conclusions, though, is the classication of workers. In
concord with the facts presented in tables 2.1 and 2.2, workers are treated symmetrically,
making the goal of the social planner equilibrium surplus. Because of the ready labor-
market alternatives and the uidity with which these outside options are exercised, the
value of unemployment is the same for all workers, meaning Γ(θ ,ϕ) in equation (2.11) does
not vary by sector. From equations (2.12) and (2.13), it follows that pφ = pχhˆ and therefore
the sectoral wages are equal, a result that follows directly from (2.8). Everyone benets
from equilibrium surplus. On the other hand, if shers are only shers, then targeting
MSY may come at the cost of shers. From the worker perspective, this strategy lowers
the value of unemployment and thus aects wage bargaining. From the perspective of
vessel owners, targeting MSY lowers prots.
The gap between Christensen (2010) and Sumaila and Hannesson (2010) reects the
missing pieces between “benets” generally and what is meant by the shery sector, a
gap that orienting the model in general equilibrium is meant to ll in a small way.
2.4.2 The Oracle Planner
The oracle planner chooses the share of shers in the economy, a vessel-level harvest
policy, and the vacancy–unemployment ratio subject to labor-market frictions and the
evolution of the stock of sh. The oracle planner solves
max
{θ (t)},
{ϕ(t)}∈[0,1],
{h(t)}∈[0,h]
∞∫
0
e−rt
{(1 − u(t)) [ϕ(t)pχ (ϕ(t),h(t))h(t) + (1 − ϕ(t))pφ(ϕ(t),h(t)) − rk]
+zu(t) − θ (t)u(t)rk} dt,
subject to Ûu(t) = (1−u(t))λ− f (θ (t))u(t) and Ûs(t) = д(s(t))−ϕ(t)(1−u(t))h(t)withu(0) = u0
and s(0) = s0 given.
I set up the current-value Hamiltonian, using σ1(t) and σ2(t) as the Kuhn–Tucker mul-
tipliers for the constraints h(t) ≤ h and h(t) ≥ 0. In the stationary equilibrium of this
economy, I show that σ1 > 0, making it optimal for the oracle planner to set h = h. The
result is summarized in proposition 5.
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Proposition 5 In the stationary equilibrium of the economy regulated by the oracle social
planner, the oracle planner maintains the stock level implicitly dened by д′(s??) = r . If the
matching technology is such that f (0) = 0 and f is concave, any interior equilibrium with
ϕ?? ∈ (0, 1) requires a positive level of harvest and a positive level of vacancies. Moreover,
if the matching technology is Cobb–Douglas, there is a unique level of unemployment in the
stationary equilibrium and the oracle planner directs the eet to harvest at h.
Proposition 5 is established in section B.1.12 of an appendix.
Proposition 5 is one reason for the tension between advocates of MEY versus advocates
of MSY. The forward-looking oracle planner with total control of the economy chooses h
in the stationary equilibrium and manages the shery at a rate equal to the required rate
of return on all assets in the economy. In the decentralized equilibrium regulated by a
forward-looking sole owner without total control, however, managing the shery at MSY
can lead to greater economy-wide surplus.
2.5 Calibration
The previous section established that managing a shery at MSY as opposed to MEY, when
regulation prevents vessels from operating at maximum capacity, leads to economy-wide
gains. In this section, I evaluate the gains by calibrating the steady state of the model to
match the 2015 Alaskan labor market.
A meaningful laboratory for studying preferred harvest patterns can be found in Alaska.
Alaska’s sheries are, for the most part, regulated by the The North Pacic Fishery Man-
agement Council. The Council uses a patchwork of regulation to manage Alaska’s sh-
eries. The clearest statement of their regulation involves the Bering Sea and Aleutian
Islands Management Area, which species that the groundsh complex operates at 85
percent of the historical estimate of MSY.
I use this target-stock policy to compare steady states of the model economy. Specif-
ically, I match the average vacancy–unemployment ratio that prevailed in Alaska over
2015 to determine 0.85 × MSY and calculate the gains from increasing TAC to MSY. For
the calibration exercise, I posit that the Alaskan economy is capable of maintaining the
stock of sh at MSY.
2.5.1 Parameters
The time period is one month. I set the required rate of return on assets to match a 5
percent annual rate. The parameter α represents the share of consumers’ expenditure on
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sh.8 I take α to be a fundamental parameter and use US consumers’ 2015 expenditures on
shery products at food service establishments plus retail sales for home consumption.
This is divided by 2015 personal consumption expenditures on nondurable goods and
services to calculate the share of income spent on sh. This parameter reects the value
of chain of shing (but not perfectly).9
Turning to labor-market parameters, I used Shimer’s (2012) procedure to adjust transi-
tion rates for temporal aggregation. I used aggregate US data for the calculation. I set the
separation rate, λ, equal to the average UE transition rate in 2015. The ow benet of un-
employment comes from Hall (2005) and represents close to 40 percent of the equilibrium
wage. The cost of purchasing a unit of capital to begin production, k , is set equal to Hall’s
ow cost of posting a vacancy multiplied by the expected duration of posting, 1/q (θ?) .
The bargaining parameter, β , is set to 0.5 so that shers and vessel owners evenly split
the gains from their productive match.
The calibration strategy is to match the average vacancy–unemployment ratio for
Alaska. Data on Alaskan unemployment are available from the Local Area Unemployment
Statistics program. Data on Alaskan vacancies are available from the Conference Board.
Recent vacancy data most often come from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover
Survey, which are based on rms’ responses. But these data are not disaggregated to
the state level. The Conference Board’s vacancy data, while available at the state level,
are constructed from vacancies advertised online. Since I am unaware of any estimated
matching technology based exclusively on vacancies advertised online, I use the Confer-
ence Board’s data on vacancies to estimate a matching technology for the United States. I
parameterize the matching technology as Cobb–Douglas,m = ωvξu1−ξ . Based on this es-
timate, I take ξ = 0.858. I use ω in the matching function to match Alaska’s 2015 average
unemployment rate, which was 7.95 percent. Finally, I set the maximum harvest capacity,
h, to 1.1. The parameters are listed in table 2.3.
2.5.2 Implications of Managing the Fishery at MSY as Opposed to
MEY
The implications of managing the shery at MSY as opposed to MEY increase the TAC
by almost 18 percent. Doing so lowers the unemployment rate from 7.95 percent to 7.59
8The model economy is isomorphic to one where consumers have Cobb–Douglas utility with the coef-
cient on sh equal to α .
9Personal consumption expenditures on nondurable goods and services is listed in table 1.1.5, lines 5
and 6, in the National Income and Product Accounts.
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percent. Figure 2.6 shows the increase in equilibrium labor-market tightness, θ?.10
The equilibrium for the initial calibration of the model is depicted in gure 2.6 as
the intersection of the two job-creation curves depicted with solid black lines. The job-
creation curves are parameterizations of θχ (ϕ) and θφ (ϕ), implicitly given in equations
(2.12) and (2.13). As proved in proposition 2, the share of shers in the economy is α .
When TAC increases, both job-creation curves shift upwards. This shift is depicted in the
gure with broken red lines. The increase in TAC shifts the vessel-level harvest prole
rightward, as depicted in gure 2.6. Catch increases. When catch increases, the relative
price of the non-shery good increases. Firms nd it more protable to recruit workers in
the non-shery sector. The economy expands as the economy moves along the Beveridge
curve in gure 2.3. The increase in aggregate demand includes increased demand for sh
at the new equilibrium. The expansion is similar to the expansion associated with an
increase in carrying capacity described in proposition 3.
For the calibration, the increase in labor-market tightness depicted in gure 2.6 ex-
pands Alaskan employment by 1,300 jobs, or 0.4 percent, in both sectors of the economy.
Unemployment is lower and equilibrium economy-wide surplus increases by 0.13 percent.
Only 11 (1, 300 × ϕ?) of the jobs are created in Alaskan commercial sheries. The re-
mainder represent the part of the economy that gets sh from “sea to plate” (Christensen,
2010) and the associated macroeconomic linkages.
This general-equilibrium eect is unaccounted for by the sole owner but accounted for
by the social planner. The tighter labor market in equilibrium means wages are higher.
Higher wages increase demand for the homogeneous nal good. Faced with increased
demand, nal-good producers pay more for inputs, both sh and non-shery goods alike.
Overall surplus increases.
2.6 Conclusion
To gauge the benets of acknowledging linkages between commercial sheries and the
macroeconomy, I presented an operational model economy calibrated to match the 2015
Alaskan economy. The calibration exercise increased the TAC from MEY to MSY and
expanded Alaskan employment by 1,300 jobs, but only 11 of those were in commercial
sheries.
This result was guaranteed by propositions 2 and 4, which establish that the share
of shers in equilibrium is α and that equilibrium surplus increases when the shery is
10Figure 2.6 also shows the non-responsiveness of job creation in the non-shery sector for the small
equilibrium share of shers—the curve is essentially at in this region.
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managed at MSY and harvest policies constrain eort. On the other hand, if the calibration
exercise parameterized shers as shing near maximum capacity, there would be a much
smaller eect.
Proposition 5 establishes that a stationary social policy controlling the number of va-
cancies posted in the economy, the share of shers, and a vessel-level harvest policy would
have each vessel sh at full capacity and maintain the stock at MEY.
But that level of control is beyond the scope of most shery management plans. When
that is the case, according to proposition 4, there is scope for reallocating labor input away
from commercial sheries or managing the shery at MSY.
In this paper, I have tried to show how incorporating linkages between commercial
sheries and the larger economy can aect management plans and targeted stock levels.
If correct, the theory implies that, in addition to recognizing biological linkages between
sheries and ecosystems, there may be substantial benets to recognizing macroeconomic
linkages as well.
Table 2.1: Fraction remaining shers coming from unemployment
Occupational Fraction that
classication scheme Title remain shers
1976–1982 Fishermen and oystermen .468
1983–1991 Fishers .501
1992–2002 Fishers .532
2003–2010 Fishers and related shing workers .486
2011–2018 Fishers and related shing workers .459
1976–2018 .508
Sources: Data adapted from Flood et al. (2015); Drew, Flood, and Warren (2014).
Note: Occupational classication scheme refers to the occupational codes used in the
Current Population Survey. The fraction that remain shers is calculated by looking at
unemployment-to-employment transitions for unemployed shers.
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Table 2.2: Occupations taken by unemployed shers
Title Fraction
1976–1982
Janitors and sextons .079
Construction laborers .075
Garage laborers and car washers and greasers .058
1983–1991
Laborers, except construction .134
Carpenters .079
Farmers, except horticulture .064
1992–2002
Laborers, except construction .127
Construction laborers .113
Bus, truck mechanic .111
2003–2010
Oce clerks, general .078
Packers and packagers, hand .072
First-line supervisors/managers
of retail sales workers .068
2011–2018
Laborers and
freight, stock, and material movers .133
Retail salesperson .118
Packers and packagers, hand .066
Sources: Data adapted from Flood et al. (2015); Drew, Flood, and Warren
(2014).
Note: The fraction is calculated conditional on switching occupation.
Only the top three occupations are listed for each occupational classi-
cation scheme.
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Table 2.3: Calibration
Parameter Interpretation Value
ω Matching eciency .319
ξ Elasticity of job-nding with respect to θ .858
z Flow value of unemployment .4
kχ = kφ Cost of capital 2.983
λ Separation rate .022
r Interest rate .004 07
β Bargaining parameter .5
α Income share devoted to sh .0087
h Vessel-level harvesting capacity 1.1
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Figure 2.1: Employment of shers, three-year moving average, 1976–2018.
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Figure 2.2: Indexes of employment series, 1976–2018.
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Figure 2.3: Beveridge curve. Increasing stock growth from a low carrying capacity (K•)
to a high carrying capacity (K••) increases labor-market tightness thereby lowering the
unemployment rate.
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Figure 2.6: Numeric equilibrium, response of managing the shery at MSY as opposed
to MEY. The curve labeled χ depicts the job-creation curve in the shery. The curve
labeled φ depicts the job-creation curve in the non-shery sector. The black curves match
the Alaskan economy and the red curves depict the eect of managing the shery at
MSY as opposed to MEY. The equilibrium share of shers in both cases is α , measured in
percentage points.
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CHAPTER 3
Tracking Earnings Ability over the Business
Cycle: Implications for Wage Statistics
In data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, individual-level wages ex-
hibit substantially more procyclicality than the average wage. Theories of the labor mar-
ket disagree on which factors are responsible. I test one explanation: whether in periods
of low unemployment, which coincide with rising individual-level wages, employment
opportunities available to workers with low earnings ability countercyclically push the
average wage downward. Based on individuals’ detailed labor-market histories avail-
able in the NLSY79, I nd that earnings-ability composition explains about 20 percent
of the dierence in cyclicality between individual-level wages and the average wage. Us-
ing data from the NLSY79, Current Population Survey, and Current Employment Statis-
tics program, I nd that business-cycle patterns in workers’ experience have the largest
countercyclical eect on the average wage. Gender, race, educational attainment, union
membership, marital status, and industrial composition have little countercyclical eect.
Using a simple Mortensen–Pissarides search-and-matching environment, I show how a
model that dierentiates workers by ability and features idiosyncratic productivity uc-
tuations can explain the inuence earnings ability has on business-cycle variation in the
average wage.
3.1 Introduction
Many economists now accept that real wages are procyclical. Their acceptance is based on
empirical evidence provided by numerous studies that make use of individual-level data.
These studies nd that real wages are “substantially procyclical” (Elsby, Shin, and Solon,
2016, S250). Further, they nd that real wages are not only procyclical but more procycli-
cal than what is suggested by aggregate wage statistics, a fact attributed to movements of
workers into and out of employment over the business cycle.
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But the debate over real-wage cyclicality was not always so one-sided. Many convinc-
ing models favor real wages being countercyclical or acyclical (Abraham and Haltiwanger,
1995). On one side of the debate, Keynes (1936) expected real wages to exhibit counter-
cyclical patterns because nominal wages were expected to adjust more slowly than prices
(Pencavel, 2015). On another side, real wages might exhibit acyclical patterns if wages
reect long-term relationships with employers that insure their employees against bad
times. These models are supported empirically by patterns observed in aggregate-level
wage statistics, which are found to be mildly procyclical or acyclical (Stock and Watson,
1999).
So why are studies showing wage procyclicality using individual-level data so con-
vincing? Perhaps the best explanation is given by Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994). Ac-
cording to the narrative, all wages rise during expansions. But expansions provide job op-
portunities for previously unemployed low-skill, low-paid workers. Adding these workers
during expansions pushes the average wage downward, making the average wage appear
less cyclical than individual-level wages. The opposite happens during recessions when
the economy sheds low-skill, low-paid workers. Shedding these workers during reces-
sions pushes the average wage upward. In summary, Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) use
individual-level data to establish that real wages are substantially procyclical and they
provide an explanation for why the average appears less cyclical.
Solon, Barsky, and Parker’s preferred approach dealt with compositional bias in a
straightforward way. They constructed a longitudinal dataset of continually employed
wage earners to entirely account for movements of workers into and out of employment.
In doing so, compositional bias was eectively eliminated. This approach leaves open an
interesting question: Who are the people moving into and out of employment and biasing
aggregate wage statistics?
To answer this question, I propose a simple measure of a worker’s earnings ability
that is trackable over the business cycle. Earnings ability is a specic component of a
worker’s wage. It reects the dierence that persists through time in hourly wages paid
to two workers that is not attributable to the business cycle, educational attainment, union
aliation, industry, or experience. Earnings ability represents one measure of what Solon,
Barsky, and Parker refer to as skill. The purpose of tracking earnings ability over the
business cycle is to characterize the earnings ability of people moving into and out of
employment. Doing so provides a measure of how earnings-ability composition aects
aggregate wage statistics.
To uncover estimates of earnings ability, I use data from the National Longitudinal Sur-
vey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). NLSY79 respondents not only report their earnings and hours
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through time, but also answer questions about their employment histories. These data
allow me to uncover both earnings ability and the business-cycle component of wages.
Detailed employment histories provided by respondents allow me to track wage statistics
constructed from earnings ability over the business cycle.
Tracking workers through time also allows me to track the composition of unem-
ployed workers. The composition of unemployment matters for job creation (Mueller,
2017) and has implications for whether workhorse models of macroeconomics can match
business-cycle facts (Shimer, 2005).
I nd that earnings ability explains 19.6 percent of the dierence in cyclicality between
individual-level wages and the average wage. This nding is based on two constructed
wage statistics. The rst wage statistic reects wage cyclicality holding constant the com-
position of employment. I nd that a 1 percentage point increase in the economy-wide
unemployment rate above trend predicts an individual’s hourly wage falls 1.192 percent,
whereas the average wage falls 0.615 percent using data on compensation per hour in
the nonfarm business sector. The dierence in cyclicality between individual-level wages
and the average wage is therefore 0.577 percentage points. The second wage statistic re-
ects earning-ability composition holding constant wage cyclicality and the composition
of other worker characteristics. I nd that a 1 percentage point increase in the economy-
wide unemployment rate above trend predicts hourly wages countercyclicaly increase
0.113 percent. The countercyclical compositional eect of earnings ability explains 19.6
percent (100 × 0.113/0.577) of the gap between the cyclicality of individual-level wages
and the average wage.
To provide some context for this result, I present a model of the labor market that
features a trade-o between earnings ability and idiosyncratic productivity. Fluctuations
in idiosyncratic productivity may be meaningful based on the results from panel regres-
sions, which attribute only 50 percent of the variation in wages to characteristics of work-
ers, earnings ability, and the business-cycle. If the remaining component of a worker’s
wage reects—at least partially—their performance at work, then employment will reect
a trade-o between earnings ability and idiosyncratic productivity.
Low-ability workers require higher idiosyncratic productivity to remain in a produc-
tive match unlike matched high-ability workers who can tolerate lower idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity. But crucially, at the boundary between productive and nonproductive matches,
workers of all abilities generate zero surplus from a match. When aggregate economic
shocks shift this boundary, workers of all abilities are aected. Whether aggregate shocks
shift the ability composition of employment depends on where workers are distributed
along the boundary—in other words, an empirical question. This description of the econ-
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omy is shown within the context of a simple economic environment that features unem-
ployment because of a random-search friction. Nevertheless, the simple economic envi-
ronment shares many features of dynamic Mortensen—Pissarides economies.
To explain the remainder of the dierence between the cyclicality of individual-level
wages and the average wage, I investigate labor-force composition using data from the
Current Population Survey and Current Employment Statistics program. These datasets
suggest that gender, race, educational attainment, union membership, marital status, and
industrial composition exhibit little countercyclical inuence on the average wage. Ruling
these inuences out leaves the composition of workers’ experience as the main counter-
cyclical driver of the dierence between the cyclicality of individual-level wages and the
average wage.
The empirical work provides key elasticities that will be of interest to labor–macro
modelers that dierentiate workers by productivity. And the simple macroeconomic struc-
ture I use to explain the issues at stake contains many features of richer models, which
means the general lessons should form the basis for future work on earnings ability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes a frame-
work for understanding the issues at stake by comparing two models of the labor market.
The following section describes the NLSY79 data used to construct the wage statistics
based on earnings ability and time-varying characteristics of workers. These statistics
are compared to business-cycle patterns in labor-force composition observed in the Cur-
rent Population Survey and the Current Employment Statistics program in the following
section. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Two Models of the Labor Market
This section compares two models of the labor market to frame the issue in this paper. Sec-
tion 3.2.1 describes a model of the labor market where workers are essentially organized
by “skill” or ability. In this model, lower-ability workers below a cuto are unemployed
and higher-ability workers are employed. Workers transition between employment and
unemployment at the cuto, which produces stark predictions for labor-market compo-
sition over the business cycle.
In contrast, section 3.2.2 describes a model of the labor market that adds a trade-o
between ability and an idiosyncratic component that aects productivity. Lower-ability
workers require higher idiosyncratic productivity to maintain productive matches and
higher-ability workers require lower idiosyncratic productivity to maintain productive
matches. The boundary between employment and unemployment varies systematically
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with ability and is determined by productive relationships that produce zero surplus. Im-
portantly, this zero-surplus condition applies to workers of all abilities. And as the zero-
surplus condition shifts over the business cycle, workers of all abilities transition between
employment and unemployment. The main message is that the employment composition
of ability may shift little over the business cycle.
3.2.1 Organized by Earnings Ability
To understand what is meant by earnings ability, consider two workers who work in the
same industry at non-union-aliated jobs. Both have earned the same academic degrees
and have worked the same number of years in addition to having worked at their current
job the same amount of time. Comparing their hourly wages, the dierence could be at-
tributed to dierences in common, macroeconomic conditions or temporary, idiosyncratic
factors such as health shocks. But if the dierence in their wages is not due to macroe-
conomic conditions and persists through time, then the dierence reects a permanent
factor that I refer to as earnings ability.1
Now imagine organizing the labor force into a single line ordered by earnings ability.
At one end are workers with low earnings ability and at the other end are workers with
high earnings ability. If some workers are repeatedly paid less, despite having the same
experience and academic degree, then it is reasonable to expect that in periods of high
unemployment the lower-paid, lower-skill workers exit employment. In other words, who
is unemployed and employed depends on earnings ability and a cuto determined by
the business cycle. Lower-ability workers who are below the cuto are unemployed and
higher-ability workers who are above the cuto are employed. Panel A of gure 3.1 depicts
this model of the labor market for a baseline unemployment rate.
In the model depicted in gure 3.1, wages have two components. The rst component
reects earnings ability. A worker with higher earnings ability earns a higher wage than
a worker with lower earnings ability. The second component reects the business cycle.
Wages of all workers are positively correlated with the business cycle.
As the economy expands in panel B all wages rise according to the business-cycle com-
ponent. But the expansion provides job opportunities to previously unemployed, lower-
ability workers. As a consequence, the average earnings ability of employed workers falls
because of the workers who compose the average. This fall can be seen by comparing
1To be clear, earnings ability includes, among other factors, an individual’s race and gender. In section
3.4.3 I show that the composition of employment and unemployment varies little over the business cycle in
terms of race and gender. In other words, the reason wages are cyclical is that within a gender category,
wages are cyclical. This fact is consistent with the idea that what drives wage cyclicality is a component of
earnings ability that is unobservable to the researcher and reects an individual’s innate productivity.
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Low earnings ability High earnings ability
Business-cycle cutoff
A: Baseline unemployment rate.
Unemployed Employed
Low earnings ability High earnings ability
Business-cycle cutoff
B: Low unemployment rate.
Figure 3.1: Workers organized by earnings ability to illustrate how the average wage
can appear less cyclical than individual-level wages. A business cycle determines unem-
ployment rates. The magenta squares indicate average earnings ability among employed
workers.
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the magenta squares, which indicate average earnings ability. If the magnitude of the
business-cycle component outweighs the compositional eect, then the average wage in-
creases.
The framework is useful because it explains how the ability of workers added to em-
ployment over the business cycle cause the average wage to be less cyclical than individual-
wages. The framework also establishes how longitudinal data can be used to separate
earnings ability from common macroeconomic conditions that aect wages, while taking
into account other factors, like on-the-job tenure, in a statistical model of wages.
A statistical model for the real wage paid in period t to person i , wi,t , is
logwi,t = αi + X ′i,tβ +ψt + νi,t , (3.1)
where {αi} are person eects that capture workers’ time-invariant earnings ability; Xi,t is
a vector of time-varying controls that includes years of experience, union aliation, in-
dustry eects, and educational eects for earned academic degrees; {ψt } are period eects
that capture macroeconomic conditions common to all workers; and νi,t is an unobserved,
time-varying error that captures shocks to human capital, person-specic job matches,
and other factors.
Including {αi} in (3.1) is key because the earnings-ability terms capture the composi-
tional eects depicted in gure 3.1 and highlighted by Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994).
To see this, note that the collection
{
ψˆt
}
is used to summarize composition-adjusted wage
cyclicality. These terms trace out the estimated conditional expectation through time con-
trolling for earnings ability and time-varying characteristics of workers.
If person eects are not included in (3.1), then an estimate of wage cyclicality will
be biased by earnings-ability composition. According to the narrative, a boom in period
t ′ provides jobs for low-ability workers. Low-ability worker i• enters into the sample
with a low νi•t ′ without αi included in the statistical model. Because the period eects
are constructed to make residuals have zero mean, ψˆt ′ will be pulled down because of
composition. Without person xed eects, real wages appear less cyclical because of
compositional bias. This narrative is consistent with the discrepancy between cyclical
measures based on aggregate versus individual-level data and the model of employment
depicted in gure 3.1.
The organized-by-ability model, however, is missing a major component of wages that
features meaningfully in the statistical model for wages in (3.1). In NLSY79 data, the R2s
from the estimated statistical models attribute around 40 percent of the variation in wages
to ν . Adding this component to the model lets wages reect earnings ability, the business
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cycle, and idiosyncratic productivity uctuations. The next section considers this feature
in the context of a random-search environment.
3.2.2 A Model of Earnings Ability and Idiosyncratic Productivity
This section describes a model where workers of all abilities transition between employ-
ment and unemployment over the business cycle. I consider a simple economic environ-
ment to be precise about broadly intuitive ideas.
3.2.2.1 Description of the Economic Environment
The environment consists of a single period and is a modied version of a conventional
Mortensen–Pissarides search-and-matching economy. The basic features of the environ-
ment include a search friction, which prevents rms from instantly hiring workers and
leads to unemployment; a homogeneous consumption good; risk-neutral agents and rms;
and Nash wage bargaining. Aggregate productivity drives uctuations in output. I add
two features: 1) workers are dierentiated by ability to produce the homogeneous con-
sumption good and 2) production is inuenced by idiosyncratic uctuations. I show how
these added features together determine the composition of ability over the business cycle.
The time horizon of the economy is a single period. The beginning of the period is
indexed by 0 and the end of the period is indexed by 1. The economy is populated by a
unit measure of risk-neutral workers and a large measure of risk-neutral rms.
Workers are indexed by their ability, which is denoted by a, and are either employed
or unemployed. Unemployed workers search for work. Let u0 (a) ∈ (0, 1) denote the
exogenous stock of workers of ability a who begin the period unemployed The total stock
of workers looking for jobs is u0 =
∫ a
a
u0(a) da, where a and a dene the support of types.
Employed workers earn wages, which are paid in units of the homogeneous consump-
tion good. Risk-neutral workers consume their wages if employed or the level of home
production if unemployed. The home production technology is allowed to depend on
ability.
The large measure of rms is divided between active and inactive rms. Inactive rms
become active by posting a vacancy and matching with a worker. Once matched with a
worker, a rm operates a production technology that turns a worker’s indivisible unit of
labor into zaε units of output. The rst component of productivity, z, is common to all
rms and represents aggregate productivity. The second component of productivity, a, is
the worker’s ability. The third component of productivity, ε , is specic to a rm–worker
pair and represents idiosyncratic productivity.
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A matching technology summarizes the complicated process that brings together rms
looking to ll vacancies and workers searching for jobs. Givenv posted vacancies,m (u0,v)
matches take place within the period. I assume that m is increasing and dierentiable in
both its arguments; moreover, I assume that m exhibits constant returns to scale. Let
θ := v/u0 denote the “tightness” of the labor market. The probability an unemployed
worker nds a job is f (θ ) := m(u0,v)/u0 = m(1, θ ) and the probability a vacancy is lled
is q(θ ) :=m(u0,v)/v =m(θ−1, 1). Because nding a job is easier the more vacancies there
are relative to the level of unemployment, f is increasing in tightness; likewise, because
it is harder for a rm to ll a vacancy the more vacancies there are relative to the level of
unemployment, q is decreasing in tightness.
Because rms cannot instantly match with workers looking for work, unemployment
persists in the economy. The matching process is random.
Jobs end for two reasons. Some jobs end because of an exogenous disruption. Other
jobs end because matched rms and workers bilaterally agree that there are better op-
tions than maintaining the match. The decision to end the match depends on aggregate
productivity, the worker’s ability, and idiosyncratic uctuations that aect production.
Workers and rms know the level of aggregate productivity in the economy and learn
about idiosyncratic productivity uctuations according to the following timeline:
1. The economy starts with u0 unemployed and n0 = 1 − u0 employed workers.
2. Firms post vacancies to recruit workers.
3. Unemployed workers match with rms that had posted a vacancy. Newly matched
workers and the n0 employed workers travel to work.
4. Worker–rm matches end exogenously with likelihood sx , with sx ∈ (0, 1).
5. At this point, a rm knows the ability of the worker they are matched with. Id-
iosyncratic productivity is then observed, determining potential output. Reserva-
tion productivity is determined and endogenous separations occur.
6. The remaining workers engage in production.
3.2.2.2 Region of Production
I solve the model by analyzing a collection of functions.
On the worker side of the economy, I denote the value of unemployment as U and
the value of employment asW . The value of employment to a worker of ability a having
drawn idiosyncratic productivity ε is the earned wage, w (a, ε): W (a, ε) = w(a, ε). The
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value of unemployment for a worker of ability a is the level of home production, denoted
by b (a): U (a) = b (a). The level of home production, which includes unemployment
benets, is in units of the homogeneous consumption good and is allowed to depend on
ability, with b′ (a) > 0 for reasons discussed below.
On the rm side of the economy, I denote the value of a lled vacancy by J and the
value of a posted vacancy byV . Firms are either active or inactive. Inactive rms expand
recruiting eort until the expected benets of posting a vacancy are driven to zero: V = 0.
The value of an active rm matched with a worker of ability a engaged in production
with idiosyncratic productivity draw ε is the value of production less the wage paid to the
worker: J (a, ε) = zaε −w (a, ε).
Given the value of a lled vacancy, the value of a posted vacancy, the value of being
employed, and the value of being unemployed it is straightforward to determine the sur-
plus generated from a match, S . The surplus generated from a match between a worker
with ability a having idiosyncratic productivity ε and a rm is the sum of the surplus
contributed by the rm, J −V , plus the surplus contributed by the worker,W −U :
S(a, ε) = [J (a, ε) −V ]︸         ︷︷         ︸
Firm contribution
+ [W (a, ε) −U (a)]︸              ︷︷              ︸
Worker contribution
= zaε − b(a). (3.2)
For a given level of ability, S is increasing in ε . The unique reservation idiosyncratic
productivity level below which the rm and worker no longer nd it protable to maintain
the match is determined implicitly by S = 0, or εˆ(a) = b(a)/(za).
Reservation idiosyncratic productivity determines employment and the region of pro-
duction. For ability level a•, all workers who travel to work and receive an idiosyncratic
productivity draw of at least εˆ (a•) engage in production. A trade-o exists between a and
ε , where low- and high-ability workers require dierent levels of idiosyncratic produc-
tivity to remain employed. Low-ability workers require higher idiosyncratic productivity
draws and high-ability workers require lower idiosyncratic productivity draws. This stip-
ulation amounts to low-ability workers experiencing higher unemployment rates on av-
erage and high-ability workers experiencing lower unemployment rates on average. For
production to be characterized according to this trade-o, it must be that ∂εˆ/∂a < 0. This
condition requires that b′(a)a/b(a) < 1, which says that the elasticity of the ow value of
nonwork with respect to ability is less than one. (More will be said about this dependence
below.)
Figure 3.2 depicts the region of production and the trade-o between ability and id-
iosyncratic productivity. For a given aggregate state of the economy, a worker of ability
a• ∈ [a,a] who travels to work engages in production as long as they receive an idiosyn-
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cratic productivity draw of at leastb(a•)/(za•). The region of production is therefore given
by {(a, ε) : S (a, ε) ≥ 0} = {(a, ε) : a ≤ a ≤ a,b(a)/(za) ≤ ε ≤ ε}.
a
ε
εˆ =
b¹aº
za
Region of production = f¹a; εº : S ¹a; εº ≥ 0g
Figure 3.2: Region of production. Workers who travel to work and do not separate from
employment for an exogenous reason or due to a low idiosyncratic productivity draw
engage in production. Productive workers are characterized by ordered pairs (a, ε) that
generate non-negative surplus. These productive pairs are colored green.
Characterizing the region of production depends on whether surplus is generated from
a match, not on how a rm and worker split the surplus. Any surplus is split through wage
payments made by rms to workers. I follow convention by having wages determined
through Nash wage bargaining. Doing so provides a characterization of the productive
region in terms of reservation wages.
Let η be the relative bargaining strength of a worker and let 1 − η be the relative bar-
gaining strength of a rm. Consider a match between a worker of ability a who has drawn
idiosyncratic productivity ε and a rm. The outcome of Nash bargaining requires that
w(a, ε) be chosen so that (1 − η) [W (a, ε) −U (a)] = η [J (a, ε) −V ]. This requirement sets
the worker’s gain,W (a, ε) −U (a), proportional to the rm’s gain, J (a, ε) −V . Developing
the outcome of Nash bargaining leads to an expression for wages:
w(a, ε) = ηzaε + (1 − η)b(a). (3.3)
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The worker gets their η-share of production plus 1−η of their outside option. A worker’s
outside option is their value of unemployment, which equals b (a).
At the reservation idiosyncratic productivity level, using the expression for wages in
(3.3), a worker of ability a earnswr (a, εˆ(a)) = b (a). At the reservation wage the worker is
indierent between work and nonwork and the rm is indierent between maintaining
the match and foregoing the opportunity of posting a vacancy, which has a value of zero.
The reservation wage is increasing in a because b′ (a) > 0.
This result is summarized in proposition 6:
Proposition 6 For a worker of ability a, the reservation wage, wr (a), is the wage paid
when S = 0 and equals w (a, εˆ (a)) = b (a), the worker’s outside option. Reservation wages
are increasing in ability: ∂wr (a) /∂a > 0.
3.2.2.3 Equilibrium
This section establishes the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium and investigates
how ability aects labor-market outcomes.
It will be convenient to change the order of integration. Dene ζ (a) := a/b(a). Under
the elasticity assumption, b′(a)a/b(a) < 1, ζ is strictly increasing and therefore its inverse
exists. Changing the order of integration, the productive region is given by ε ≤ ε ≤ ε and
ζ −1(1/(zε)) =: χ (1/(zε)) ≤ a ≤ a. Because ζ is strictly increasing, so is χ . And therefore
both ∂χ/∂z and ∂χ/∂ε are negative, which says that cuto ability is decreasing in both
the aggregate productivity level and the level of idiosyncratic productivity.
Inactive rms become active by paying a cost c > 0 to post a vacancy. Any inactive
rm can choose to post a vacancy, which drives the value of posting a vacancy to zero. As
rms expand recruiting eort the likelihood of lling a vacancy falls, causing the value of
posting to fall as well. This free-entry margin guarantees an interior equilibrium.
In addition to the number of other vacancies posted in the economy, the value of
a posted vacancy depends on the composition of the unemployment pool. Firms post
vacancies prior to knowing who they will match with and what the match’s idiosyncratic
productivity will be.
LetH (a) denote the cumulative distribution function that describes the ability compo-
sition of agents in the unemployment pool and let h (a) denote the associated probability
density function, where h (a) = u (a) /u0. Idiosyncratic productivity is drawn from a dis-
tributionG with associated probability density function д. The value of posting a vacancy
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is
V = −c + [1 − q(θ ) + q(θ )sx ] × 0 + q(θ ) (1 − sx )
ε∫
ε
χ (1/(zε ′))∫
a
0 × h(a′)h(ε′) da′dε′
+ q(θ ) (1 − sx )
ε∫
ε
a∫
χ (1/(zε ′))
J (a′, ε′)h(a′)д(ε′) da′dε′.
(3.4)
The vacancy costs c to post. With probability the 1−q(θ ) the vacancy is unlled, yielding
zero payo for the posted vacancy. With probability q(θ )sx the vacancy is lled and the
worker travels to work, but the match terminates due to an exogenous separation, yielding
zero payo for the posted vacancy. With probability q(θ ) (1 − sx ) the vacancy is lled,
the worker travels to work, and the match does not end exogenously. The rm–worker
pair then learn their level of idiosyncratic productivity. For a given level of idiosyncratic
productivity ε′, a worker must be of ability χ (1/(zε′)) in order for surplus to be non-
negative. An idiosyncratic productivity draw less than ε′ yields zero payo for the posted
vacancy. An idiosyncratic productivity draw greater than ε′ yields the value of a lled
vacancy. Only if the (a, ε) pair falls within the shaded region in gure 3.2 does the vacancy
yield J (a, ε).
The willingness of rms to post vacancies depends on the ability composition in the
unemployment pool. The likelihood of encountering higher-ability workers shows up in
h. And because there are no complementarities among workers engaged in production,
the willingness of rms to post vacancies does not depend on the ability composition of
the employment pool.
An equilibrium in the economy consists of a list, 〈θ?, εˆ(a),n〉, such that vacancy post-
ing is optimal, making V equal zero in (3.4), and wages are set through Nash bargaining.
The rst element of the list is a unique level of labor-market tightness, θ?, which deter-
mines v? and therefore the number of matches. The second element is a function that
describes the reservation level of productivity to generate a positive surplus, which deter-
mines the matches that survive and therefore the level of employment. The third element
is a function n :
[
a,a
] → [0, 1], with n (a) denoting the stock of employed workers of
ability a.
To characterize the economy, I parameterize the job-lling rate as q(θ ) = 1/(1 + θ )
before relaxing the parameterization below. Parameterizing q this way guarantees that q
and f are constrained within zero and one (den Haan, Ramey, and Watson, 2000). Using
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the free-entry condition in (3.4), the equilibrium level of tightness is given by
θ? =
(1 − sx )(1 − η)
c
ε∫
ε
a∫
χ (1/(zε ′))
[za′ε′ − b(a)]h(a′)д(ε′) da′dε′ − 1. (3.5)
The cuto rule for idiosyncratic productivity comes from S(a, εˆ(a)) = 0, which uniquely
determines εˆ = b (a) /(za).
Equation (3.5) makes clear that in order for vacancy creation to be optimal, a rm’s
properly discounted share of the expected surplus must be greater than the cost of posting
a vacancy. From (3.2), recall that the surplus generated from a worker with ability a
and idiosyncratic productivity draw ε is zaε − b(a). The rm’s share of the surplus is
1 − η, but this amount must be further discounted by the likelihood that the match ends
exogenously. Therefore (1 − sx )(1 − η) times the expected surplus must be larger than c
for θ? > 0.2 This characterizes optimal vacancy posting.
The expression for the equilibrium level of labor-market tightness in (3.5) shows that
labor-market tightness is decreasing in the exogenous separation rate, the relative bar-
gaining strength of workers, and the cost of posting a vacancy. These parameters all
make posting a vacancy less attractive to a rm. Increasing aggregate productivity in-
creases labor-market tightness: ∂θ?/∂z. The result follows from the fact that zaε − b(a)
evaluated at a = χ (1/(zε)) is zero, making part of Leibniz’s rule zero. All workers added
at the employment margin, in other words, generate zero surplus.
How labor-market tightness responds to parameters does not depend on the param-
eterization of the job-lling rate. For q strictly decreasing in labor-market tightness, the
equilibrium level of tightness is given by
θ?q = q
−1
c

ε∫
ε
a∫
χ (1/(zε ′))
(1 − sx ) (1 − η) [za′ε′ − b(a)]h(a′)д(ε′) da′dε′

−1 .
Straightforward calculations establish the comparative statics in proposition 7 hold. In
general the subsequent analysis holds for a general matching technology; however, the
algebra is signicantly less transparent and is therefore avoided.
To determine n, it is useful to derive the transition probabilities for workers of ability
a. The economy starts with n0 (a) ∈ (0, 1) employed workers. After posting vacancies,
2Otherwise, θ? = 0. The expression for the equilibrium level of tightness in (3.5) therefore excludes cer-
tain combinations of parameters. A general expression for the equilibrium level of tightness is max
{
θ?, 0
}
.
For the case when θ? = 0, the functions εˆ and n are inconsequential.
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f
(
θ?
)
u0 (a)matches occur and n0 (a)+ f
(
θ?
)
u0 (a)workers travel to work. Of the work-
ers who travel to work, a fraction sx separate exogenously. Of those who do not separate
exogenously, a fraction G (εˆ (a)) have ability levels too low, given their idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity draws, to generate a positive surplus. The composite separation rate, which
captures both exogenous and endogenous separations, is s = sx + (1 − sx )G (εˆ (a)). These
transition probabilities determine n. To see that n :
[
a,a
] → [0, 1], it is true that
n (a) = (1 − s) [n0 (a) + f (θ?) u0 (a)]
≤ n0 (a) + u0 (a) ≤ n0 + u0 = 1,
where the rst inequality uses the fact that s = sx + (1 − sx )G (εˆ (a)) ≤ sx + (1 − sx ) = 1
and s ≥ sx ; f
(
θ?
) ∈ (0, 1); and the fact that u0 + n0 = 1 by construction.
These following proposition summarizes the results of this section:
Proposition 7 Suppose that b′(a)a/b(a) < 1. Then, a unique equilibrium 〈θ?, εˆ(a),n〉 ex-
ists. The equilibrium level of labor-market tightness is decreasing in the exogenous separation
rate, the relative bargaining strength of workers, and the cost of posting a vacancy. Equilib-
rium labor-market tightness is increasing in aggregate productivity.
3.2.2.4 How the Region of Production Shifts in Response to an Aggregate Pro-
ductivity Shock
Given a unique equilibrium, consider the economy’s response to an increase in aggre-
gate productivity from z′ to z′′ > z′. When the economy initially has access to aggregate
productivity z′, the productive boundary is given by εˆ′ = b (a) /(z′a). The region of pro-
duction at z′ in gure 3.3 is colored blue.
When aggregate productivity shifts to z′′ > z′, the productive boundary is given by
εˆ′′ = b (a) /(z′′a). Higher productivity benets workers of all abilities because lower id-
iosyncratic productivities now manage to generate a positive surplus. The economy’s
region of production shifts downward. In addition to the blue region, the economy’s re-
gion of production also includes the green region after the productivity shift.
Figure 3.3 does not answer how the ability composition of employment responds to
an aggregate productivity shock. The answer depends on where workers are distributed
along the boundary between employment and unemployment. Denote the probability
density function that describes the ability stock of employed workers as λ, where λ (a, z) =
n (a) /
a∫
a
n (a) da. The average ability is given by
a∫
a
λ (a, z) da. In general the relationship
between λ and z is complicated and requires parameterizing both n0 and u0, making the
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relationship between average ability and z hard to quantify. In a dynamic model both
n0 and u0 are endogenous objects and, most likely, both would be matched to empirical
statistics, making this an empirical question. I turn to this question in sections 3.3 and 3.4.
The main message I want to convey is that, unlike the model presented in section 3.2.1,
composition of ability is not necessarily guaranteed to shift in a predictable way.
a
ε
εˆ
0
=
b¹aº
z 0a
εˆ
00
=
b¹
z
z
0
< z
00
Figure 3.3: Compositional response to an increase in aggregate productivity from z′ to
z′′ > z′. Initially the productive boundary is εˆ′ and the region of production equals the
blue region. Increasing productivity shifts the region of production to include the green
region in addition to the blue region.
3.2.2.5 Reinterpreting the Level of Home Production and Ability
Many other factors aect production besides an agent’s ability. These factors include work
experience, on-the-job tenure, and education. There are at least a few ways to interpret
these factors within the context of the model.
The easiest way would be to consider these factors xed over the duration of a business
cycle. Letting x denote an additional factor of production common to all agents, a rm’s
output would be given be zaxε . In the above analysis, this interpretation would amount to
relabeling aggregate productivity. The worry with this interpretation is that factors like
schooling or experience may depend on ability; that is, x depends on a. When this is the
case, the surplus generated from a productive match is zax(a)ε −b(a) and the surplus will
be non-negative as long as ε ≤ ε ≤ ε and ax(a)/b(a) ≥ 1/(zε). The above analysis will go
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through as long as
b′(a) a
b(a) < 1 + x
′(a) a
x(a) .
The left-hand side of the above expression is the elasticity of home production with respect
to ability. The right-hand side of the above expression is one plus the elasticity of the factor
of production with respect to ability.
With linear utility, b and x capture the gains from transitioning from unemployment
to employment. Unlike in neoclassical models of labor supply determined at an intensive
margin, in this economy labor is determined entirely at the extensive margin. Ifb is rapidly
increasing in a, then an agent with higher ability may have less to gain from transitioning
from unemployment to employment than a lower-ability agent. This eect, however, may
be negated by the eecta has on x . If x increases witha, which would be the case if higher-
ability agents earn higher educational degrees, then a higher-ability agent stands more to
gain from transitioning to employment from unemployment because they will earn more
with a higher x . While these features of the labor market are not explicitly modeled in this
paper, endogenizing labor supply for dierent ability levels is an interesting way forward.3
In summary, the simple economic environment provides a precise description of
worker ows at dierent ability levels. In contrast to the organized-by-ability model pre-
sented in section 3.2.1, the ability composition of the employment and unemployment
pools is not guarenteed to be countercyclical. This is an empirical question. The remain-
der of the paper provides evidence that earnings-ability composition is countercyclical.
3.3 Earnings Ability
This section describes the data used to estimate the statistical model of wages and the
estimation of earnings ability, including the dispersion of earnings ability.4
3.3.1 Data
Uncovering earnings ability and tracking it over the business cycle requires data to have
two features. First, the data need to be longitudinal. Using a sample of wage earners
over time allows me to estimate a worker’s person eect in (3.1) or their earnings ability.
Second, tracking earnings ability over the business cycle requires detailed labor-market
3This extension could be done along the lines of Garín and Lester (2019).
4Section C.2, in an appendix, depicts how the entire distribution of earnings ability varies over the
business cycle for the pools of employed and unemployed workers.
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histories of wage earners. Data like these are available in the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth 1979 (NLSY79).
The NLSY79 is a survey of men and women born in the years 1957 to 1964. NLSY79
respondents were interviewed over 26 rounds. Respondents were interviewed annually
from 1979 to 1994 and biennially afterwards. Each respondent answered questions about
jobs held at the time of the survey as well as questions about previously held jobs, includ-
ing beginning and ending dates associated with each job. This feature of the survey is key
because, by tracking wage earners over time, it provides a week-by-week work record of
each respondent’s labor-force status.
The NLSY79 initially surveyed 12,686 people in 1979 who comprised three subsam-
ples. A supplemental subsample surveyed non-institutionalized, civilian Black, Hispanic
or Latino, and economically disadvantaged non-Black, Non-Hispanic, or Latino youths
and a military subsample surveyed the population enlisted in the Army, Air Force, Navy,
or Marine Corps. I put aside these two subsamples, which were eventually dropped from
the survey, and focus on the cross-sectional subsample. The cross-sectional subsample
was designed to represent the noninstitutionalized civilian segment of people living in
the United States. It initially surveyed 6,111 people.
The hourly wage statistics I use are those computed by the NLSY79. These statistics
are computed using respondents’ answers to usual earnings and hours worked. Wages
include earnings from tips, overtime pay, and bonuses but are based on usual-earnings
data before deductions.5 I deate wages using the implicit price deator for personal
consumption expenditures. Using 1979 dollars, wages greater than $100 per hour and
less than $1 per hour are excluded from the analysis because, in the words of the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS), “the reported earnings levels were almost certainly in error.”6
The BLS uses the same requirement for its publication titled “Number of Jobs Held, Labor
Market Activity, and Earnings Growth Among the Youngest Baby Boomers.”
In addition to information on usual earnings and hours worked, respondents provide
information on educational attainment, whether they were in a union or employee asso-
ciation, and the industry in which they worked. These controls are included as a system
of dummy variables. Because the panel regression includes a person eect, the eects of
education, union status, and industrial composition are estimated by respondents com-
pleting more schooling across survey rounds, taking jobs covered and not covered by a
union, and taking jobs in dierent industries.
5Beginning in 1988, respondents’ hours worked from home were included in the calculation for respon-
dents who reported that they worked from home but the hours worked from home were not included in
the usual hours worked per week.
6See https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/nlsoy.pdf.
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The dummies for educational attainment are primarily identied by young workers
earning academic degrees early in the sample. To see this, gure 3.4 depicts the shares
of NLSY79 respondents with a college degree, a high-school degree, and some college
experience by year. In every year, the shares add to 1. The vertical line indicates the year
1986. Before 1986 the average worker in the sample is younger than 25 years old. Young
workers who previously earned high-school degrees steadily earned college degrees from
1976 through 1985, indicated in gure 3.4 by a fall in the high-school share and a rise in the
college share before 1986. By 1986, however, there is little aggregate evidence that workers
continued their schooling, which oers little variation to identify the eect of a college
degree. Therefore the early period when workers earned college degrees is dropped in
parts of the subsequent analysis along with the educational eects specied in (3.1).
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Figure 3.4: Educational attainment in the NLSY79 by year. The vertical line indicates 1986
when the average age in the sample reaches 25.
In addition to these controls, I include controls based on respondents’ detailed work
histories. I control for cumulative work experience and tenure at a respondent’s current
job.
Finally, I make two sample restrictions. Wages reported in non-NLSY79 survey years
are dropped from the sample because average wages in those years exhibit an unusual
pattern identied by Basu and House (2016). And I require that respondents be observed
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in the sample at least ve times in order to estimate the person eect.7 The end result is a
sample of 5,293 people who reported usual earnings and hours worked between 1978 and
2012. This sample is used to estimate the regression specication in (3.1).
To be clear, earnings ability has a less transparent interpretation than the one given
so far. The person eects in (3.1), for example, reect rm xed eects, a point made
transparently by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). Firm dynamics no doubt aect
labor-market dynamics and these are embodied in what I am calling earnings ability.8
Earnings ability also reects time-invariant characteristics of workers like their gender
and race. These components of wages are analyzed subsequently using data from the
Current Population Survey. The basic message from that analysis is that race and gen-
der explain very little of the business-cycle variation in CPS wages, suggesting that the
business-cycle variation in earnings ability identied below is not driven by these factors.
3.3.2 Estimated Earnings Ability
Estimates of earnings ability are obtained by estimating equation (3.1) using 100× logwi,t
as the dependent variable. Figure 3.5 depicts the estimates {α̂i}, where the histogram is
constructed to have a zero mean. The level of earnings ability is not identied, only the
dispersion is identied. To get a sense of the estimated dispersion, a wage earner at the
75th percentile of earnings ability earns approximately 20.6 times a wage earner at the
50th percentile of earnings ability when the two wage earners have the same observable
characteristics. The dierence between a wage earner at the 95th percentile and a wage
earner at the 50th percentile is 53.9 percent.9
3.4 Wage Cyclicality
Within the context of the statistical model of wages in (3.1), wages are determined by a
worker’s earnings ability, the value of their time-varying characteristics, and a common
business-cycle component that measures real-wage cyclicality. These are included in the
7Requiring respondents to be observed in the sample at least ten times has little eect.
8The admixture is not ideal. But datasets that allow for separate identication of person and rm eects
do not have high-frequency data on workers’ labor-force status, which is a concern given the high rate of
job nding in the United States.
9For example, to be precise, the constructed wages are 100 × logw75,t = α̂75 + X ′β̂ + ψˆt and100 × logw50,t = α̂50 + X ′β̂ + ψˆt . The dierence in constructed wages is100 × logw75,t − 100 × logw50,t = α̂75 − α̂50 = 20.6.
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Figure 3.5: Histogram of estimated earnings ability constructed to have zero mean.
model as αi , X ′i,tβ , and ψ . To assess how these factors contribute to wage cyclicality, I
construct wage statistics that reect each factor in isolation and compare them to the
simple cross-sectional average wage.
In light of gure 3.4 and the lack of variation in educational attainment in the NLSY79
sample after 1985, I restrict my discussion to estimates based on the sample of prime-age
workers and do not include the system of educational dummies in (3.1). The prime-age
sample NLSY79 begins in 1986 and runs through 2012. I use data from NLSY79 survey
years.10 Section C.3, in an appendix, contains a broader discussion alternative samples.
The relationships between the constructed statistics and the business cycle are as-
sessed through regressions of the form
w j,t = ςj + βj (economy-wide unemployment rate − CBO trend)t + дj (t) + εj,t , (3.6)
where j indexes the wage statisticw j,t constructed for period t , дj (t) is a nonlinear trend,
and the dierence between the economy-wide unemployment rate and the Congressional
Budget Oce’s estimate of the natural rate is a measure of the business cycle. The cyclical
component of the unemployment rate reects uctuations in aggregate demand. The
10There are 18 years in the sample. The interval 1986–1994 consists of 9 years and the even years in
interval 1996–2012 consists of another 9 years. The NLSY79 was administered biennially after 1994.
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nonlinear trend term reects wage growth along the economy’s balanced growth path
and aging among respondents over time. Both of these wage components are estimated
in (3.1) through the period xed eects. I parameterize дj with a quadratic trend going
forward. The term ςj reects the fact that levels of wage statistics are in general not
identied.
3.4.1 Major Components of Wage Cyclicality
The cross-sectional average wage,wavg,t , is constructed as the weighted average of wages
observed in year t of NLSY79 data using cross-sectional weights provided by the NLSY79.
How the average wage varies with the business cycle is reported in column 1 of table 3.1.
The average-wage column reports β̂avg estimated from the regression specied in (3.6).
The estimate predicts that when the cyclical unemployment rate is 1 percentage point
above trend, wavg procyclically falls 0.176 percent.
As Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) point out, this statistic masks individual wage
cyclicality because dierent workers are employed over the business cycle, which aects
the average. A wage statistic that controls for characteristics of workers and reects only
real-wage cyclicality can be constructed from ψˆt . I construct wcyclical,t as the average pre-
dicted cross-sectional wage in the sample:
wcyclical,t =
∑
i∈Et
(
α + X
′
β̂ + ψ̂t
) /
|Et | = ϱcyclical + ψ̂t ,
where Et indexes the set of respondents in the NLSY79 sample used to estimate (3.1),
|Et | represents the cardinality of this set, and ϱcyclical is a constant.11 Essentially wcyclical,t
traces out the estimated conditional expectation function through time, holding constant
earnings ability and time-varying characteristics of the sample. Because the second-step
regression in (3.6) contains a constant, there is no need to specify an “average person”
through X and α as these are included in ϱcyclical and estimated as part of the constant in
(3.6).
The cyclicality column of table 3.1 reports β̂cyclical. When the cyclical unemployment
rate is 1 percentage point above trend, wcyclical,t procyclically falls 1.192 percent. This
estimate indicates that individual-level wages are 6.773(1.192/0.176) times as cyclical as
the average wage.12
11The presentation does not include the use of weights even though weights are used to construct wage
statistics unless explicitly mentioned.
12This factor is larger than what is found in Basu and House (2016). The reason is the fall in cyclicality
of the average wage later in the sample. Using data from 1979–2012 in the second-step cyclical regression,
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Table 3.1: Components of wage cyclicality
1986–2012
Avg wage Cyclicality Characteristics Earnings ability
Cyclical UR −0.176 −1.192∗ 0.576∗∗ 0.439∗∗
(0.627) (0.597) (0.229) (0.165)
N 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.15, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05
The dierence in cyclicality between individual-level wages and the average wage is
due to the types of workers who compose employment over the business cycle. Workers
dier in terms of their earnings ability and their time-varying characteristics. A wage
statistic that reects only time-varying characteristics in Xi,t is
wX ,t =
∑
i∈Et
(
α + X ′i,t β̂ +ψ
) /
|Et | = ϱX + X ′t β̂,
whereX t is the cross-sectional average respondent, holding constant earnings ability, and
ϱX is a constant. The time-varying characteristics column of table C.1 reports how wX ,t
varies with the business cycle. When the cyclical unemployment rate is 1 percentage point
above trend, wX ,t countercyclically increases by 0.576 percent.
Finally, a wage statistic that reects only earnings ability is
wearnings ability,t =
∑
i∈Et
(
α̂i + X
′
β̂ +ψ
) /
|Et | = ϱearnings ability + α̂ t ,
where α̂ t is the time-t average of earnings ability in the sample and ϱearnings ability is a
constant. The earnings-ability column of table C.1 reports howwearnings ability,t varies with
the business cycle. When the cyclical unemployment rate is 1 percentage point above
trend, wearnings ability,t countercyclically increases by 0.439 percent.
The countercyclical coecients forwX ,t andwearnings ability,t indicate that workers with
characteristics that predict higher earnings are disproportionately retained in recessions
and workers with characteristics that predict lower earnings are disproportionately let
go in recessions. Mechanically, because the period xed eects are constructed so that
the cross-sectional average wage matches the predicted average wage and wages are
the cyclicality coecient for the average wage is −0.624. The magnitude of this coecient implies that
individual-level wages are relatively less cyclical than the average wage.
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modeled as log-linear, the sum of the countercyclical eects of time-varying character-
istics and earnings ability, 0.576 + 0.439 = 1.015, equals the dierence in cyclicality be-
tween individual-level wages and the average wage. These numbers imply 43.3 percent
(100×0.439/1.105) of the dierence is explained by procyclical selection on earnings abil-
ity.
The next set of regressions, reported in table 3.2, investigates the individual compo-
nents used to construct wX . The components of X t used to construct wX include dum-
mies for educational attainment, major industries, and union status as well as controls for
cumulative work experience and tenure at a respondent’s current job. For each of these
components I constructwX by leaving the other components unchanged. The constructed
wX s are then used to estimate regressions specied in (3.6). As a comparison, the rst col-
umn of table 3.2 reports the overall cyclicality of time-varying characteristics. This entry
is copied over from column 3 of table 3.1.
The second column of table 3.2 indicates that variation in the industrial composition
of jobs held by NLSY79 respondents does not aect overall average-wage variation.13 The
third and fourth columns of table 3.2 indicate that variation in union aliation and expe-
rience explain the variation in wages. The coecient on union aliation is 0.130 and the
coecient on experience is 0.448. Both are statistically signicant at the 0.15 level. The
positive signs indicate that both eects are countercylical. Again, because the statistical
model for wages in (3.1) is linear, the individual contributions approximately sum to the
overall cyclicality of time-varying characteristics reported in column 1 of table 3.2. [The
sum is not exact because the trends in (3.6) are estimated separately.]14
The estimates suggest that uctuations in experience and earnings ability explain over
40 percent of average-wage cyclicality. These estimates, though, only rely on respondents’
wages used in the regression sample. Respondents in the NLSY79 also provide detailed
work histories that indicate the weeks they were employed and unemployed throughout
the sample period. Joining the monthly labor-force status of respondents to their earnings
ability oers another measure of earnings ability over the business cycle. Importantly,
this feature of the NLSY79 sample characterizes the unemployment pool in addition to
the employment pool.
13This nding is consistent with evidence reported in McLaughlin and Bils (2001) and evidence from the
BLS’s Current Employment Statistics program that I report in gure 3.7.
14Cyclical variation in education is section C.3. Table C.2 indicates that variation in educational attain-
ment explains much of the variation in the average wage before 1986, which is consistent with shares of
educational attainment depicted in gure 3.4. After 1985, the cyclical coecient for wX constructed only
from variation in educational attainment is 0.0895.
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Table 3.2: Time-varying components of wage cyclicality
Characteristics Industry Union Experience
Cyclical UR 0.576∗∗ −0.000949 0.130+ 0.448∗∗
(0.229) (0.0345) (0.0809) (0.179)
N 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.15, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05
3.4.2 Average Earnings Ability in the Employment and Unem-
ployment Pools over the Business Cycle
Using a respondent’s reported weekly labor-force status, I take their monthly status to be
their status in whatever week contains the 12th day of the month, corresponding to the
reference week in the CPS.15 I use a respondent’s status in January, April, July, and October
to get a quarterly series, the frequency at which the Congressional Budget Oce publishes
their series on the natural rate of unemployment. I match a respondent’s labor-force status
to their earnings ability. The measure of earnings ability comes from estimating the panel
regression in (3.1), using data that begin in 1985 and omitting educational eects in Xi,t .
The result is a quarterly panel of earnings ability.
A quarterly series of average earnings ability is constructed by averaging over re-
spondents in a given quarter by labor-force status. This is analogous towearnings ability,t for
employed workers and represents a shadow-wage statistic for unemployed workers.
To see how these quarterly statistics vary over the business cycle, I use the series to
estimate regressions like those in (3.6).16 The estimated coecients on the cyclical unem-
ployment rate are reported in table 3.3. A total of 72 observations compose the sample.
These years of the sample include 1986–1994 and the even years after 1994 through 2012.
They correspond to the NLSY79 survey rounds and total 18 years and 72 quarters.17
Table 3.3 reports the results. The employed column indicates that when the cyclical
unemployment rate is 1 percentage point above trend, average earnings ability increases
0.113 percent among employed workers. The unemployed column indicates that when
the cyclical unemployment rate is 1 percentage point above trend, average earnings ability
increases 0.518 percent among unemployed workers. Both of these estimates are precisely
15Although the BLS has occasional exceptions to this rule. See https://www.bls.gov/cps/denitions.htm#
refweek.
16In addition I include quarterly dummies to control for seasonality.
17Including non-NLSY79 years makes little dierence and no qualitative dierence. The results using
these years are reported in table C.4. Not including these years is motivated by distinct patterns in respon-
dents’ wages in non-NLSY79 years (Basu and House, 2016).
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Table 3.3: Cyclicality of average earnings ability for employed and unemployed
1986q1–2012q4
Employed Unemployed
Cyclical UR 0.113∗∗ 0.518∗∗
(0.0167) (0.200)
N 72 72
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.15, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05
estimated.
The cyclicality of average earnings ability in table 3.3 indicates that average earnings
ability is less cyclical when measured using respondents’ labor-force histories than when
using only respondents who report earnings. This dierence is partly attributable to more
observations used to construct average earnings ability from the weekly status arrays. A
respondent’s weekly labor-force status is asked retrospectively. So even if the respon-
dent missed reporting their earnings in a survey round, they are asked about about when
they started their job. Their answer updates their labor-force status through their current
status.
Putting aside dierences in samples, the labor-force status arrays characterize the abil-
ity composition of the unemployment pool. Average earnings ability varies more in the
unemployment pool than in the employment pool. This is not surprising given that the
number of unemployed workers is less than one tenth the number of employed work-
ers. These are no unemployed workers in the regression sample, so table 3.3 provides the
only measure of earnings ability in the unemployment pool. The positive coecients in
table 3.3 indicate that, on average, workers with lower earnings ability are disproportion-
ately let go in periods of high unemployment. As low-ability workers exit employment,
they increase average ability in the unemployment pool. This pattern is consistent with
the organized-by-ability model described in gure 3.1 and informs the model described
in gures 3.2 and 3.3. Improving the incentive to post vacancies in periods of high un-
employment will exacerbate the ability of heterogeneous-agent labor–macro models to
replicate sustained periods of high unemployment observed in the data.
Earnings ability includes the earnings eect associated with a respondent’s gender
and race. The next section uses CPS data to make the case that these factors matter little
for business-cycle variation in wages. The composition of employment in terms of ed-
ucational attainment, marital status, age, and industry is also investigated. I argue that
these factors do not drive the gap between the cyclicality of individual-level wages and
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the average wage. Eliminating these factors, leaves experience as the driving force.
In summary, using detailed labor-market histories of NLSY79 respondents in my pre-
ferred specication, earnings ability explains 19.6 percent of the gap between individual-
level wages and the average wage. I arrive at this number through the following calcula-
tion.
Wage cyclicality is remarkably consistent in the NLSY79 data. But the NLSY79 co-
hort, which ages over time, does not provide a good measure of the average wage. To
get a measure of the average wage I follow Basu and House (2016) and use compensa-
tion per hour in the nonfarm business sector. Using this series to estimate the cyclical-
regression specication in (3.6) for the 1986–2012 period, the cyclicality coecient is
−0.615. The dierence between −0.615 and individual-level wage cyclicality in table 3.1 is
0.577 [(−0.615)− (−1.192)]. The countercyclical eect of earnings ability over this period,
reported in the bottom panel of table 3.3, is 0.113. Using these numbers, earnings ability
countercyclically accounts for 19.6 percent (100 × 0.113/0.577) of the dierence between
individual-level wages and the average wage.
3.4.3 Evidence from the Current Population Survey and Current
Employment Statistics Program
This section is motivated by gure 3.6, which depicts shares of employment by educational
attainment. These data come from the Current Population Survey.18 Over time workers
have earned higher degrees. For example, the college share more than doubled—college
graduates made up around 12.5 percent of employment in early 1992 and made up over
25 percent by 2018.
But what stands out in the gure is the lack of cyclical variation in the shares. Even in
the teeth of the Great Recession, the employment shares seemed to be on trend. The lack
of cyclicality in employment shares oers little scope for the story that low-skill workers
with low education comprise employment exists in recessions, making the average wage
appear less cyclical.19 Instead, the average wage is less cyclical because, within each broad
educational category, workers with low earnings ability exit employment.
The remainder of this section looks at labor-force composition of prime-aged individ-
uals over the business cycle. I nd that the composition of employment, unemployment,
and non-employment varies little with the business cycle in terms of education, sex, race,
marital status, and age. The lack of variability in composition for dierent demographic
18The data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ LN series in the LABSTAT database. The series are
seasonally adjusted by the BLS and count workers 25 years and older.
19Which is one reading of Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994).
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and industrial groups means variation in average wages is driven by wage cyclicality
within each group. A wage-decomposition exercise corroborates this idea. Within each
group, in other words, the evidence is consistent with rms retaining workers with more
experience and higher earnings ability when the unemployment rate is high. Workers
with lower ability who exit employment when the unemployment rate is high are not
concentrated in any particular demographic group or industry.
3.4.3.1 Data
I use data from the Current Population Survey. Each month the CPS interviews a sam-
ple of roughly 60,000 households to determine characteristics of the civilian noninstitu-
tional population. The civilian noninstitutional population comprises two groups—people
in the labor force and people not in the labor force. The labor force in turn comprises
two groups—the employed and unemployed. Additionally I consider the non-employed—
people either unemployed or not in the labor force.
In addition to labor-force status, the CPS collects information on a respondents’ de-
mographic information. Respondents’ answers to these questions can be used as a repre-
sentative sample of the civilian population of the United States by using cross-sectional
weights provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
I restrict the population to respondents between 25 and 64 years of age. This restriction
allows me to focus on the prime years of employment that are largely unaected by other
life transitions, like schooling and retirement. Additionally, focusing on respondents of
this age group allows me to compare the cross-sectional data to longitudinal NLSY79 data,
which follows respondents continually over the prime ages of their careers.
Respondents answers to the monthly surveys are used to construct aggregate series. I
aggregate series to the quarterly level by using the average of monthly values in each quar-
ter. All aggregated series are seasonally adjusted using the Census Bureau’s X-13ARIMA-
SEATS automatic procedures. The series cover 1976q1–2019q1.
Many of the series of interest represent the composition of a particular group. For
example, CPS respondents report their gender as either male or female in the survey. The
unemployment pool can be therefore written as the sum of unemployed men (M) and
unemployed women (W): ut = uMt + uWt . In general, the unemployment pool can be
divided into groups listed as {д1, . . . ,дn} = G. For the case of men and women, G =
{M,W}. Then
ut =
∑
д∈G
uдt =⇒ 1 =
∑
д∈G
uдt
ut
=
∑
д∈G
shareдt ,
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where shareдt denotes the share of group д in the unemployment pool in period t . I sim-
ilarly construct share series for the employed and non-employed and for people not in
the labor force. I take the cyclical component of the share of workers in each group. The
cyclical component of each share series is computed as described in Hamilton (2018).
I am interested in how the composition of the employment, unemployment, non-
employment, and not-in-the-labor-force pools vary with the business cycle. Each pool
is broken down by education, sex, race, marital status, and age to get a sense of how
demographic composition varies over the business cycle. The industrial composition of
employment is then investigated using data from the Current Employment Statistics (CES)
program of the BLS, which provides estimates of employment and wage information for
major industrial sectors of the economy.
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Figure 3.6: Shares of employment by educational attainment, 1992m1–2018m12.
3.4.3.2 Cyclicality of Shares
To assess how composition varies over the business cycle, I take a demographic like ed-
ucational attainment and construct the shares of college-educated people, people with
some college, and people with a high-school degree or less. For each of these share series
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Table 3.4: Cyclical response of shares to uctuations in the aggregate unemployment rate.
Series E U NILF N
College 0.084 −0.111 −0.172 −0.180
(0.051) (0.125) (0.044) (0.046)
Some college 0.036 0.194 0.099 0.171
(0.049) (0.117) (0.051) (0.058)
HS or less −0.119 −0.093 0.061 −0.001
(0.045) (0.163) (0.053) (0.061)
Female 0.079 −1.255 −0.176 −0.837
(0.027) (0.119) (0.061) (0.111)
Nonwhite −0.096 −0.483 0.064 0.129
(0.035) (0.109) (0.045) (0.045)
Unmarried −0.041 −0.711 0.192 0.372
(0.049) (0.103) (0.082) (0.089)
Under 30 −0.035 −0.205 0.139 0.323
(0.052) (0.131) (0.038) (0.048)
Standard errors in parentheses.
I report βˆд estimated from a regression of the form
shareдt = αд + βдU˜Rt + εдt , (3.7)
where U˜Rt is the cyclical component of the unemployment rate.20 The cyclical coecients,{
βˆд
}
, are reported in table 3.4.
When there are only two classications within a group, like married and unmarried
people, I report only one of the two regression coecients estimated in (3.4). This is be-
cause the unreported regression coecient equals the negative of the reported coecient.
While this isn’t guaranteed by the empirical exercise—I don’t impose that the shares sum
to one and the trends are estimated separately for each series—the estimated coecients
do in fact nearly sum to one in response to a business-cycle uctuation.
Table 3.4 shows that business-cycle variation in labor-force shares is small. Turning
20The cyclical component is extracted using the method described in Hamilton (2018).
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to the employment pool, which is reported in the rst column of table 3.4, the rst three
rows—“College”, “Some college”, and “HS or less”—report the response of the employment
pool delineated by educational attainment to the cyclical component of the aggregate un-
employment rate. Table 3.4 indicates that a 1-percentage-point increase in the aggregate
unemployment rate above trend predicts that the share of employed, college-educated
workers increases by 0.08 percentage points; the share of employed workers with some
college increases by 0.04 percentage points; and the share of employed workers with at
least a high-school degree decreased by 0.12 percentage points. In other words, the the
composition of the employment pool barely responds to the business cycle.
The same holds for gender. The share of men in the employment pool decreases by
0.08 percentage points when the unemployment rate is 1 percentage point above trend,
according to the linear prediction. For the same uctuation in unemployment, the share
of women increases by 0.08 percentage points.
The white share in the employment pool, according to the linear regression, increases
by 0.1 percentage points. The nonwhite share decreases by 0.1 percentage points. The
married share increases slightly and the under-30 group decreases slightly.
Together, as indicated by the rst column of table 3.4, the composition of the employ-
ment pool responds little to the business cycle.
This lack of business-cycle compositional variation may not be too surprising. This
type of variation requires moving the composition of the stock of employed workers,
which is large. Unemployment, although also a stock, is much smaller. Yet the compo-
sition of the unemployment pool responds only mildly more than the employment pool.
The largest coecient in the second column of table 3.4 is 1.25 for men. This number rep-
resents the prediction that the share of men in the unemployment pool increases by 1.25
percentage points when the aggregate unemployment rate is 1 percentage point above its
trend.21
Columns 3 and 4 of table 3.4 indicate that the not-in-the-labor-force pool and the non-
employment pool are predicted to barely budge when the aggregate unemployment rate
is 1 percentage point above trend.
A similar business-cycle pattern holds for employment shares by major industrial sec-
tor. To see this, I repeat the exercise using data from the BLS’s Current Employment
Statistics program. The CES program publishes employment data for consistent indus-
trial sectors beginning in 1972. There are 15 industrial sectors, including government.
21To be clear, the nonwhite unemployment rate is more volatile, even though the share of nonwhites
in the unemployment pool falls relative to trend. The not-in-the-labor-force share of nonwhite rises as
does the non-employment share. If these transitions happen because workers are discouraged, then this is
further evidence of that this group “suers disproportionately” (Aaronson et al., 2019, 370).
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Figure 3.7 shows the βˆдs associated with estimating equation (3.4) for the 15 industrial
sectors. The dot next to each sector represents the estimated coecient and the black bar
shows the 95-percent condence interval. The “Government” coecient reported in the
rst row of gure 3.7 indicates that that a 1-percentage-point increase in the aggregate
unemployment rate above trend predicts that the share of workers working for the gov-
ernment increases by about 0.3 percentage points. This share is counter-cyclical but not
large.
Looking down the row in gure 3.7, there are no large eects. For example, the share
of workers engaged in durables manufacturing is predicted to decrease by less than 0.2
percentage points. Of the 15 sectors, 11 respond to a 1-percentage-point increase in the
aggregate unemployment rate above trend by less than 0.1 percent.
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Figure 3.7: Predicted change in share when the cyclical unemployment rate is 1 percent-
age point above trend for major industrial sectors, 1972m1–2019m6.
3.4.3.3 Wage Decompositions
This section decomposes the variation in wages into a compositional eect and a wage-
cyclicality eect. The decomposition is based on writing the average wage as a share-
weighted average of dierent groups. The economy-wide average wage can therefore
uctuate for two reasons. Either the shares can uctuate or average wages for dierent
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groups can uctuate. I call uctuations in the economy-wide average wage due to uctua-
tions in shares compositional. I call uctuations in the economy-wide average wage due to
uctuation in a group’s average wage wage-cyclicality. The main message of this section
is that variation in the average wage is nearly entirely due to real-wage cyclicality. This
pattern holds for decompositions based on the industrial composition of employment and
employment delineated by dierent demographic groups.
To formalize the decomposition, let t denote the period of time. Let W t denote the
average wage in period t . In period t , the employment pool comprises dierent groups of
workers. If there are only two groups, for example, then the average wage can be written
as
W t = S1tW 1t + S2tW 2t , (3.8)
whereW jt is the period-t average wage of group j.
For the average wage in period t ,W t , letwt denote its logarithm. Let the bold termwᵀt
denote the trend component of wt . Let w˜t denote wt −wᵀt , which represents the percent
away wt is from trend in period t , or the cyclical component of the average wage. The
trend and cyclical components of the Sjts are dened similarly, although S˜jt represents the
percentage points Sjt is from trend.
A rst-order approximation of the average wage in equation (3.8) around trend is
w˜t ≈ W
ᵀ
1t
W
ᵀ
t
S˜1t +
W
ᵀ
2t
W
ᵀ
t
S˜2t + S
ᵀ
1t
W
ᵀ
1t
W
ᵀ
t
w˜1t + S
ᵀ
2t
W
ᵀ
2t
W
ᵀ
t
w˜2t . (3.9)
According to (3.9), how far the average wage is away from its trend in percentage terms
depends on both uctuations in group employment shares and how far group wages are
away from trend in percentage terms.
The dierence between a share and its trend in percentage points, S˜jt , is weighted
by a group’s relative-wage trend,W ᵀjt/W
ᵀ
t . While it is true that S˜1t + S˜2t = 0, inducing a
negative correlation between the two shares, the weights provide scope for share variation
to explain uctuations in the average wage. For example, if the share of group j uctuates
meaningfully and wages in group j are not insignicant relative to the average, then the
eect on w˜t will be small.
The percent away a group’s average wage is from its trend, w˜ jt , is weighted by the
trend component of a group’s employment share, Sᵀjt , and a group’s relative-wage trend,
W
ᵀ
jt/W
ᵀ
t . Fluctuations in a group’s wage will be meaningful if the group’s wage is high
relative to average, but only if the employment share of group j is also meaningful.
One way to make the decomposition operational is by investigating the variance
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of average-wage uctuations and attributing it to either compositional eects or wage
cyclicality. The variance of average wage uctuations can be written as var
(
w˜t
)
=
cov
(
w˜t , w˜t
)
. The two-sector analysis carries over directly to the n-sector case. Devel-
oping the expression for the variation in the average wage yields
1 ≈
n∑
j=1
cov
(
wt ,
W
ᵀ
jt
W
ᵀ
t
S˜jt
)
var
(
w˜t
)
︸              ︷︷              ︸
share contributions
+
n∑
j=1
cov
(
wt , S
ᵀ
jt
W
ᵀ
jt
W
ᵀ
t
w˜jt
)
var
(
w˜t
)
︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
wage-cyclicality contributions
. (3.10)
The terms in (3.10) are convenient because each of the right-hand-side terms represents a
regression coecient. For example, the term cov
(
w˜t ,
W
ᵀ
jt
W
ᵀ
t
S˜jt
)
/var
(
w˜t
)
is the coecient
on w˜t in a regression of
W
ᵀ
jt
W
ᵀ
t
S˜jt on w˜t .
The sum of the share contributions represents the composition eect and the sum
of the wage contributions represents the wage-cyclicality eect. The two eects should
approximately sum to 1.
I use the decomposition in equation (3.10) to decompose uctuations in the average
wage into composition and real-wage-cyclicality eects for dierent demographic groups.
Wages come from respondents answers in months 4 and 8 to their hourly earnings in the
CPS. All series are seasonally adjusted using the Census X-13 program.
Table 3.5 lists separate decompositions for demographic groups delineated by educa-
tion, sex, race, marital status, and age. Fluctuations in wages explain nearly all of the
variation in the average wage.
Shares, though, do explain a small portion of the variation in the average wage for the
education demographic. The educational composition of employment explains about 2.5
percent of the variation in the average wage. And marital status explains about 1 percent
of the variation in the average wage.
While wage variation explains nearly all the variation in the average wage, wage vari-
ation diers across demographic groups. For example, looking at the rst block of table
3.5, the wages of college-educated workers explain 48.8 percent of the variation of the av-
erage wage, the wages of workers with some college education explain 19.1 percent, and
the wages of workers with a high-school degree or less explain 29.6 percent. In the second
block of table 3.5, the wages of men explain 63.1 percent and the wages of women explain
37.7 percent of the variation in the average wage. The same pattern holds for workers de-
lineated by race, marital status, and age; namely, variation in the majority group’s wage
91
Table 3.5: Decompositions of average wages for various demographic groups.
Series Wage Share Wage + share
College 0.488 0.040 0.528
Some college 0.191 0.059 0.250
HS or less 0.296 −0.075 0.221
Total 0.975 0.024 1.000
Female 0.377 0.047 0.424
Male 0.631 −0.054 0.577
Total 1.008 −0.007 1.001
Nonwhite 0.200 −0.034 0.166
White 0.797 0.037 0.834
Total 0.997 0.003 1.000
Unmarried 0.371 −0.072 0.299
Married 0.618 0.083 0.701
Total 0.990 0.010 1.000
Under 30 0.179 −0.019 0.160
Over 30 0.818 0.023 0.841
Total 0.997 0.003 1.001
92
explains the most signicant share of the variation in the average wage.
While not reported, the patterns uncovered in the decomposition based on demo-
graphics continues to hold for industrial sectors in the CES data. This idea was foreshad-
owed in gure 3.7 by the lack of cyclical variability.
Data from the CPS and CES program established that both the industrial and demo-
graphic compositions of employment have little eect on the business-cycle variation in
wages. Fluctuations in real wages are not explained by people moving in and out of em-
ployment for these demographic groups and industrial sectors, but rather by uctuations
in real wages at the industrial-sector or demographic-group level.
These facts are consistent with the analysis using NLSY79 data: The main drivers of
wage cyclicality are experience and, to a lesser extent, earnings ability.
3.5 Conclusion
A worker’s wage, on average, varies more with the business cycle than what would be
expected by just looking at the average wage. This has to do with workers moving in
and out of employment over the business cycle. Using data from the NLSY79, I have
shown that the countercyclical compositional eect of earnings ability explains around
20 percent of the gap using respondents’ detailed labor-market histories. The rest of the
gap is primarily driven by a worker’s cumulative work experience and on-the-job tenure.
It is not driven by gender, race, educational attainment, union membership, marital status,
and industrial composition.
I hope these facts will be of interest to macro modelers that dierentiate workers by
productivity. The simple macroeconomic structure I use to explain the issues at stake
contains many features of richer models, which means the general lessons should form
the basis for future work on earnings ability.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix to Estimates of Matching
Technology under Constant Returns to Scale
with Implications for Fundamental Surplus
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A.1 Derivation of Time-Aggregation Adjustment
This section provides a fuller derivation of the time-aggregation adjustment.
Workers are either employed or unemployed, transitioning between labor-market
states. Time is continuous, while data are available only at discrete dates. Following
Shimer (2012), refer to the interval [t, t + 1), for t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }, as “period t .” Within the
interval [t, t + 1) workers neither exit or enter the laborforce.
Dene the following quantities:
• Ft ∈ [0, 1] is the job-nding probability in period t ,
• St ∈ [0, 1] is the separation probability in period t ,
• ft ≡ − log (1 − Ft ) ≥ 0 is the arrival rate of the Poisson process that changes a
worker’s state from unemployment to employment, and
• st ≡ − log (1 − St ) ≥ 0 is the arrival rate of the Poisson process that changes a
worker’s state from employment to unemployment.
To be clear, Ft and St are probabilities, while ft and st are rates. Ft is the probability that a
worker who begins period t unemployed nds a job during period t ; St is the probability
that a worker who begins period t employed loses a job during period t . I am interested
in uncovering St and Ft .
For any t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . } I let τ ∈ [0, 1] be the elapsed time since the start of the period.
Dene the following stocks:
• et+τ is the number of employed workers at time t + τ ,
• ut+τ is the number of unemployed workers at time t + τ , and
• eht (τ ) is the number of workers who are employed at time t+τ but were unemployed
at some time t ′ ∈ [t, t + τ ); that is, the number of new hires or matches.
The number of new hires is zero at the start of the period:
eht (0) = 0 for all t .
The number of new hires at the end of the period is dened as
eht+1 ≡ eht (1)
as the number of new hires at the end of the period, as measured by the JOLTS program.
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Employment within the period evolves according to
Ûet+τ = ftut+τ − stet+τ (A.1)
Ûeht+τ = ftut+τ − steht+τ . (A.2)
Solving equation (A.2) for ftut+h and substituting this into equation (A.1) yields
Ûet+τ = ftut+τ − stet+τ
=
(
Ûeht+τ + steht+τ
)
− stet+τ
= Ûeht+τ + steht+τ − stet+τ for τ ∈ [0, 1) .
This is a linear rst-order equation for Ûet+τ with τ ∈ [0, 1).
The generation solution is
et+τ =
[
c +
∫ τ
0
(
Ûeht+z + steht+z
)
e−
∫ z
0 −stdνdz
]
e
∫ τ
0 −stdz
=
[
c +
∫ τ
0
(
Ûeht+z + steht+z
)
estzdz
]
e−stτ . (A.3)
which uses the fact thata (τ ) is constant and thus independent of τ . Expanding the integral
in the bracketed term in (A.3) yields∫ τ
0
(
Ûeht+z + steht+z
)
estzdz =
∫ τ
0
estz Ûeht+zdz +
∫ τ
0
estzste
h
t+zdz
=
∫ τ
0
estz Ûeht+zdz + st
∫ τ
0
estzeht+zdz. (A.4)
The rst integral on the right-hand size of the latter equation can be integrated by parts:∫ τ
0
estz Ûeht+zdz = estzeht+z
z=τ
z=0
−
∫ τ
0
ste
stzeht+zdz
=
(
estτeht+τ − est 0eht
)
− st
∫ τ
0
estzeht+zdz
= estτeht+τ − st
∫ τ
0
estzeht+zdz,
where the last equality uses the fact that eht = eht (0) = 0. Using this result in equation
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(A.4) yields∫ τ
0
(
Ûeht+z + steht+z
)
estzdz = estτeht+τ − st
∫ τ
0
estzeht+zdz + st
∫ τ
0
estzeht+zdz
= estτeht+τ .
Substituting this result into equation (A.3) yields
et+τ =
[
c +
∫ τ
0
(
Ûeht+z + steht+z
)
estzdz
]
e−stτ
=
[
c + estτeht+τ
]
e−stτ
= ce−stτ + eht+τ .
The determination of c comes from evaluating the latter at τ = 0:
et = c + e
h
t (0) = c,
as there are no new hires at the beginning of the period and eht (0) = 0. Therefore
et+τ = ete
−stτ + eht+τ .
Evaluating the latter at τ = 1 yields
et+1 = ete
−st + eht+1
= et (1 − St ) + eht+1, (A.5)
which indicates that the level of employment in the following survey period equals the
employed who do not separate from their jobs plus new hires. Solving this expression for
St yields
et+1 = et (1 − St ) + eht+1
∴ et+1 − et = −etSt + eht+1
∴ etSt = eht+1 − et+1 + et
∴ St = 1 −
et+1 − eht+1
et
. (A.6)
To solve for the nding rate, which is the point of interest, solve equation (A.1) for-
ward. Dene lt = ut + et as the labor force. The labor force is assumed to be constant
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during that period; that is, ut+τ + et+τ = lt for all τ ∈ [0, 1). Using this assumption implies
Ûet+τ = ftut+τ − stet+τ
= ft (lt − et+τ ) − stet+τ
= ftlt − (st + ft ) et+τ .
This is a linear dierential equation for Ûet+τ with constant coecients. The solution to
this dierential equation is
et+τ =
ftlt
(st + ft ) + c2e
−(st+ft )τ , (A.7)
where c2 is a constant. The value of c2 comes from evaluating the latter expression at
τ = 0:
c2 = et − ftlt
st + ft
.
Using the expression for c2 in equation (A.7) implies
et+τ =
ftlt
(st + ft ) +
(
et − ftlt
st + ft
)
e−(st+ft )τ
=
ftlt
(st + ft ) + ete
−(st+ft )τ − ftlt
st + ft
e−(st+ft )τ
=
ftlt
(st + ft )
[
1 − e−(st+ft )τ
]
+ ete
−(st+ft )τ .
Evaluating this expression at τ = 1 yields
et+1 =
ftlt
(st + ft )
[
1 − e−(st+ft )
]
+ ete
−(st+ft )
or
et+1 =
(
1 − e−st−ft ) ft
(st + ft ) lt + e
−(st+ft )et . (A.8)
I am interested in uncovering Ft and St . The separation probability, St , is calculated using
(A.6). The nding probability Ft is dened implicitly in equation (A.8). I solve equation
A.8 using a bisection method to uncover ft and then compute Ft = 1 − e−ft .
To see how a bisection method can be used to solve for ft using (A.8), a simple appli-
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cation of the intermediate-value theorem establishes that there exists a solution. Dene
T (x) = et+1 − (1 − e
−st−x )x
(st + x) lt − e
−(st+x)et .
Then
T (0) = et+1 − e−stet
= et+1 − (1 − St ) et
= et+1 −
(
et+1 − eht+1
)
= eht+1 > 0,
where the second-to-last equation uses the expression for (1 − st ) et in (A.5). Additionally
lim
x→∞ T (x) = et+1 − limx→∞
[ (1 − e−st−x )x
(st + x) lt
]
= et+1 − lim
x→∞ [1 − e
−st−x ] lim
x→∞
[
x
st + x
lt
]
= et+1 − lt
< 0,
where the last line uses L’Hôpital’s rule and the fact that the limit of a product of functions
is the product of the limits, provided that both limits exist. The inequality holds as long as
next period’s level of employment is less than the size of the current period’s laborforce.
An application of the intermediate-value theorem establishes the existence of an ft that
solves T (ft ) = 0.
Uniqueness is harder to establish. The function T can be written
T (x) = et+1 − (1 − e
−st−x )x
(st + x) lt − e
−(st+x)et
= et+1 − (1 − e
−ste−x )x
(st + x) lt − e
−ste−xet
= et+1 − [1 − (1 − St ) e
−x ]x
(st + x) lt − (1 − St ) e
−xet
= et+1 − [x − (1 − St )xe
−x ]
(st + x) lt − (1 − St ) e
−xet .
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Developing this expression further yields
T (x) = et+1 − x
st + x
lt +
(1 − St )xe−x
st + x
lt − (1 − St ) e−xet
= et+1 − x
st + x
lt + (1 − St ) e−x
(
x
st + x
lt − et
)
= et+1 − x
st + x
lt + (1 − St ) e−x
[
x
st + x
(et + ut ) − et
]
= et+1 − x
st + x
lt + (1 − St ) e−x
[
x
st + x
ut − st
st + x
et
]
.
Then
T ′ (x) = − st(st + x)2
lt +
d
dx
{
(1 − St ) e−x
[
x
st + x
ut − st
st + x
et
]}
.
Looking at the term in curly brackets
d
dx
{
(1 − St ) e−x
[
x
st + x
ut − st
st + x
et
]}
= − (1 − St ) e−x
[
x
st + x
ut − st
st + x
et
]
+ (1 − St ) e−x d
dx
[
x
st + x
ut − st
st + x
et
]
= − (1 − St ) e−x
[
x
st + x
ut − st
st + x
et
]
+ (1 − St ) e−x
[
st
(st + x)2
ut +
st
(st + x)2
et
]
= − (1 − St ) e−x
[
x
st + x
ut − st
st + x
et
]
+ (1 − St ) e−x st(st + x)2
lt .
Note that
x
st + x
ut − st
st + x
et =
xut − stet
st + x
.
Combining these two expressions yields
T ′ (x) = − st(st + x)2
lt +
d
dx
{
(1 − St ) e−x
[
x
st + x
ut − st
st + x
et
]}
=
st
(st + x)2
lt [(1 − St ) e−x − 1] − (1 − St ) e−x
[
x
st + x
ut − st
st + x
et
]
=
st
(st + x)2
lt [(1 − St ) e−x − 1] − (1 − St ) e
−x
st + x
Ûet ,
where the last line uses the denition of Ûet+τ in (A.1) evaluated at τ = 0. The rst term is
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negative because
(1 − St ) e−x − 1 < 0
as 1− St and e−x are both in [0, 1]. If Ûet > 0, then there is a unique solution. If Ûet < 0, then
there is a unique solutions as long as the magnitude of Ûet is not too large. In general, this
does not appear to be true. None of the empirical work ran into the problem of multiple
solutions.
A.2 Properties of Matching Technologies
In this section I collect a few well known properties of two constant-returns-to-scale
matching technologies. The rst is the familiar Cobb–Douglas parameterization. The sec-
ond is the matching technology suggested in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000). The
main takeaway is that the Cobb–Douglas parameterization implies that within a given pe-
riod the probability that a worker nds a job and the probability that a rm lls a vacancy
can fall outside of the unit interval, [0, 1]; whereas, the nonlinear parameterization in den
Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) constrains the job-nding and job-lling probabilities
to fall inside of the unit interval.
A.2.1 Elasticity of Matching with Respect to Unemployment
Before turning to the particular parameterization, I state and prove a well known result
about the elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment. This result will be used
in the discussion about the decomposition of the elasticity of tightness.
In general, a matching technology computes the number of new matches or new hires
produced when u workers are searching for jobs and v vacancies are posted. A match-
ing technology, in other words, maps unemployment and vacancies into matches. It is
increasing in both its arguments and exhibits constant returns to scale in u and v .
I use the following notation:
• M denotes the number of new matches.
• u denotes the measure of unemployed workers searching for a job.
• v denotes the measure of vacancies posted by rms recruiting workers.
• θ = v/u, the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, denotes labor-market tightness.
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• q (θ ) = M/v denotes the probability that a vacancy is lled.
• θq (θ ) = M/u denotes the probability that a worker nds a job.
That M/v denotes the probability that a posted vacancy is lled follows from the assump-
tion that search is random, meaning each vacancy faces the same likelihood of being lled.
The elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment is
ηM,u =
dM
du
u
M
= −θq
′ (θ )
q (θ ) . (A.9)
The expression in (A.9) comes from direct computation. Indeed, from the denition of job
lling, q (θ ) = M/v ,
dM
du
=
d
du
[q (θ )v]
= q′ (θ ) −v
u2
v = −q′ (θ )θ 2.
Thus
dM
du
u
M
= −q
′ (θ )θ 2
M/u = −
q′ (θ )θ 2
θq (θ )
= −θq
′ (θ )
q (θ ) > 0,
where the last equality in the rst line uses the denition of job nding; that is, θq (θ ) =
M/u. The inquality uses the property that q′ < 0. The fact that ηM,u > 0 says that, for
a given level of labor demand, an increase in workers searching for jobs increases the
number of new hires.
Moreover ηM,u lies in the interval (0, 1). It has already been established that ηM,u > 0.
The fact that ηM,u < 1 can be established by dierentiation θq (θ ) with respect to v :
d
dv
[θq (θ )] = {[1 × q (θ )] + θq′ (θ )} 1
u
= [q (θ ) + θq′ (θ )] 1
u
.
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Because θq (θ ) can be written θM (u,v) /v , it also follows that
d
dv
[θq (θ )] = 1
u
M
v
+ θ
Mvv −M
v2
=
1
u
M
v
+ θ
(
Mv
v
− q (θ )
v
)
=
1
v
{θq (θ ) + θ [Mv − q (θ )]}
whereMv is the derivative of the matching function with respect to vacancies. Combining
these two expressions yields
[q (θ ) + θq′ (θ )] 1
u
=
1
v
{θq (θ ) + θ [Mv − q (θ )]}
∴ [q (θ ) + θq′ (θ )]θ = θq (θ ) + θ [Mv − q (θ )]
∴ θq′ (θ ) = Mv − q (θ )
∴
θq′ (θ )
q (θ ) =
Mv
q (θ ) − 1
∴ 1 −
(
−θq
′ (θ )
q (θ )
)
=
Mv
q (θ )
∴ 1 − ηM,u = Mv
q (θ ) .
Therefore 1 − ηM,u is positive since M is increasing in both its arguments. Re-arranging
establishes that ηM,u < 1. Hence ηM,u ∈ (0, 1). These results are collected in proposition 8.
Proposition 8 Given a constant-returns to scale matching function, M (u,v), that is in-
creasing in both its arguments, the elaticity of matching with respect to unemployment,
ηM,u=-θq′ (θ ) /q (θ ), lies in the interval (0, 1).
A.2.2 Parameterizations
One parameterization of M is
M (u,v) = Au1−αvα ,
which imposes constant returns to scale in u and v . This is the Cobb–Douglas parame-
terization. Because M is increasing in both unemployment and vacancies, 1 − α > 0 and
α > 0. These two inequalities imply 0 < α < 1. Under random search, the probability
that a vacancy is lled is M/v .
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Under the Cobb–Douglas parameterization, the probability that a vacancy is lled is
q (θ ) = M
v
= Au1−αvα−1 = Aθα−1 = A
(
1
θ
)1−α
.
A direct computation establishes that the job-lling probability is decreasing in tightness.
It is harder, in other words, for an individual rm to ll a vacancy the more vacancies there
are for a given level of unemployment. From the expression for q (θ ), it is straightforward
to see how q can be larger than 1. For example, if A = 1, θ = .25, and α = .5, then(
1
.25
) .5
= 4.5 = 2.
This value of α is well within the range of empirical estimates and the value of θ was
experienced in the US economy around 2010.
The probability that a worker nds a job is
θq (θ ) = M
u
v
v
= Aθα .
The job-nding probability is increasing in θ . It is easier, in other words, for an individual
worker to nd a job the more vacancies there are for a given level of unemployment.
When evaluated at the parameters from the example above, job-nding is
.25.5 =
(
1
4
) .5
= .5.
These simple numerical examples suggest that a reasonable job-nding probability may
easily lead to an unreasonable job-lling rate.
The elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment is
ηM,u = −θq
′ (θ )
q (θ )
= −θ (α − 1)Aθ
α−2
Aθα−1
= 1 − α .
Another parameterization of the matching technology, suggested in den Haan, Ramey,
and Watson (2000), is
M (u,v) = A uv[uγ +vγ ]1/γ , γ > 0.
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The function M is increasing in both its arguments. Indeed,
∂M
∂u
= A
v (uγ +vγ )1/γ − 1γ (uγ +vγ )1/γ−1 γuγ−1uv
(uγ +vγ ) 2γ
= Av [u
γ +vγ ]1/γ − (uγ +vγ )1/γ−1uγv
(uγ +vγ ) 2γ
= Au [u
γ +vγ ]1/γ
(uγ +vγ ) 2γ
(
1 − u
γ
uγ +vγ
)
> 0.
A symmetric argument establishes that M is increasing in v as well.
Under the nonlinear parameterization, the probability that a vacancy is lled is
q (θ ) = M
v
= A u[uγ +vγ ]1/γ
1/u
1/u
= A 1
[1 + (v/u)γ ]1/γ
= A 1(1 + θγ )1/γ .
A direct computation establishes that the job-lling probability is decreasing in tightness:
dq (θ )
dθ
= −A
γ
1
(1 + θγ )1/γ−1γθ
γ−1 < 0.
The probability a worker nds a job is
θq (θ ) = M
u
= A θ(1 + θγ )1/γ .
The job-nding probability under the nonlinear parameterization is increasing in θ :
d
dθ
[θq (θ )] = A
(1 + θγ )1/γ − θ 1γ (1 + θγ )1/γ−1 γθγ−1
(1 + θγ )2/γ
= A (1 + θ
γ )1/γ − (1 + θγ )1/γ−1 θγ
(1 + θγ )2/γ
= A (1 + θ
γ )1/γ
(1 + θγ )2/γ
(
1 − θ
γ
1 + θγ
)
> 0.
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Importantly, for the nonlinear matching technology, when A =∞, the job-nding
probability is between 0 and 1. Indeed,
lim
θ→0
θq (θ ) = lim
θ→0
A θ(1 + θγ )1/γ = 0
and
lim
θ→∞
θq (θ ) = lim
Θ→∞A
θ
(1 + θγ )1/γ = limθ→∞A
1
(1 + Θγ )1/γ−1 Θγ−1
= A,
where the second-to-last equality uses L’Hôpital’s rule and the fact that
(1 + θγ )1/γ−1 θγ−1 = (1 + θγ ) 1−γγ
(
1
θ
)1−γ
= (1 + θγ ) 1−γγ
(
1
θ
)1−γ
= (1 + θγ ) 1−γγ
( [
1
θ
]γ ) 1−γγ
= (1 + θγ ) 1−γγ
(
1
θγ
) 1−γ
γ
=
[
1
θγ
(1 + θγ )
] 1−γ
γ
=
[
1 + 1
θγ
] 1−γ
γ
and therefore
lim
θ→∞
(1 + θγ )1/γ−1 θγ−1 = lim
θ→∞
[
1 + 1
θγ
] 1−γ
γ
= 1.
Additionally, the fact that the job-nding probability is increasing everywhere implies
that the probability a worker nds a job lies between 0 and 1 when A = 1.
Similarly, the job-lling probability for the nonlinear parameterization falls between
0 and 1. Indeed,
lim
θ→∞
q (θ ) = lim
θ→∞
A 1(1 + θγ )1/γ = 0
and
lim
θ→0
q (θ ) = lim
θ→∞
A 1(1 + θγ )1/γ = A.
The fact that the job-lling probability is decreasing everywhere implies that the proba-
bility a job is lled falls between 0 and 1 when A = 1.
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The elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment for the nonlinear parame-
terization is
ηM,u = −θq
′ (θ )
q (θ )
=
θ 1γA (1 + θγ )−1/γ−1 γθγ−1
A (1 + θγ )−1/γ
=
(1 + θγ )−1/γ−1 θγ
(1 + θγ )−1/γ
= (1 + θγ )−1 θγ = θ
γ
1 + θγ .
As implied by proposition 8, the elasticity falls inside the unit interval.
A.3 Canonical Search Model
This section provides a detailed analysis of the model described in section 1.4.2.
A.3.1 Key Bellman Equations and a Unique Equilibrium
Here I repeat the economy’s key Bellman equations described in the text for ease of ref-
erence. The key Bellman equations for rms are
J = y −w + β [sV + (1 − s)J ] , (A.10)
V = −c + β {q (θ )J + [1 − q (θ )]V} . (A.11)
Imposing the zero-prot condition in equation (A.11) implies
0 = −c + β {q (θ )J + [1 − q (θ ) 0]}
∴ c = βq (θ )J
or
J = c
βq (θ ) . (A.12)
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Substituting this result into equation (A.10) and imposing the zero-prot condition implies
J = y −w + β [sV + (1 − s)J ]
∴
c
βq (θ ) = y −w + β (1 − s)
c
βq (θ )
∴
c
βq (θ ) = y −w + (1 − s)
c
q (θ )
∴ w = y + (1 − s) c
q (θ ) −
c
βq (θ )
∴ w = y +
c
q (θ )
(
1 − s − 1
β
)
∴ w = y +
c
q (θ ) (−s − r ) .
This simplies to
w = y − r + s
q (θ )c . (A.13)
The key Bellman equations for workers are
E = w + β [sU + (1 − s) E] (A.14)
U = z + β {θq (θ ) E + [1 − θq (θ )]U } . (A.15)
In the canonical matching model, the match surplus, S = (J − V) + (E − U), is split
between a matched rm and worker. The outcome of Nash bargaining species
E − U = ϕS and J = (1 − ϕ)S, (A.16)
where ϕ ∈ [0, 1) measures the worker’s bargaining power.
Solving equation (A.10) for J yields
J = y −w + β (1 − s)J
∴ J [1 − β (1 − s)] = y −w
∴ J = y −w1 − β (1 − s) .
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And solving (A.14) for E yields
E = w + βsU + β (1 − s) E
∴ E [1 − β (1 − s)] = w + βsU
∴ E = w + βsU1 − β (1 − s) =
w
1 − β (1 − s) +
βsU
1 − β (1 − s) .
Developing the expressions in (A.16) yields
E − U = ϕS
= ϕ
J
1 − ϕ
and using the just-derived expressions for J and E yields[
w
1 − β (1 − s) +
βsU
1 − β (1 − s)
]
︸                                  ︷︷                                  ︸
E
−U = ϕ1 − ϕ
[
y −w
1 − β (1 − s)
]
︸            ︷︷            ︸
J
.
Developing this expression yields
w + βsU − [1 − β (1 − s)]U = ϕ1 − ϕ (y −w)
∴ w + βsU − U + βU − sβU = ϕ1 − ϕ (y −w)
∴ w =
ϕ
1 − ϕ (y −w) + (1 − β)U
∴ (1 − ϕ)w = ϕ (y −w) + (1 − ϕ) (1 − β)U
∴ w = ϕy + (1 − β)U − ϕ (1 − β)U .
Using the fact that
1 − β = 1 − 11 + r =
1 + r − 1
1 + r =
r
1 + r ,
the latter expression can be written as
w =
r
1 + r U + ϕ
(
y − r1 + r U
)
, (A.17)
which is equation (12) in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017). The annuity value of being un-
employed is rU/(1 + r ). To get an expression for the annuity value, solve equation (A.15)
for E−U and substitute this expression and equation (A.12)) into equations (A.16. Turning
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to equation (A.15):
U = z + β {θq (θ ) E + [1 − θq (θ )]U }
∴ U = z + βθq (θ ) E + βU − βθq (θ )U
∴ U = z + [βθq (θ )] (E − U) + βU
U (1 − β) − z = [βθq (θ )] (E − U)
∴ E − U = 1
βθq (θ ) [(1 − β)U − z]
=
1 + r
θq (θ ) [(1 − β)U − z]
=
r
θq (θ )U −
1 + r
θq (θ )z.
Using this expression for E − U in (A.16) yields
E − U = ϕS
∴
r
θq (θ )U −
1 + r
θq (θ )z = ϕS
= ϕ
( J
1 − ϕ
)
=
ϕ
1 − ϕ
c
βq (θ ),
where the last equality uses the expression for J in equation (A.12). Developing this
expression yields
r
θq (θ )U −
1 + r
θq (θ )z =
ϕ
1 − ϕ
c
βq (θ )
∴ rU − (1 + r ) z = ϕ1 − ϕ
1
β
cθ
∴ rU − (1 + r ) z = ϕ1 − ϕ (1 + r ) cθ
∴
r
1 + r U = z +
ϕcθ
1 − ϕ , (A.18)
which is equation (10) in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017). Substituting equation (A.18)) into
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equation (A.17 yields
w =
r
1 + r U + ϕ
(
y − r1 + r U
)
= z +
ϕcθ
1 − ϕ + ϕ
(
y − z − ϕcθ1 − ϕ
)
= (1 − ϕ) z + (1 − ϕ)
(
ϕcθ
1 − ϕ
)
+ ϕy
= (1 − ϕ) z + ϕcθ + ϕy
= z + ϕ (y − z + θc) . (A.19)
The two expression in (A.13)) and (A.19 for the wage rate jointly determine the equi-
librium value of θ :
y − r + s
q (θ )c = z + ϕ (y − z + θc) .
Developing this expression yields
y − r + s
q (θ )c = z + ϕ (y − z + θc)
∴ y − z = ϕ (y − z + θc) + r + s
q (θ )c
∴ (1 − ϕ) (y − z) = ϕθc + r + s
q (θ )c
=
[
ϕθq (θ )
q (θ ) +
r + s
q (θ )
]
c
∴ y − z = r + s + ϕθq (θ )(1 − ϕ)q (θ ) c (A.20)
Equation A.20 implicitly denes an equilibrium level of tightness. Existence and unique-
ness of equilibrium tightness is established by proposition 9.
Proposition 9 Suppose y > z, which says that workers produce more of the homogeneous
consumption good at work than at home, and suppose that (1 − ϕ) (y − z) /(r + s) > c , a
unique θ > 0 solves the relationship in (A.20). The condition that (1 − ϕ) (y − z) /(r + s) > c
requires that the marginal value of the rst vacancy is positive.
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To establish the existence part of proposition 9, I dene the function
T
(
θ˜
)
=
y − z
c
−
r + s + ϕθ˜q
(
θ˜
)
(1 − ϕ)q
(
θ˜
)
=
y − z
c
− r + s
(1 − ϕ)q
(
θ˜
) − ϕ1 − ϕ θ˜ .
Then, using the fact that limθ→0 q (θ ) = 1,
lim
θ˜→0
T
(
θ˜
)
=
y − z
c
− r + s1 − ϕ > 0,
where the inequality uses the assumption that (1 − ϕ) (y − z) /(r + s) > 0. Additionally, I
dene
θ˜• =
1 − ϕ
ϕ
y − z
c
> 0,
where the inequality comes from the fact that y > z and ϕ ∈ (0, 1) by assumption. Then
T
(
θ˜•
)
=
y − z
c
− r + s
(1 − ϕ)q
(
θ˜•
) − ϕ1 − ϕ θ˜•
=
y − z
c
− r + s
(1 − ϕ)q
(
θ˜•
) − ϕ1 − ϕ 1 − ϕϕ y − zc
= − r + s
(1 − ϕ)q
(
θ˜•
)
< 0,
where the inequality comes from the fact that q
(
θ˜•
)
> 0. Because T is a combination of
continuous functions, it is also continuous. Therefore, an application of the intermediate
value theorem establishes that there exists θ ∈
(
0, 1−ϕϕ
y−z
c
)
such that T (θ ) = 0.
The uniquness part of proposition 9 comes from the fact that T is decreasing. Indeed,
T ′
(
θ˜
)
=
r + s
(1 − ϕ)
[
q
(
θ˜
)]2q′ (θ˜ ) − ϕ(1 − ϕ) < 0,
and the inequality comes from the fact that q′ < 0.
In proposition 9, the condition that (1 − ϕ) (y − z) /(r + s) > c requires that the
marginal value of posting an initial vacancy is protable. The following thought experi-
112
ment illustres why.
Starting from a given level of unemployment, which is guarenteed with exogenous
separations, the marginal value of posting an initial vacancy is computed as limθ→0 V .
In this thought experiment, the probability that the vacancy is lled is 1; that is,
limθ→0 q (θ ) = 1. The following period the rm earns the value of a productive match,
which equals the ow payo y − w plus the value of a productive match discounted by
β (1 − s); that is, y −w + β (1 − s)J . Solving this expression for J yields
J = y −w + β (1 − s)J
∴ J [1 − β (1 − s)] = y −w
∴ J = y −w1 − β (1 − s) .
The wage rate paid by the rm, looking at the expression in (A.19), is
lim
θ→0
w = lim
θ→0
z + ϕ (y − z + θc)
= ϕy + (1 − ϕ) z,
making
J = (1 − ϕ) (y − z)1 − β (1 − s) .
Using this expression in the value of an initial vacancy
lim
θ→0
V = lim
θ→0
〈−c + β {q (θ )J + [1 − q (θ )]V}〉
= −c + β (1 − ϕ) (y − z)1 − β (1 − s)
> 0.
The inequality stipulations that in order to start the process of posting vacancies, the rst
needs to be protable. Developing this inequality yields
β
(1 − ϕ) (y − z)
1 − β (1 − s) > c
∴
1
1 + r
(1 − ϕ) (y − z)
1 − 11+r (1 − s)
> c
∴
(1 − ϕ) (y − z)
1 + r − 1 + s > c
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or (1 − ϕ) (y − z)
r + s
> c .
Which is the condition listed in proposition 9.
Finally, for thoroughness, the equilibrium level of unemployment is
u =
s
s + θq (θ ) . (A.21)
A.3.2 A Eecomposition of the Elasticity of Market Tightness and
Fundamental Surplus
The elasticity of tightness with respect to productivity is
ηθ,y =
dθ
dy
θ
y
.
Folliwng Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017), in this section I decompose this key elasticity
into two terms the rst is a constant and the second is the inverse of fundamental surplus.
I show that the constant depends is bounded below by 1 and above the inverse of the
elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment.
To uncover ηθ ,y , note that equation (A.20) can be written
y − z = r + s + ϕθq (θ )(1 − ϕ)q (θ ) c
∴
1 − ϕ
c
(y − z) = r + s + ϕθq (θ )
q (θ )
=
r + s
q (θ ) + ϕθ . (A.22)
Dene
z (θ ,y) ≡ 1 − ϕ
c
(y − z) − r + s
q (θ ) − ϕθ .
Then implicit dierentiation implies
dθ
dy
= −∂z/∂y
∂z/∂θ = −
1−ϕ
c
r+s
[q(θ )]2q
′ (θ ) − ϕ
= −
[
r+s
q(θ ) + ϕθ
]
1
y−z
r+s
[q(θ )]2q
′ (θ ) − ϕ ,
where the last equality uses the equality in (A.22).
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Developing this expression yields
dθ
dy
= −
[
r+s
q(θ ) + ϕθ
]
r+s
[q(θ )]2q
′ (θ ) − ϕ
1
y − z ×
θq (θ )
θq (θ )
= − [r + s + ϕθq (θ )]
(r + s) q′(θ )θq(θ ) − ϕθq (θ )
θ
y − z . (A.23)
The expression in the denominator is related to the elasticity of matching with respect to
unemployment.
Using the expression for ηM,u in (A.9) in the developing expression for dθ/dy yields
dθ
dy
= − [r + s + ϕθq (θ )]
(r + s)
(
q′(θ )θ
q(θ )
)
− ϕθq (θ )
θ
y − z
=
[r + s + ϕθq (θ )]
(r + s)ηM,u + ϕθq (θ )
θ
y − z .
Further developing this expression yields
dθ
dy
=
r + s + ϕθq (θ )
(r + s)ηM,u + ϕθq (θ )
θ
y − z
=
r + s + (r + s)ηM,u − (r + s)ηM,u + ϕθq (θ )
(r + s)ηM,u + ϕθq (θ )
θ
y − z
=
[
1 +
r + s − (r + s)ηM,u
(r + s)ηM,u + ϕθq (θ )
]
θ
y − z
=
[
1 +
(r + s) (1 − ηM,u )
(r + s)ηM,u + ϕθq (θ )
]
θ
y − z .
This expression implies
ηθ ,y =
dθ
dy
y
θ
=
[
1 +
(r + s) (1 − ηM,u )
(r + s)ηM,u + ϕθq (θ )
]
y
y − z
= ϒ
y
y − z , (A.24)
which is a fundamental result in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017). The expression in
(A.24) decomposes the elasticity of tightess with respect to productivity into two factors.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017) focus on the second factor because the rst factor, ϒ, “has
an upper bound coming from a consensus about values of the elasticity of matching with
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respect to unemployment.”
As long as the conditions for an interior equilibrium in proposition 9 hold, ϒ is bounded
above by 1/ηM,u . Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017) establish this fact by noting that ϒ can be
viewed as a function of ϕ. The evaluating ϒ at ϕ = 0 implies
ϒ

ϕ=0
= 1 +
(r + s) (1 − ηM,u )
(r + s)ηM,u = 1 +
1 − ηM,u
ηM,u
=
1
ηM,u
> 1,
where the inequality is established in proposition 8. Moreover, ϒ is decreasing in ϕ:
∂ϒ
∂ϕ
= − (r + s)
(
1 − ηM,u
)[(r + s)ηM,u + ϕθq (θ )]2θq (θ ) < 0.
These two facts establish that ϒ is bounded above by 1/ηM,u . Moreover, the expression for
ϒ in (A.24) establishes that ϒ is bounded below by 1. These results collected in proposition
10.
Proposition 10 In the canonical search model, which features random search, exogenous
separations, and no disturbances in aggregate productivity, the elasticity of market tightness
with respect to productivity can be decomposed as
ηθ ,y = ϒ
y
y − z ,
where the second factor is the inverse of fundamental surplus (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2017)
and the rst factor is bounded below by 1 and above by 1/ηM,u ; that is,
1 < ϒ < 1
ηM,u
.
Proposition 10 suggests the importance of ηM,u in the data.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix to On the Tension between
Maximum Sustainable Yield and Maximum
Economic Yield
B.1 Proofs and derivations for analysis in Tension be-
tween Maximum Sustainable Yield and Maximum
Economic Yield
B.1.1 The shery manager’s problem
The unit mass of people that make up the household is divided between employment and
unemployment: 1 = e(t)+u(t). Employment is further divided between people who work
in commercial shing and those that don’t: e(t) = eχ + eϖ . Employment in the shery
evolves according to
Ûeχ = −λeχ (t) + ϕ(t)f (θ (t))u(t),
where ϕ(t) is the relative number of vacancies posted by vessel owners. Commercial sh-
ing loses vessels at rate λ and gains workers from unemployment at rate ϕ(t)f (θ (t))u(t).
Employment outside the shery evolves similarly:
Ûeχ = −λeχ (t) + ϕ(t)f (θ (t))u(t).
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Steady-state employment in the two sectors is given by
eχ =
ϕ f (θ )u
λ
eφ =
(1 − ϕ)f (θ )u
λ
.
Using the Beveridge curve relationship that comes out of (2.1), u = λ/(λ + f (θ )), the two
above expressions can be written as
eχ =
ϕ f (θ )u
λ
=
ϕ f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
eφ =
(1 − ϕ)f (θ )u
λ
=
(1 − ϕ)f (θ )
λ + f (θ ) .
As a check:
eχ + eφ =
ϕ f (θ ) + (1 − ϕ)f (θ )
λ + f (θ ) =
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
= 1 − u(θ ) = 1 − λ
λ + f (θ ) =
f (θ )
λ + f (θ ),
which simply conrms that steady-state employment is one minus the unemployment.
Steady-state employment in the shery is
eχ = ϕ
f (θ )
λ + f (θ ) = ϕe = ϕ(1 − u);
that is, the employment share in the shery is ϕ and the employment share outside the
shery is 1 − ϕ.
As in the text, at time t , the regulator chooses an optimal path by regulating vessel-
level harvest:
max
{h(τ )}
∫ ∞
τ=t
e−r (τ−t)
[
pχ (t)ϕ(t)(1 − u(t))h(τ ) −wχ (t)ϕ(t)(1 − u(t)) − ϕ(t)(1 − u(t))rk
]
dτ
subject to
ds
dτ
= д(s(τ )) − ϕ(t)(1 − u(t))h(τ ),
with s(t) = s0 given. The regulator takes pχ (t), ϕ(t), u(t), and wχ (t) as xed. The current-
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value Hamiltonian, with current-value costate variable Λ(τ ), is
H (h(τ ), s(τ ),Λ(τ )) = pχ (t)ϕ(t)(1 − u(t))h(τ ) −wχ (t)ϕ(t)(1 − u(t)) − ϕ(t)(1 − u(t))rk
+ Λ(τ ) [д(s(τ )) − ϕ(t)(1 − u(t))h(τ )] .
(B.1)
Linearity of the control implies a bang–bang solution. When pχ > Λ, the price of sh is
greater than the value of leaving the sh in the sea, directing the regulator to set h = h.
Conversely, when pχ < Λ, h = 0. When pχ = Λ, the regulator is directed to harvest sh
at the steady-state level: ϕ(1 −u)h = д(s?). To maintain s?, recruitment is divided among
the ϕ(1 − u) vessels. The regulator, in summary, moves the shery as rapidly as possible
to s? and then sets vessel-level harvest to hˆ = д(s?)/[ϕ(1 − u)] in order to maintain the
targeted stock level.
The level s? is determined from the two necessary conditions from the optimal-control
problem:
∂H
∂h
= (1 − u(t))ϕ(t)pχ (t) − Λ(τ )(1 − u(t))ϕ(t) = 0 (B.2)
∂H
∂s
= Λ(τ )дs(s(τ )) = rΛ(τ ) − dΛ
dτ
. (B.3)
Equation (B.2) implies
pχ = Λ(τ ), ⇒ dΛ
dτ
= 0,
as price is assumed to be xed. Using this result in equation (B.3) yields
Λдs(s?) = rΛ
дs(s?) = r .
Therefore the shery manager chooses s? so that дs(s?) = r . This choice is depicted in
gure 2.4.
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B.1.2 Derivation of the wage rule in the two sectors under Nash
bargaining
The following is the derivation of expressions for wages given in (2.8). Using (2.2) we
have
(r + λ)Wi = wi + λU
Wi =
wi + λU
r + λ
.
(B.4)
From equation (2.4), we have
(r + λ)Jφ = p −wφ + λVφ
Jφ =
p −wφ + λVφ
r + λ
Nash wage bargaining in the nonresource sector means the surplus a worker gains from
going from unemployment to nonresource employment,Wφ −U , equals a fraction of the
the surpluse a nonresource rm gains by lling a vacancy, Jφ − Vφ : (1 − β)(Wφ − U ) =
β(Jφ −Vφ); and it follows that
(1 − β)(Wφ −U ) = β(Jφ −Vφ)
(1 − β)((r + λ)−1(wφ + λU ) −U ) = β((r + λ)−1(p −wφ + λVφ) −Vφ)
(1 − β)(wφ + λU − (r + λ)U ) = β(p −wφ + λVφ − (r + λ)Vφ)
(1 − β)(wφ − rU ) = β(p −wφ − rVφ)
(Vφ = kφ)
(1 − β)(wφ − rU ) = β(p −wφ − rkφ)
(1 − β)wφ − (1 − β)rU = β(p − rkφ) − βwφ
wφ = β(p − rkφ) + (1 − β)rU ,
which is the expression found in (2.8) of the text.
Similarly in the resource sector, from the corresponding equation (2.4), we have
(r + λ)Jχ = pχhˆχ −wχ + λVχ
Jχ =
pχhˆχ −wχ + λVχ
r + λ
.
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Nash wage bargaining means (1 − β)(Wχ −U ) = β(Jχ −Vχ ). Using this fact gives
(1 − β)((r + λ)−1(wχ + λU ) −U ) = β((r + λ)−1(pχhˆ −wχ + λVχ ) −Vχ )
(using the expression forWχ in equation (B.4))
(1 − β)(wχ + λU − (r + λ)U ) = β(pχhˆ −wχ + λVχ − (r + λ)Vχ )
(1 − β)(wχ − rU ) = β(pχhˆ −wχ − rVχ )
(Vχ = kχ )
(1 − β)(wχ − rU ) = β(pχhˆ −wχ − rkχ )
(1 − β)wχ − (1 − β)rU = β(pχhˆ − rkχ ) − βwχ
wχ = β(pχhˆ − rkχ ) + (1 − β)rU ,
which is the expression found in (2.8) of the text.
B.1.3 Derivation of the value of being unemployed
This section derives equation (2.11). Using equation (2.2), we have:
rWφ = wφ + λ(U −Wφ)
⇒Wφ =
wφ + λU
r + λ
and
rWχ = wχ + λ(U −Wχ )
⇒Wχ =
wχ + λU
r + λ
.
Using the expressions for wages given in (2.8), the latter two expressions become
Wφ =
β(p − kφ) + (1 − β)rU + λU
r + λ
=
β(p − kφ) + [(1 − β)r + λ]U
r + λ
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and
Wχ =
β(pχhˆ − rkχ ) + (1 − β)rU + λU
r + λ
=
β(pχhˆ − rkχ ) + [(1 − β)r + λ]U
r + λ
Using the latter expressions for the value of work in equation (2.11) gives
rU = z + f (θ ) [ϕWχ + (1 − ϕ)Wφ −U ]
= z + f (θ )
{
ϕ
β(pχhˆ − rkχ ) + [(1 − β)r + λ]U
r + λ
+(1 − ϕ)β(pφ − rkφ) + [(1 − β)r + λ]U
r + λ
−U
}
= z + f (θ )
{
ϕ
β(pχhˆ − rkχ ) + [(1 − β)r + λ]U
r + λ
+(1 − ϕ)β(pφ − rkφ) + [(1 − β)r + λ]U
r + λ
− r + λ
r + λ
U
}
= z + f (θ )
[
ϕ
β(pχhˆ − rkχ )
r + λ
+ (1 − ϕ)β(pφ − rkφ)
r + λ
+
(1 − β)r + λ
r + λ
U − r + λ
r + λ
U
]
= z + f (θ )
[
ϕ
β(pχhˆ − rkχ )
r + λ
+ (1 − ϕ)β(pφ − rkφ)
r + λ
+
(1 − β)r + λ − r − λ
r + λ
U
]
((1 − β)r + λ − r − λ = r − rβ + λ − r − λ = −rβ)
= z + f (θ )
[
ϕ
β(pχhˆ − rkχ )
r + λ
+ (1 − ϕ)β(pφ − rkφ)
r + λ
− βr
r + λ
U
]
.
⇒ (r + λ)rU = (r + λ)z + f (θ )
[
ϕβ(pχhˆ − rkχ ) + (1 − ϕ)β(pφ − rkφ) − βrU
]
⇒ rU =
(r + λ)z + β f (θ )
[
ϕ(pχhˆ − rkχ ) + (1 − ϕ)(pφ − rkφ)
]
r + λ + βθq(θ ) ,
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which is equation (2.11) in the text.
B.1.4 How the value of unemployment changes with respect to
tightness
The value of unemployment has an ambiguous relationship with tightness due to declin-
ing productivity in the renewable resource sector. To be sure, the value of unemployment
is increasing in tightness for small values of ϕ; that is, when productivity in the shery is
h¯ > 1, the value of unemployment is increasing in tightness:
B.1.4.1 Case: ϕ < ϕˇ
When ϕ < ϕˇ, assuming the costs associated with posting a vacancy are the same across
the two sectors, kχ = kφ = k , the value of unemployment, from equation (2.11), is
Γ =
(r + λ)z + β f (θ )
[
ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk
]
r + λ + β f (θ ) , (B.5)
where, using equation (2.9),
ϕpχhˆ = ϕαh¯
α
(
1 − ϕ
ϕ
)1−α
(B.6)
and, from equation (2.10),
(1 − ϕ)pφ = (1 − ϕ)(1 − α)h¯α
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)α
. (B.7)
To determine ∂Γ/∂θ , dene the following terms:
T1 := (r + λ)z + β f (θ )
[
ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk
]
T2 := ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk
T3 := r + λ + β f (θ ).
The term T2 does not depend on θ . Then
∂Γ
∂θ
=
∂T1
∂θ T3 − ∂T3∂θ T1
T 23
(B.8)
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and
sgn ∂Γ
∂θ
∝ ∂T1
∂θ
T3 − ∂T3
∂θ
T1 (B.9)
as the denominator is positive. Evaluating these expressions gives
∂T1
∂θ
T3 − ∂T3
∂θ
T1 = β f
′(θ )T2T3 − β f ′(θ )T1
= β f ′(θ ) [T2T3 −T1]
= β f ′(θ ) {T2 [r + λ + β f (θ ) − (r + λ)z − β f (θ )T2]}
= β f ′(θ ) [T2(r + λ) − (r + λ)z]
= β f ′(θ )(r + λ)(T2 − z)
= β f ′(θ )(r + λ)
[
ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk − z
]
.
The latter gives
sgn ∂Γ
∂θ
∝ β f ′(θ )(r + λ)(ϕpχσ ∗h + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk − z) > 0. (B.10)
The inequality comes from the fact that ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk is the net expected ow of
output from all jobs (the value of output less the rental cost of capital) and this is greater
than the ow benet of nonwork (otherwise there would be no incentive to work). This
result yields
∂Γ
∂θ
> 0. (B.11)
B.1.4.2 Case: ϕ > ϕˇ
On the other hand, when ϕ > ϕˇ, the value of unemployment has an ambiguous relation-
ship with tightness. Still, from equation (2.11),
Γ =
(r + λ)z + β f (θ )
[
ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk
]
r + λ + β f (θ ) , (B.12)
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but now, using price from equation (2.9) and harvest from equation (2.7),
ϕpχhˆ = ϕα
[ (1 − ϕ)(1 − u)
д(s?)
]1−α д(s?)
ϕ(1 − u) (B.13)
= α(1 − ϕ)1−α
(
д(s?)
1 − u
)α
(B.14)
= α(1 − ϕ)1−αд(s?)α (1 − u)−α (B.15)
and
(1 − ϕ)pφ = (1 − ϕ)(1 − α)
[
д(s?)
(1 − ϕ)(1 − u)
]α
(B.16)
= (1 − α)(1 − ϕ)1−αд(s?)α (1 − u)−α . (B.17)
It will be useful to know
∂
∂θ
[
ϕpχhˆ
]
= α2д(s?)α (1 − ϕ)1−α
(
1
1 − u
)1+α
∂u
∂θ
< 0, (B.18)
as unemployment is decreasing in tightness. And that
∂
∂θ
[(1 − ϕ)pφ ] = α(1 − α)д(s∗)α (1 − ϕ)1−α ( 11 − u )1+α ∂u∂θ < 0, (B.19)
as, again, unemployment is decreasing in tightness.
Dene the terms
T4 := ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ (B.20)
T5 := (r + λ)z + β f (θ )T4 (B.21)
T6 := r + λ + β f (θ ). (B.22)
From (B.18) and (B.19)
∂T4
∂θ
< 0. (B.23)
Using the above terms,
Γ =
(r + λ)z + β f (θ )T4
T6
.
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Dierentiating Γ with respect to θ yields:
∂Γ
∂θ
=
[
β f ′(θ )T4 + ∂T4∂θ β f (θ )
]
T6 − β f ′(θ )T5
T 26
. (B.24)
Evaluating the latter yields
sgn ∂Γ
∂θ
∝ β f ′(θ )T4T6 + ∂T4
∂θ
β f (θ )T6 − β f ′(θ )T5
= β f ′(θ )T4[r + λ + β f (θ )] + ∂T4
∂θ
β f (θ )[r + λ + β f (θ )] − β f ′(θ )[(r + λ)z + β f (θ )T4]
= β f ′(θ )(r + λ)(T4 − z) + ∂T4
∂θ
β f (θ )[r + λ + β f (θ )].
The latter equation gives
sgn ∂Γ
∂θ
∝ β f ′(θ )(r + λ)[ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk − z]
+
∂T4
∂θ
β f (θ )[r + λ + β f (θ )].
(B.25)
The expression in (B.25) is the same as the expression for ∂Γ/∂θ in (B.10) except for the
eects of crowding and stock externalities: ∂T4/∂θ , which is the eect of tightness on the
value of average productivity. Since ∂T4/∂θ < 0, established in equation (B.23), crowding
and stock externalities have a negative eect on the value of average productivity.
B.1.5 How the value of unemployment changeswith respect to the
share of shers
The value of unemployment rst increases and then decreases at the share of jobs in the
shery increases. The value of unemployment is given in equation (2.11). Assuming the
cost of posting vacancies is the same across both sectors, this expression can be simplied
to
Γ(θ,ϕ) =
(r + λ)z + β f (θ )
[
ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ
]
r + λ + β f (θ ) , (B.26)
with prices given in equations (2.9) and (2.10). Then
sgn ∂Γ
∂ϕ
= sgn ∂
∂ϕ
[
ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ
]
. (B.27)
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When ϕ is nearly zero [see (2.7)], the latter expression evaluates to
ϕαh¯α−1
(
1 − ϕ
ϕ
)1−α
h¯ + (1 − ϕ)(1 − α)h¯α
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)α
,
which simplies to
αh¯αϕ
(
1 − ϕ
ϕ
)1−α
+ (1 − α)h¯α (1 − ϕ)
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)α
h¯α
[
αϕ
(
1 − ϕ
ϕ
)1−α
+ (1 − α)(1 − ϕ)
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)α ]
h¯α
[
αϕα (1 − ϕ)1−α + (1 − α)ϕα (1 − ϕ)1−α ]
h¯αϕα (1 − ϕ)1−α .
Dierentiating ϕα (1 − ϕ)1−α with respect to ϕ gives
αϕα−1(1 − ϕ)1−α − (1 − α)ϕα (1 − ϕ)−α
α
(
1 − ϕ
ϕ
)1−α
− (1 − α)
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)α
α
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)−1+α
− (1 − α)
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)α
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)α (
α
1 − ϕ
ϕ
− (1 − α)
)
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)α α − ϕ
ϕ
.
(B.28)
Therefore, for an interior equilibrium,
sgn ∂Γ
∂ϕ
= sgn α − ϕ
ϕ
. (B.29)
The expression in equation (B.29) is positive for small values of ϕ and negative for large
values of ϕ. Preference parameterization determines the sign.
When ϕ is away from 0; that is, when the shery is able to harvest an amount equal
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to recruitment, ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ evaluates to
ϕpχσ
∗h + (1 − ϕ)pφ
ϕα(1 − ϕ)1−α (1 − u)1−αд(s∗)−1+α д(s
∗)
ϕ(1 − u) + (1 − ϕ)(1 − α)
[
д(s∗)
(1 − ϕ)(1 − u)
]α
αд(s∗)α (1 − u)−α (1 − ϕ)1−α + (1 − α)д(s∗)α (1 − u)−α (1 − ϕ)1−α
д(s∗)α (1 − u)−α (1 − ϕ)1−α
(B.30)
Dierentiating the latter with respect to ϕ yields
− α(1 − α)
[
д(s∗)
1 − u
]α 1
(1 − ϕ)2 − (1 − α)
2
[
д(s∗)
(1 − ϕ)(1 − u)
]α
< 0. (B.31)
Here sgn ∂Γ/∂ϕ < 0: The value of unemployment is decreasing once the shery is capable
of harvesting a level equal to recruitment. The manager of the shery sets a target harvest
level and then divides this level evenly among the shers. Adding more shers at this
point decreases catch per vessel.
B.1.6 The value of unemployment is nite, given a level of tight-
ness
From equation (2.11),
Γ(θ ,ϕ) =
(r + λ)z + β f (θ )
[
ϕ
(
pχhˆ − rkχ
)
+ (1 − ϕ) (pφ − rkφ ) ]
r + λ + β f (θ )
=
(r + λ)z + β f (θ )
[
ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk
]
r + λ + β f (θ ) ,
(B.32)
where the second equality comes from the maintained assumption that kχ = kφ = k . The
only terms in (B.32) that depend on ϕ are contained in the bracket. And because the other
terms of nite, focus on the bracketed term.
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B.1.6.1 When the shery manager directs the eet to harvest at full capacity
When hˆ = h, the term in brackets (ignoring the cost of capital) becomes, using the expres-
sions for prices in equations (2.9) and (2.10),
ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ
= ϕαh
α−1
(
1 − ϕ
ϕ
)1−α
h + (1 − ϕ)(1 − α)hα
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)α
= αh
α
ϕα (1 − ϕ)1−α + (1 − α)hαϕα (1 − ϕ)1−α
= h
α
ϕα (1 − ϕ)1−α .
The term h
α
is a nite, positive number. The dependence on ϕ will therefore be qualita-
tively determined by ρ(ϕ) := ϕα (1 − ϕ)1−α . As ϕ → 0, this term goes to 0. As ϕ → 0, this
term goes to 0.
The maximum of ρ(ϕ) on [0, 1] is determined by setting the rst derivative equal to 0:
ρ′(ϕ) = αϕα−1(1 − ϕ)1−α − (1 − α)ϕα (1 − ϕ)−α = 0.
Developing this expression by multiplying both sides by ϕ−α yields
0 = αϕ−1(1 − ϕ)1−α − (1 − α)(1 − ϕ)−α = αϕ−1(1 − ϕ) − (1 − α),
where the last equality comes from multiplying both sides by (1 − ϕ)α . Re-arranging the
latter yields:
ϕ
1 − ϕ =
α
1 − α ⇐⇒ ϕ = α .
The critical point ϕ = α is a maximum. Indeed:
ρ′′(ϕ) = α(α − 1)ϕα−2(1 − ϕ)1−α + α(1 − α)ϕα−1(1 − ϕ)−α (−1)−[
α(1 − α)ϕα−1(1 − ϕ)−α − α(1 − α)ϕα (1 − ϕ)−α−1(−1)]
= α − (1 − α)ϕα−2(1 − ϕ)1−α − α(1 − α)ϕα−1(1 − ϕ)−α
− α(1 − α)ϕα−1(1 − ϕ)−α − α(1 − α)ϕα (1 − ϕ)−α−1
< 0.
Because |αα (1 − α)1−α | < +∞, the value of unemployment, given θ ∈ (0,∞), takes on
only nite values as ϕ varies.
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B.1.6.2 When the shery manager implements a tradable quota scheme
When the shery is capable of harvestingд(s?) the shery manager implements a tradable
quota scheme, leading to each vessel harvesting д(s?)/[ϕ(1 −u)]. As with the case where
the shery is directed to harvest at full capacity, how the value of unemployment depends
on ϕ is determined by the bracketed terms in (B.32). Using prices in equations (2.9) and
(2.10), the term in brackets, ignoring the cost of capital, becomes
ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ
= ϕα
[ (1 − ϕ)(1 − u)
д(s?)
]1−α д(s?)
ϕ(1 − u) + (1 − ϕ)(1 − α)
[
д(s?)
(1 − ϕ)(1 − u)
]α
= α(1 − ϕ)1−α (1 − u)−αд(s?)1−α + (1 − α)(1 − ϕ)1−αд(s?)α (1 − u)−α
= (1 − ϕ)1−αд(s?)α (1 − u)−α .
This term is nite for all ϕ ∈ [0, 1].
B.1.7 Equilibrium Job-creation Equations for Firms
Equation (2.12) comes from equations (2.4) and (2.5). These two equations generate a
single equation in terms of θ and U :
r Jφ − rVφ = r (Jφ −Vφ)
= pφ −wφ + λ(Vφ − Jφ) − q(θ )(Jφ −Vφ)
= pφ −wφ − λ(Jφ −Vφ) − q(θ )(Jφ −Vφ).
⇒ [r + λ + q(θ )](Jφ −Vφ) = pφ −wφ
Jφ −Vφ =
pφ −wφ
r + λ + q(θ )
(using the expression for wages in equation (2.8))
Jφ −Vφ =
pφ − β(pφ − rkφ) − (1 − β)rU
r + λ + q(θ ) .
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From equation (2.5), rVφ = rkφ = q(θ )(Jφ −Vφ), we have
rkφ
q(θ ) =
pφ − β(pφ − rkφ) − (1 − β)rU
r + λ + q(θ )
rkφ = q(θ )
pφ − β(pφ − rkφ) − (1 − β)rU
r + λ + q(θ )
rkφ[r + λ + q(θ )] = q(θ )[pφ − β(pφ − rkφ) − (1 − β)rU ]
rkφ[r + λ + (1 − β)q(θ )] = (1 − β)q(θ )(pφ − rU ).
The latter gives,
pφ − rU =
rkφ[r + λ + (1 − β)q(θ )]
(1 − β)q(θ ) ,
which gives equation (2.12) in the text.
Equation (2.13) comes from using the expressions for Jχ andVχ = 0, which correspond
to equations (2.4) and (2.5). These expressions generate an equation in terms of θ and U :
r Jχ − rVχ = r (Jχ −Vχ )
= pχhˆ −wχ + λ(Vχ − Jχ ) − q(θ )(Jχ −Vχ )
= pχhˆ −wχ − λ(Jχ −Vχ ) − q(θ )(Jχ −Vχ ).
⇒ [r + λ + q(θ )](Jχ −Vχ ) = pχhˆ −wχ
Jχ −Vχ =
pχhˆ −wχ
r + λ + q(θ )
(using the expression for wages in equation (2.8))
Jχ −Vχ =
pχhˆ − β(pχhˆ − rkχ ) − (1 − β)rU
r + λ + q(θ )
131
Using the latter and the fact that rVχ = rkχ = q(θ )(Jχ −Vχ ), we have
rkχ
q(θ ) =
pχhˆ − β(pχhˆ − rkχ ) − (1 − β)rU
r + λ + q(θ )
rkχ = q(θ )
pχhˆ − β(pχhˆ − rkχ ) − (1 − β)rU
r + λ + q(θ )
rkχ [r + λ + q(θ )] = q(θ )[pχhˆ − β(pχhˆ − rkχ ) − (1 − β)rU ]
rkχ [r + λ + (1 − β)q(θ )] = (1 − β)q(θ )(pχhˆ − rU ).
The latter gives
pχhˆ − rU =
rkχ [r + λ + (1 − β)q(θ )]
(1 − β)q(θ ) ,
which is equation (2.13) in the text.
B.1.8 Equilibrium share of shers
Looking at the two job-creation equations in (2.12) and (2.13), the right-hand sides are
both the same. The two left-hand sides therefore must be equal. Thus, in equilibrium, the
value of output must be the same in both sectors:
pχhˆ = pφ . (B.33)
Regardless of the shery manager’s regulation, the share of equilibrium shers is α .
Indeed, when shers are directed to harvest h, equation (B.33) evaluates to
αh
α−1
(
1 − ϕ
ϕ
)1−α
h = (1 − α)hα
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)α
,
using prices in (2.9) and (2.10). Developing this expression yields
αh
α
(
1 − ϕ
ϕ
)1−α
= (1 − α)hα
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)α
∴ α
(
1 − ϕ
ϕ
)1−α
= (1 − α)
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)α
∴ α(1 − ϕ)1−αϕ−1+α = (1 − α)ϕα (1 − ϕ)−α
∴ α(1 − ϕ)ϕ−1 = (1 − α)
∴
α
1 − α =
ϕ
1 − ϕ .
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So α(1 − ϕ) = (1 − α)ϕ, or α = ϕ, establishing part of proposition 2.
The same result holds when the eet is capable of harvesting д(s?). In this case, equa-
tion (B.33) becomes
α
[ (1 − ϕ)(1 − u)
д(s?)
]1−α д(s?)
ϕ(1 − u) = (1 − α)
[
д(s?)
(1 − ϕ)(1 − u)
]α
.
Therefore
α(1 − ϕ)1−α (1 − u)1−αд(s?)−1+αд(s?)ϕ−1(1 − u)−1 =
(1 − α)д(s?)α (1 − ϕ)−α (1 − u)−α .
Canceling terms yields
α(1 − ϕ)1−α (1 − u)−αд(s?)αϕ−1 = (1 − α)д(s?)α (1 − ϕ)−α (1 − u)−α
∴ α(1 − ϕ)ϕ−1 = (1 − α)
∴
α
1 − α =
ϕ
1 − ϕ .
The same algebra from above establishes that ϕ = α .
B.1.9 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
To get the existence and uniqueness result in proposition 2, use the fact that pφ = pχhˆ in
equilibrium to write the value of unemployment in equilibrium as
Γ(θ ,ϕ) =
(r + λ)z + β f (θ )
[
ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk
]
r + λ + β f (θ )
=
(r + λ)z + β f (θ ) [pφ − rk]
r + λ + β f (θ ) .
Use this result in the equilibrium job-creation curve in the nonresource sector, given in
equation (2.12):
pφ − Γ(θ ,ϕ) = rk + rk(r + λ)(1 − β)q(θ ),
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yielding
rk(r + λ)
(1 − β)q(θ ) = pφ − rk −
(r + λ)z + β f (θ ) [pφ − rk]
r + λ + β f (θ )
∴
rk(r + λ)
(1 − β)q(θ ) =
(pφ − rk) [r + λ + β f (θ ) − β f (θ )]
r + λ + β f (θ ) −
(r + λ)z
r + λ + β f (θ )
∴
rk(r + λ)
(1 − β)q(θ ) =
(pφ − rk) (r + λ)
r + λ + β f (θ ) −
(r + λ)z
r + λ + β f (θ )
∴
rk(r + λ)
(1 − β)q(θ ) =
(pφ − z − rk) (r + λ)
r + λ + β f (θ ) .
When the equilibrium result ϕ? = α is used in the above expression, the latter is an
expression only in terms of θ . One can write T (θ?) = 0, where
T (θ ) := (pφ − rk − z) (r + λ)
r + λ + β f (θ ) −
rk(r + λ)
(1 − β)q(θ ) (B.34)
and pφ is given in (2.10). Equilibrium tightness is dened implicitly as T (θ?) = 0.
There are two cases to consider, depending on the form of pφ . The form of pφ depends
on whether or not the eet is capable of harvesting д(s?). For low values of θ , the eet is
incapable of harvesting д(s?). As θ becomes arbitrarily large, however, the eet is capable
of harvesting д(s?). The critical value of θ comes from the harvest rule in (2.7).
The critical value of θ , denoted by θˆ , is dened by
h =
д(s?)
α
f (θˆ )
λ+f (θˆ )
,
where ϕ in (2.7) has been replaced by its equilibrium value α and (1−u) has been replaced
by the equilibrium level of employment. Rearranging yields
αhf (θˆ ) =
[
λ + f (θˆ )
]
д(s?)
∴
[
αh − д(s?)
]
f (θˆ ) = λд(s?)
∴ f (θˆ ) = λд(s
?)
αh − д(s?)
.
In order for the right-hand side to be positive in the above expression αh > д(s?). Which
is equivalent to requiring that the equilibrium eet for the case when the entire economy
is working is capable of harvesting the desired stock level. This is not a restriction on
parameters for models of modern commercial shing.
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The critical value θˆ is then dened as
θˆ = f −1
(
λд(s?)
αh − д(s?)
)
.
Note that, other than being a function of biological parameters, s? is an implicit function
of r . So the expression for θˆ is written entirely in terms of deep parameters.
For values of θ < θˆ , h < д(s?)/α/(1 − u) and the shery manager directs the eet to
harvest at full capacity. For values of θ > θˆ , h > д(s?)/α/(1 −u) and the shery manager
implements a tradable quota scheme to target the desired stock level.
B.1.9.1 Existence
To prove that an equilibrium exists, observe that T is continuous.
For θ < θˆ , because ϕ = α , pφ = (1 − α)hααα (1 − α)−α . The price of the good pro-
duced in the nonresource sector is independent of θ . And because limθ→0 f (θ ) = 0 and
limθ→0 q(θ ) = ∞,
T (0) = pφ − z − rk > 0.
The inequality follows from the fact that pφ − rk is the net product of a productive match
and, in equilibrium, this is greater than the ow value of nonwork.
On the other hand, when θ > θˆ and θ →∞, pφ depends on θ . From equation (2.10)
pφ = (1 − α)
[
д(s?)
(1 − α)(1 − u)
]α
= (1 − α)д(s?)α (1 − α)−α (1 − u)−α
= (1 − α)1−αд(s?)α
(
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
)−α
,
where f (θ )/[λ + f (θ )] is the equilibrium level of employment.
The expression for T becomes
T (θ ) :=
[
(1 − α)1−αд(s?)α
(
f (θ )
λ+f (θ )
)−α − rk − z] (r + λ)
r + λ + β f (θ ) −
rk(r + λ)
(1 − β)q(θ ) .
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Dene θ˜ implicitly as
(pφ − rk − z)(r + λ)
r + λ + β f (θ˜ ) =
1
2
rk(r + λ)
(1 − β)q(θ˜ ) . (B.35)
and put aside whether θ˜ exists for the moment. Then
T (θ˜ ) = rk(r + λ)(1 − β)q(θ˜ )
(
1
2 − 1
)
< 0.
By the intermediate-value theorem, there exists θ? ∈ (θ, θ˜ ) such that T (θ?) = 0.
The existence of such a θ˜ in (B.35) comes from another application of the intermediate
value theorem. Write (B.35) as
q(θ˜ ) pφ − rk − z
r + λ + β f (θ˜ ) =
1
2
rk
(1 − β) .
Using the equilibrium expression for pφ the latter evaluates to
q(θ˜ )
[
(1−α)1−αд(s?)α(
f (θ˜ )
λ+f (θ˜ )
)α − rk − z
]
r + λ + β f (θ˜ ) =
1
2
rk
(1 − β) .
The question is whether the left-hand side can equal the positive number rk/(1 − β)/2.
The answer is yes.
Dene the function
Ψ(θ ) :=
q(θ )
[
(1−α)1−αд(s?)α(
f (θ )
λ+f (θ )
)α − rk − z
]
r + λ + β f (θ ) . (B.36)
First note that Ψ is a continuous function of θ . Moreover, evaluating Ψ at θˆ leads to a
positive number. To see this, use the fact that
f (θˆ )
λ + f (θˆ ) =
д(s?)
αh
.
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Use this expression in (B.36), yielding
Ψ(θˆ ) =
q(θˆ )
[
(1−α)1−αд(s?)α(
д(s?)
αh
)α−rk−z
]
r + λ + β f (θˆ ) .
Simplifying yields the expression
Ψ(θˆ ) = q(θˆ )
r + λ + β f (θˆ )
{
(1 − α)1−αααhα − rk − z
}
=
q(θˆ )
r + λ + β f (θˆ )
{
pφ − rk − z
}
> 0,
where the second equality uses the expression for pφ in (2.10) with ϕ = α and the inequal-
ity follows from pφ − rk > z in equilibrium.
To get a negative value, use the fact that limθ→∞ q(θ ) = 0 and limθ→∞ f (θ ) = ∞ to see
that Ψ(θ ) → 0 as θ →∞. The intermediate-value theorem then establishes the existence
of θ˜ ∈ (θˆ,∞) such that Ψ(θ˜ ) = rk/(1 − β)/2. This result establishes the existence of θ˜
dened in (B.35).
B.1.9.2 Uniqueness
Uniqueness of the equilibrium follows from the fact that T is a decreasing function of θ .
When θ < θˆ , the derivative of T with respect to θ evaluates to:
∂T
∂θ

θ>θˆ
= −(pφ − rk − z)(r + λ)(r + λ + β f (θ ))2 β f
′(θ ) + rk(r + λ)(1 − β)[q(θ )]2q
′(θ )
< 0,
where the inequality comes from the fact that f ′ > 0 and q′ < 0.
When the case when θ > θˆ , Dene
x(θ ) := (1 − α)1−αд(s?)α
(
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
)−α
. (B.37)
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And note that
∂x(θ )
∂θ
= −(1 − α)1−αд(s?)αα
(
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
)−α−1 f ′(θ ) [λ + f (θ )] − f ′(θ )f (θ )
[λ + f (θ )]2
= −(1 − α)1−αд(s?)αα
(
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
)−α−1 f ′(θ )λ
[λ + f (θ )]2
< 0.
(B.38)
The inequality follows from the fact that f ′(θ ) > 0.
Using x(θ ) dened in (B.37), write T (θ ) as
T (θ )

θ>θˆ
=
[x(θ ) − rk − z] (r + λ)
r + λ + β f (θ ) −
rk(r + λ)
(1 − β)q(θ ) .
Then
∂T
∂θ

θ<θˆ
=
x′(θ )(r + λ) [r + λ + β f (θ )] − β f ′(θ ) [x(θ ) − rk − z]
[r + λ + β f (θ )]2 +
rk(r + λ)
(1 − β) [q(θ )]2
=
x′(θ )(r + λ) [r + λ + β f (θ )] − β f ′(θ ) [pϕ − rk − z]
[r + λ + β f (θ )]2 +
rk(r + λ)
(1 − β) [q(θ )]2q
′(θ )
< 0,
where the inequality follows from the fact that pφ − rk > z because equilibrium net prot
is greater than the ow value of nonwork, x′(θ ) < 0 from (B.38), f ′(θ ) > 0, and q′(θ ) < 0.
Thus T is monotonically decreasing in θ and therefore must equal zero exactly once
at T (θ?), establishing uniqueness.
B.1.10 Optimal composition of jobs
This section derives results on the optimal composition of jobs. There are two cases to
consider. Equilibrium surplus is
S = (1 − u)[ϕ(pχhˆ − rk) + (1 − ϕ)(pφ − rk)] + zu − θurk .
How equilibrium surplus changes with respect to the composition of jobs is given by
∂S
∂ϕ
= (1 − u) ∂
∂ϕ
[
ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ
]
. (B.39)
Our interest lies in evaluating the derivative in equation (B.39) at the equilibrium levels.
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B.1.10.1 Case: ϕ < ϕˇ
When ϕ < ϕˇ, the derivative in equation (B.39) evaluated at equilibrium levels, using the
expressions for equilibrium prices in equations (2.10)) and (2.9) and harvest in equation
(2.7, is:
∂S
∂ϕ
= (1 − u) ∂
∂ϕ
[
ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ
]
∂S
∂ϕ

dec. eqm.
= (1 − u?) ∂
∂ϕ
[
ϕαh
α−1
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)α
h + (1 − ϕ)(1 − α)hα
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)]
= (1 − u?) ∂
∂ϕ
[
αh
α
ϕ
(
1 − ϕ
ϕ
)1−α
+ (1 − α)hα (1 − ϕ)
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)α ]
= (1 − u?)hα ∂
∂ϕ
[
αϕα (1 − ϕ)1−α + (1 − α)ϕα (1 − ϕ)1−α ]
= (1 − u?)hα ∂
∂ϕ
[
ϕα (1 − ϕ)1−α ] .
Dierentiating the latter gives
∂S
∂ϕ

dec. eqm.
= (1 − u?)hα [αϕα−1 − (1 − α)ϕα (1 − ϕ)−α ]
= (1 − u?)hα
[
α
(
1 − ϕ
ϕ
)1−α
− (1 − α)
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)α ]
.
Using the expressions for prices in equations (2.9)) and (2.10, and the fact thatu? = λ/[λ+
f (θ )],
∂S
∂ϕ

dec. eqm.
=
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )h
α
(
pχh
−α+1 − pφh−α
)
=
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
(
pχh − pφ
)
.
(B.40)
B.1.10.2 Case: ϕ > ϕˇ
When ϕ > ϕˇ, the derivative in equation (B.39) evaluated at equilibrium levels, using the
expressions for equilibrium prices in equations (2.10)) and (2.9) and harvest in equation
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(2.7, is:
∂S
∂ϕ
= (1 − u) ∂
∂ϕ
[
ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ
]
∂S
∂ϕ

dec. eqm.
= (1 − u?) ∂
∂ϕ
{
ϕα
[ (1 − ϕ)(1 − α)
д(s?)
]1−α д(s?)
ϕ(1 − u?)
+ (1 − ϕ)(1 − α)
[
д(s?)
(1 − ϕ)(1 − u?)
]α }
= (1 − u?) ∂
∂ϕ
{
α(1 − ϕ)1−α (1 − u?)−αд(s?)α
+(1 − α)(1 − ϕ)1−α (1 − u?)−αд(s?)α }
= (1 − u?) ∂
∂ϕ
{(1 − ϕ)1−α (1 − u?)−αд(s?)α }
= −(1 − α)(1 − u?)1−αд(s?)α (1 − ϕ)−α
= −(1 − α)(1 − u?)
[
д(s?)
(1 − ϕ)(1 − u?)
]α
.
Using the expression for the price of the second good in equation (2.10) and the expression
for equilibrium unemployment, the latter evaluates to
∂S
∂ϕ

dec. eqm.
= − f (θ )
λ + f (θ )pφ . (B.41)
B.1.11 Optimal stock level
This section derives results on the optimal stock level. There are two cases to consider.
Equilibrium surplus is
S = (1 − u)[ϕ(pχhˆ − rk) + (1 − ϕ)(pφ − rk)] + zu − θurk .
How equilibrium surplus changes with respect to the stock of sh is given by
∂S
∂s
= (1 − u) ∂
∂s
[
ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ
]
. (B.42)
B.1.11.1 Case: ϕ < ϕˇ
When ϕ < ϕˇ, the derivative in equation (B.42) evaluated at equilibrium levels, using the
expressions for equilibrium prices in equations (2.10)) and (2.9) and harvest in equation
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(2.7, is:
∂S
∂s

dec. eqm.
=
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
∂
∂s
[
ϕαh
α−1
(
1 − ϕ
ϕ
)1−α
h + (1 − ϕ)(1 − α)hα
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)α ]
= 0,
(B.43)
as the term on the right-hand side is independent of s?. In this scenario the sher manager
is directing the shery to sh at h and still cannot get the shery to s? in equilibrium,
which follows from the fact that the economy does not want that many sh.
B.1.11.2 Case: ϕ > ϕˇ
Whenϕ > ϕˇ, the derivative in (B.42) evaluated at equilibrium levels, using the expressions
for equilibrium prices in equations (2.10)) and (2.9) and harvest in equation (2.7, is
∂S
∂s
= (1 − u) ∂
∂ϕ
[
ϕpχhˆ + (1 − ϕ)pφ
]
∂S
∂s

dec. eqm.
= (1 − u?) ∂
∂s
{
ϕα
[ (1 − ϕ)(1 − α)
д(s?)
]1−α д(s?)
ϕ(1 − u?)
+ (1 − ϕ)(1 − α)
[
д(s?)
(1 − ϕ)(1 − u?)
]α }
= (1 − u?) ∂
∂s
{
α(1 − ϕ)1−α (1 − u?)−αд(s?)α
+(1 − α)(1 − ϕ)1−α (1 − u?)−αд(s?)α }
= (1 − u?) ∂
∂s
{(1 − ϕ)1−α (1 − u?)−αд(s?)α }
= α(1 − u?)1−α (1 − ϕ)1−αд(s?)α−1д′(s?)
= α
[ (1 − ϕ)(1 − u?)
д(s?)
]1−α
д′(s?).
From the equilibrium price of sh in equation (2.9), the latter evaluates to
∂S
∂s

dec. eqm.
= pχд
′(s?). (B.44)
B.1.12 The oracle planner’s full dynamic program
This section considers the full dynamic program from the perspective of a social planner
who maximizes the value of surplus subject to stock dynamics and frictions in the labor
market. Unlike the shery manager the social planner maximizes the economy-wide value
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of surplus, not simply the value of output in the shery.
Note that prices do not depend on unemployment per say, rather they depend on the
composition of employment. Indeed, from the expressions for prices and the two market-
clearing conditions:
pφ = (1 − α)
(
Yχ
Yφ
)α
= (1 − α)
(
ϕ(1 − u)h
(1 − ϕ)(1 − u)
)α
= (1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α
pχ = α
(
Yφ
Yχ
)1−α
= α
( (1 − ϕ)(1 − u)
ϕh(1 − u)
)
= α
(
1 − ϕ
ϕh
)1−α
= α
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−1
.
(B.45)
I look for an equilibrium where startup costs are the same across sectors: kχ = kφ = k .
In addition, I think of the planner as choosing the vacancy–unemployment ratio, which
is isomorphic to choosing the level of vacancies as u is predetermined.
The ow objective of the social planner consists of the net ow value of output pro-
duced by shers and nonshers, plus the ow value of home production, minus the ow
cost of job creation. In the shery there are (1 − u(t))ϕ(t) shers who each catch h(t)
valued at pχ (ϕ(t),h(t)). The ow cost of capital is rk . The net ow value of output in the
shery is therefore equal to
(1 − u(t))ϕ(t)[pχ (ϕ(t),h(t))h(t) − rk].
The net ow value of output produced by the nonresource sector equals the total number
of nonshers, (1 −u(t))(1 − ϕ(t)), times the net value of their output, [pφ(ϕ(t),h(t)) − rk],
making the net ow-value of output in the nonresource sector equal to
(1 − u(t))(1 − ϕ(t)) [pφ(ϕ(t),h(t)) − rk] .
The ow value of output produced at home equals u(t)z. The ow cost of job creation
equals the number of vacancies, θ (t)u(t), times their ow cost, rk .
The oracle planner solves
max
{θ (t)},
{ϕ(t)}∈[0,1],
{h(t)}∈[0,h]
∞∫
0
e−rt
{(1 − u(t)) [ϕ(t)pχ (ϕ(t),h(t))h(t) + (1 − ϕ(t))pφ(ϕ(t),h(t)) − rk]
+zu(t) − θ (t)u(t)rk} dt,
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subject to frictions in the labor market
Ûu(t) = (1 − u(t))λ − f (θ (t))u(t) (B.46)
and the evolution of the stock of sh:
Ûs(t) = д(s(t)) − (1 − u(t))ϕ(t)h(t), (B.47)
with s(0) = s0 and u(0) = u0 given.
The Lagrangian for the social planner [the current-value Hamiltonian augmented with
the constraints in (B.46) and (B.47)] is
L = (1 − u(t)) [ϕ(t)pχ (ϕ(t),h(t))h(t) + (1 − ϕ(t))pφ(ϕ(t),h(t)) − rk]
+ zu(t) − θ (t)u(t)rk
+ µ(t) [(1 − u(t))λ − f (θ (t))u(t)] + γ (t) [д(s(t)) − (1 − u(t))ϕ(t)h(t)]
+ σ1(t)(h − h(t)) + σ2(t)h(t)
+ ζ1(t)(1 − ϕ(t)) + ζ2(t)ϕ(t),
where µ andγ are the costate variables associated with the constraints in (B.46) and (B.47);
σ1, σ2 are the Kuhn–Tucker multipliers for the constraint h(t) ∈ [0,h]; and ζ1, ζ2 are the
Kuhn–Tucker multipliers for the constraint ϕ(t) ∈ [0, 1].
B.1.12.1 Necessary conditions
The rst-order necessary condition for θ is:
Lθ = −u(t)rk − µ(t)f ′(θ (t))u(t) = 0. (B.48)
The constrained-maximum rst-order necessary condition for ϕ is
Lϕ = (1 − u(t))
{
h(t) [pχ (t) + pχϕ(t)ϕ(t)] − pφ(t) + (1 − ϕ(t))pφϕ(t)}
− γ (t)(1 − u(t))h(t) − ζ1(t) + ζ2(t) = 0,
(B.49)
along with the complimentary slackness conditions
ζ1(t) ≥ 0 ζ1(t) [1 − ϕ(t)] = 0 (B.50)
ζ2(t) ≥ 0 ζ2(t)ϕ(t) = 0. (B.51)
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The constrained-maximum rst-order condition for h is
Lh = (1 − u(t))
{
ϕ(t) [pχh(t)h(t) + pχ (t)] + (1 − ϕ(t))pφh(t)}
− γ (t)(1 − u(t))ϕ(t) − σ1(t) + σ2(t) = 0,
(B.52)
along with the complimentary slackness conditions
σ1(t) ≥ 0 σ1(t)
[
h − h(t)
]
= 0 (B.53)
σ2(t) ≥ 0 σ2(t)h(t) = 0. (B.54)
The rst-order necessary condition for u is
Lu = rµ(t) − Ûµ(t) = −
[
ϕ(t)pχ (t)h(t) + (1 − ϕ(t))pφ(t) − rk
]
+ z − θ (t)rk
− µ(t) [λ + f (θ (t))] + γ (t)ϕ(t)h(t).
(B.55)
The rst-order necessary condition for s is
Ls = rγ (t) − Ûγ (t) = γ (t)д′(s(t)). (B.56)
B.1.12.2 The system of equations
I look for a stationary equilibrium. The system of stationary equations under analysis is
0 = −rk − µ f ′(θ ) (B.57)
0 = (1 − u) [h(pχ + pχϕϕ) − pφ + (1 − ϕ)pφϕ ] − γ (1 − u)h − ζ1 + ζ2 (B.58)
0 = (1 − u) [ϕ(pχhh + pχ ) + (1 − ϕ)pφh] − γ (1 − u)ϕ − σ1 + σ2 (B.59)
rµ = − [ϕpχh + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk] + z − θrk − µ [λ + f (θ )] + γϕh (B.60)
rγ = γд′(s) (B.61)
along with the state equations and the complimentary slackness conditions
0 = (1 − u)λ − f (θ )u (B.62)
0 = д(s) − (1 − u)ϕh (B.63)
0 = ζ1(1 − ϕ) (B.64)
0 = ζ2ϕ (B.65)
0 = σ1(h − h) (B.66)
0 = σ2h, (B.67)
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with σ1,σ2 ≥ 0; ζ1, ζ2 ≥ 0; and prices dened in (B.45). Equation (B.57) corresponds to
(B.48); equation (B.58) corresponds to (B.49); equation (B.59) corresponds to (B.52); equa-
tion (B.60) corresponds to (B.55); equation (B.61) corresponds to (B.56). Equation (B.62)
is the stationary version of the job-destruction constraint given in (B.46) and equation
(B.63) is the stationary version of the stock-evolution constraint given in (B.47). Equa-
tions (B.64)–(B.67) are the complimentary slackness conditions given by the Kuhn–Tucker
theorem.
I am interested in the following equilibrium objects 1) s , 2) θ , 3) u, 4) h, 5) γ , 6) ϕ,
7) µ, 8) σ1, 9) σ2, 10) ζ1, 11) ζ2. Equations (B.57)–(B.67) are the 11 corresponding nonlinear,
stationary equations.
The next section uses the necessary conditions to rule out canidate solutions to the
stationary equilibrium.
B.1.12.3 Establishing that ζ1 = ζ2 = 0
Equation (B.57) requires
µ = − rk
f ′(θ ) .
µ represents the shadow value of unemployment to the oracle planner, which is negative
because adding an unemployed worker means taking away a more productive employed
worker.
Use the expression for µ in (B.60):
−r rk
f ′(θ ) = −
[
ϕpχh + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk
]
+ z − θrk + rk
f ′(θ ) [λ + f (θ )] + γϕh
∴ r
rk
f ′(θ ) = ϕpχh + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk − z + θrk −
rk
f ′(θ ) [λ + f (θ )] − γϕh.
Combining terms yields
z + rk +
rk
f ′(θ ) [r + λ + f (θ ) − θ f
′(θ )] = ϕpχh + (1 − ϕ)pφ − γϕh. (B.68)
Develop equation (B.58) to yield
γh = pχh + ϕhpχϕ − pφ + (1 − ϕ)pφϕ − ζ11 − u +
ζ2
1 − u
∴ γϕh = ϕpχh + ϕ2hpχϕ − ϕpφ + ϕ(1 − ϕ)pφϕ − ϕ1 − u ζ1 +
ϕ
1 − u ζ2.
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Using the expression for γϕh in (B.68) yields
z + rk +
rk
f ′(θ ) [r + λ + f (θ ) − θ f
′(θ )] = ϕpχh + (1 − ϕ)pφ
− ϕpχh − ϕ2hpχϕ + ϕpφ − ϕ(1 − ϕ)pφϕ
+
ϕ
1 − u ζ1 −
ϕ
1 − u ζ2
= pφ − ϕ2hpχϕ − ϕ(1 − ϕ)pφϕ + ϕ1 − u ζ1 −
ϕ
1 − u ζ2
= pφ +
ϕ
1 − u ζ1 −
ϕ
1 − u ζ2,
where the last line uses the algebra in fact 1.
Write this expression as
pφ − rk − z = rk
f ′(θ ) [r + λ + f (θ ) − θ f
′(θ )]
− ϕ1 − u ζ1 +
ϕ
1 − u ζ2.
(B.69)
Equation (B.69) requires that ϕ?? ∈ (0, 1). To see this, dene
Ψ(θ ) := rk
f ′(θ ) [r + λ + f (θ ) − θ f
′(θ )] . (B.70)
Using the denition of Ψ in (B.70), the expression for pφ in (B.69) can be written
pφ = rk + z + Ψ(θ ) − ϕ1 − u ζ1 +
ϕ
1 − u ζ2. (B.71)
Suppose ζ2 > 0. The complimentary slackness condition in (B.65) then requires ϕ = 0.
The expression for pφ , using (B.45), evaluates to (1 − α)[(0 × h)/1]α = 0. Proposition
11 establishes that when the matching technology is parameterized as Cobb–Douglas,
limθ→0 Ψ(θ ) = 0 and λθ→∞Ψ(θ ) = ∞. Proposition 12 establishes that Ψ is increasing in θ .
These two facts together with the fact that ϕζ1/(1 − u) = 0 when ϕ = 0 establish that the
right-hand side of (B.71) is strictly positive while the left-hand side is zero when ζ2 > 0.
This is a contradiction. Hence ζ2 = 0.
Now suppose ζ1 > 0. The complimentary slackness condition in (B.64) then requires
ϕ = 1. When ϕ = 1, using (B.45) pφ evaluates to ∞. In order to balance, the right-hand
side of (B.71) must also become arbitrarily large, which requires θ = ∞ as established
in proposition 11. Is this a stationary equilibrium? The Hamiltonian function evaluated
at ϕ = 1 and θ = ∞, however, is arbitrarily negative, violating the Maximum Principle;
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namely, that the Hamiltonian is maximized by the choice variable.
To see this, note that u = 0 when θ = ∞. The algebra in fact 2 establishes that average
productivity evaluates to zero in this case. But the economy faces the burden of carrying
around the vacancies at a ow cost of rk , making the cost of job creation arbitrarily large.
The oracle planner could do better by producing nothing and having the economy engage
entirely in home production. This violates the Maximum Principle. Therefore ζ1 = 0.
A stationary steady state necessarily requires ζ1 = ζ2 = 0. The same logic also rules
out ϕ = 0 and ϕ = 1 as solutions. Therefore ϕ?? ∈ (0, 1).
B.1.12.4 Establishing that σ2 = 0
Suppose that σ2 > 0. The complimentary slackness condition in (B.67) then requires
h = 0. Equation (B.63) then requires д(s) = 0, which says that the stock will be at carrying
capacity in order for there to be no growth. This violates the planner’s choice in (B.61) to
exploit the stock at the same rate of return as other assets in the economy. The humped-
shaped dynamics of stock growth require д′ < 0 when evaluated at carrying capacity as
depicted in gure 2.4. This outcome contradicts the oracle planner’s choice, establishing
that σ2 = 0.
B.1.12.5 The reduced system of equations
These requirements reduce the list of equilibrium objects that I am interested in: 1) s , 2) θ ,
3) u, 4) h, 5) γ , 6) ϕ, 7) µ, 8) σ1.
The corresponding system of equations is
0 = −rk − µ f ′(θ ) (B.72)
0 = h(pχ + pχϕϕ) − pφ + (1 − ϕ)pφϕ − γh (B.73)
0 = (1 − u) [ϕ(pχhh + pχ ) + (1 − ϕ)pφh] − γ (1 − u)ϕ − σ1 (B.74)
rµ = − [ϕpχh + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk] + z − θrk − µ [λ + f (θ )] + γϕh (B.75)
r = д′(s), (B.76)
along with the state equations and complimentary slackness condition for σ1:
0 = (1 − u)λ − f (θ )u (B.77)
0 = д(s) − (1 − u)ϕh (B.78)
0 = σ1(h − h), (B.79)
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with σ1 ≥ 0. There are eight equations and eight unknowns.
B.1.12.6 Reducing the system of equations further
Use equation (B.72) to eliminate µ from the system by writing µ in terms of θ . Use equation
(B.77) to eliminate u from the system by writing u in terms of θ (recall that prices depend
on relative output and therefore do not have u in them). Use equation (B.76) to pin down
s?? = (д′)−1(r ). The system becomes
0 = h(pχ + pχϕϕ) − pφ + (1 − ϕ)pφϕ − γh (B.80)
0 = f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
[
ϕ(pχhh + pχ ) + (1 − ϕ)pφh
] − γϕ f (θ )
λ + f (θ ) − σ1 (B.81)
r
−rk
f ′(θ ) = −
[
ϕpχh + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk
]
+ z − θrk + rk
f ′(θ ) [λ + f (θ )] + γϕh, (B.82)
along with the state equations and Kuhn–Tucker conditions
0 = д(s) − ϕh f (θ )
λ + f (θ ) (B.83)
0 = σ1(h − h), (B.84)
with σ1 ≥ 0.
The unknowns are 1) θ , 2) h, 3) γ , 4) ϕ, 5) σ1.
B.1.12.7 Simplifying and expanding expressions
Equation (B.82) can be simplied:
r
−rk
f ′(θ ) = −
[
ϕpχh + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk
]
+ z − θrk + rk
f ′(θ ) [λ + f (θ )] + γϕh
∴ r
rk
f ′(θ ) =
[
ϕpχh + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk
] − z + θrk − rk
f ′(θ ) [λ + f (θ )] − γϕh.
Collecting terms on the left-hand side yields
rk
f ′(θ ) [r + λ + f (θ ) − θ f
′(θ )] = ϕpχh + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk − z − γϕh.
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With the simplication, the system of equations is
0 = h(pχ + pχϕϕ) − pφ + (1 − ϕ)pφϕ − γh (B.85)
0 = f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
[
ϕ(pχhh + pχ ) + (1 − ϕ)pφh
] − γϕ f (θ )
λ + f (θ ) − σ1 (B.86)
0 = ϕpχh + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk − z − γϕh
− rk
f ′(θ ) [r + λ + f (θ ) − θ f
′(θ )] (B.87)
0 = д(s) − ϕh f (θ )
λ + f (θ ) (B.88)
0 = σ1(h − h). (B.89)
B.1.12.8 Eliminating γ
To eliminate γ from the system described by (B.85)–(B.89) use equation (B.85) to write
ϕγh as
ϕγh = ϕpχh + ϕ
2hpχϕ − ϕpφ + ϕ(1 − ϕ)pφϕ . (B.90)
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Use equation (B.90) in equation (B.87):
rk
f ′(θ ) [r + λ + f (θ ) − θ f
′(θ )] = ϕpχh + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk − z − γϕh
= ϕpχh + (1 − ϕ)pφ − rk − z − ϕpχh − ϕ2hpχϕ + ϕpφ − ϕ(1 − ϕ)pφϕ
= pφ − rk − z − ϕ2hpχϕ − ϕ(1 − ϕ)pφϕ
= pφ − rk − z
− ϕ2h(α − 1)α
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−2
h
(1)(1 − ϕ) − (−1)(ϕ)
(1 − ϕ)2
− ϕ(1 − ϕ)α(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−1
h
(1)(1 − ϕ) − (−1)(ϕ)
(1 − ϕ)2
= pφ − rk − z
− ϕ2h(α − 1)α
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−2
h
1
(1 − ϕ)2
− ϕ(1 − ϕ)α(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−1
h
1
(1 − ϕ)2
= pφ − rk − z + α(1 − α) ϕ
2h2
(1 − ϕ)2
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−2
− α(1 − α)ϕh(1 − ϕ)(1 − ϕ)2
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−1
= pφ − rk − z.
Use equation (B.85) to write
γh = pχh + pχϕϕh − pφ + (1 − ϕ)pφϕ
∴ γ = pχ + pχϕϕ −
pφ
h
+ (1 − ϕ)pφϕ
h
∴ γϕ = ϕpχ + pχϕϕ
2 − ϕpφ
h
+ ϕ(1 − ϕ)pφϕ
h
.
(B.91)
Use the expression for γϕ in (B.86):
σ1 =
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
[
ϕ(pχhh + pχ ) + (1 − ϕ)pφh
] − γϕ f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
=
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
[
ϕ(pχhh + pχ ) + (1 − ϕ)pφh − γϕ
]
=
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
[
ϕ(pχhh + pχ ) + (1 − ϕ)pφh − ϕpχ − pχϕϕ2 +
ϕpφ
h
− ϕ(1 − ϕ)pφϕ
h
]
,
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where the last line uses the expression for γϕ given in (B.91). Developing this equation
yields
σ1 =
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
[
ϕ(pχhh + pχ ) + (1 − ϕ)pφh − ϕpχ − pχϕϕ2 +
ϕpφ
h
− ϕ(1 − ϕ)pφϕ
h
]
=
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
{
ϕhpχh + ϕpχ + (1 − ϕ)pφh − ϕpχ − pχϕϕ2 +
ϕpφ
h
− ϕ(1 − ϕ)pφϕ
h
}
=
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
{
ϕhpχh + (1 − ϕ)pφh − pχϕϕ2 +
ϕpφ
h
− ϕ(1 − ϕ)pφϕ
h
}
=
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
{
ϕhα(α − 1)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−2 ϕ
1 − ϕ + (1 − ϕ)α(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−1 ϕ
1 − ϕ
− ϕ2α(α − 1)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−2
h
(1)(1 − ϕ) − (−1)ϕ
(1 − ϕ)2 +
ϕ
h
(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α
− ϕ(1 − ϕ)
h
α(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−1
h
(1)(1 − ϕ) − (−1)ϕ
(1 − ϕ)2
}
=
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
{
ϕα(α − 1)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−1
+ ϕα(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−1
− ϕ2α(α − 1)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−2
h
1
(1 − ϕ)2 +
ϕ
h
(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α
− ϕ(1 − ϕ)
h
α(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−1
h
1
(1 − ϕ)2
}
=
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
{
− α(α − 1)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−1 ϕ
1 − ϕ +
ϕ
h
(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α
− α(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−1 ϕ
1 − ϕ
}
=
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )
{
ϕ
h
(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α }
.
Developing the latter equation further yields
hσ1 =
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )ϕ(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α
=
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )︸    ︷︷    ︸
e
ϕpφ .
(B.92)
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To the oracle planner, hσ1 is the shadow value of increasing the harvesting capacity of the
eet, as σ1 is the dollar value per harvest units andh represents units of harvest. The units
of hσ1 are therefore dollars in the stationary equilibrium. The shadow value of increasing
the harvesting capacity of the eet in the stationary equilibrium is set equal to value of
harvest, which equals ϕepφ , the eet size, ϕe , times the value of catch pφ . Equation (B.92)
says that the oracle planner puts no constraints on vessel-level harvest. The shadow value
of increasing vessel-level harvest in the stationary equilibrium reects the added catch of
the entire eet.
The system of equations without γ is
hσ1 =
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )ϕpφ (B.93)
pφ − rk − z = rk
f ′(θ ) [r + λ + f (θ ) − θ f
′(θ )] (B.94)
0 = д(s) − ϕh f (θ )
λ + f (θ ) (B.95)
0 = σ1(h − h). (B.96)
The unknowns are now 1) θ , 2) h, 3) ϕ, 4) σ1.
B.1.12.9 Establishing that σ1 > 0
What if σ1 = 0? If σ1 = 0, then equation (B.93) becomes
0 = f (θ )
λ + f (θ )ϕ(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α
=
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )ϕpφ .
f (θ )/[λ+ f (θ )] is employment in the stationary equilibrium, which is positive. The share
of shers in the stationary equilibrium isϕ ∈ (0, 1). The above condition therefore requires
pφ = 0. Equation (B.94) then evaluates to
−rk − z = rk
f ′(θ ) [r + λ + f (θ ) − θ f
′(θ )] .
The left-hand side of this equation is strictly negative while the right-hand side is non-
negative. This can’t happen. It must be the case that σ1 > 0. Equation (B.96) then requires
h = h. (B.97)
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Equation (B.97) reduces the list of equilibrium objects by one. The corresponding
system to (B.93)–(B.96) with (B.97) imposed is
hσ1 =
f (θ )
λ + f (θ )ϕ(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α
(B.98)
(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α
− rk − z = rk
f ′(θ ) [r + λ + f (θ ) − θ f
′(θ )] (B.99)
0 = д(s) − ϕh f (θ )
λ + f (θ ) . (B.100)
The unknowns are now 1) θ , 2) ϕ, 3) σ1.
B.1.12.10 The unique level of tightness in the stationary equilibrium
Use equation (B.100) to solve for ϕ:
ϕ =
д(s)
h
λ + f (θ )
f (θ ) . (B.101)
The oracle planner’s choice of labor share in the shery is interior. Equation (B.101) there-
fore requires
0 < д(s)
h
λ + f (θ )
f (θ ) < 1.
Rearranging yields
0 < д(s)
h
<
f (θ )
λ + f (θ ) ≤ 1
∴ 0 < д(s) < f (θ )
λ + f (θ )h ≤ h,
(B.102)
where the inequality uses the fact that the stationary employment rate, f (θ )/[λ + f (θ )],
is constrained by 1. Equation (B.102) states that the oracle planner chooses vacancies so
that all workers operating at full capacity are capable of harvesting enough sh so that
the stock is maintained at s??.
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Use the expression for ϕ in (B.101) in (B.99) with pφ given in (B.45):
(1 − α)hα
(
ϕ
1 − ϕ
)α
− rk − z = rk
f ′(θ ) [r + λ + f (θ ) − θ f
′(θ )]
∴ (1 − α)hα ©­«
д(s)
h
λ+f (θ )
f (θ )
1 − д(s)
h
λ+f (θ )
f (θ )
ª®¬
α
− rk − z = rk
f ′(θ ) [r + λ + f (θ ) − θ f
′(θ )] .
Which can be simplied to
(1 − α)hα ©­« д(s)/hf (θ )λ+f (θ ) − д(s)h ª®¬
α
− rk − z = rk
f ′(θ ) [r + λ + f (θ ) − θ f
′(θ )] . (B.103)
Equation (B.103) is in terms of the oracle planner’s choice θ alone. The oracle planner’s
choice of θ is implicitly dened by T (θ??) = 0, where
T (θ ) = (1 − α)hα ©­« д(s)/hf (θ )λ+f (θ ) − д(s)h ª®¬
α
− rk − z
− rk
f ′(θ ) [r + λ + f (θ ) − θ f
′(θ )]
= (1 − α)hα ©­« д(s)/hf (θ )λ+f (θ ) − д(s)h ª®¬
α
− rk − z − Ψ(θ ),
using equation (B.103) and the denition of Ψ in (B.70).
Since the rst term and Ψ are both continuous in θ , T is continuous in θ . As θ ap-
proaches 0, stationary employment approaches 0. Before employment approaches 0, how-
ever, the oracle planner’s choice of θ is constrained by (B.102). At the constraint, the rst
term evaluates to∞ and Ψ evaluates to a nite number using proposition 11. Therefore T
evaluates to∞. At θ = ∞ stationary employment is 1. The rst term evaluates to a nite
number. Proposition 11 establishes that Ψ(∞) = ∞. Therefore T evalutes to −∞ a θ = ∞.
Lastly, T is decreasing in θ . To see this note that ϕ dened in (B.101) is decreasing in
θ :
∂ϕ
∂θ
=
д(s)
h
f ′(θ )f (θ ) − f ′(θ ) [λ + f (θ )]
[f (θ )]2
=
д(s)
h
−f ′(θ )λ
[f (θ )]2
< 0.
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The derivative of pφ with respect to θ is
∂pφ
∂θ
= α(1 − α)
(
ϕ(θ )h
1 − ϕ(θ )
)α−1
h
(1)[1 − ϕ(θ )] − (−1)ϕ(θ )
[1 − ϕ(θ )]2
∂ϕ(θ )
∂θ
= α(1 − α)
(
ϕ(θ )h
1 − ϕ(θ )
)α−1
h
1
[1 − ϕ(θ )]2
∂ϕ(θ )
∂θ
< 0,
using the fact that ∂ϕ(θ )/∂θ < 0. Moreover, proposition 12 establishes thatΨ is increasing
in θ , making −Ψ decreasing in θ .
Together, these properties of T establish the existence and uniqueness of a θ?? that
solves T (θ??) = 0.
I have shown that equations (B.99) and (B.100) lead to a unique choice of θ??. Equation
(B.98) provides an expression for σ1. At this point the stationary equilibrium of the oracle
planner’s problem is completely characterized.
B.1.12.11 Useful properties and derivations
Proposition 11 Paremeterizing the matching technology asm(u,v) ≡ ωθ ξ , it is true that
lim
θ→0
Ψ(θ ) = lim
θ→0
rk
f ′(θ ) [r + λ + f (θ ) − θ f
′(θ )] = 0 (B.104)
and
lim
θ→∞
Ψ(θ ) = lim
θ→∞
rk
f ′(θ ) [r + λ + f (θ ) − θ f
′(θ )] = ∞. (B.105)
Proof 1 Under the parameterization of the matching technology the job-nding rate is as
given in (B.108):
f (θ ) = ωθ ξ with ξ ∈ (0, 1).
First note that
lim
θ→0
rk(r + λ)
f ′(θ ) = limθ→0
rk(r + λ)
ξω (θ )ξ−1
= lim
θ→0
rk(r + λ)
ξω
θ 1−ξ
= 0.
(B.106)
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Furthermore,
f (θ ) − θ f ′(θ )
f ′(θ ) =
ωθ ξ − θξωθ ξ−1
ξωθ ξ−1
=
(1 − ξ )ωθ ξ
ξωθ ξ−1
=
1 − ξ
ξ
θ .
Using this bit of algebra, it is true that
lim
θ→0
rk [f (θ ) − θ f ′(θ )]
f ′(θ ) = 0. (B.107)
The two limit results in (B.106) and (B.107) together establish (B.104) by showing
limθ→0 Ψ(θ ) = 0. Moreover, through (B.106) and (B.107) it is easy to see that limθ→∞ Ψ(θ ) =
∞.
Proposition 12 When the matching technology is parameterized as Cobb–Douglas, mak-
ing f (θ ) = ωθ ξ with ξ ∈ (0, 1), the function Ψ(θ ) dened in (B.70) is increasing in θ .
Proof 2 Using the parameterization,
Ψ(θ ) := rk(1 + λ)
ωξ
θ 1−ξ + rk
1 − ξ
ξ
θ .
The expression on the right-hand side uses the algebra in the proof of proposition 11. Then
∂Ψ
∂θ
=
(rk)(1 + λ)(1 − ξ )
ωξ
θ−ξ + rk
1 − ξ
ξ
> 0,
where the inequality comes from the fact that ξ ∈ (0, 1).
Fact 1 In equilibrium, −ϕ2hpχϕ − ϕ(1 − ϕ)pφϕ = 0.
Proof 3 Indeed:
−ϕ2hpχϕ − ϕ(1 − ϕ)pφϕ = ϕ2hα(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α 1
hϕ2
− ϕ(1 − ϕ)α(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−1
h
(1 − ϕ)2
= α(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α
− α(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−1 ϕh
1 − ϕ
= 0.
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Fact 2 The value of productivity (the value of ouput divided by the number of workers) is
ϕpχh + (1 − ϕ)pφ = (hϕ)α (1 − ϕ)1−α . (B.108)
Proof 4 Use expressions for prices in (B.45):
ϕpχh + (1 − ϕ)pφ = ϕα
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−1
h + (1 − ϕ)(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α
= ϕαϕα−1hα−1h(1 − ϕ)1−α + (1 − ϕ)(1 − α)ϕαhα (1 − ϕ)−α
= αϕαhα (1 − ϕ)1−α + (1 − α)ϕαhα (1 − ϕ)1−α
= (ϕh)α (1 − α),
establishing (B.108).
Fact 3 As long as f is concave with f (0) = 0, then f (θ ) − θ f ′(θ ) ≥ 0.
Proof 5 f : [0,∞) → [0,∞). Take any a,b ∈ [0,∞). Because f is concave it is bounded
above by its rst-order Taylor approximation (Varian, 1992):
f (b) ≤ f (a) + f ′(a) (b − a) .
Let 0 play the role of b and θ play the role of a. Because f (0) = 0, we have
0 ≤ f (θ ) − θ f ′(θ ),
establishing what we want to show.
The following derivatives will be used in the analysis below. The following expressions
are true:
pχϕ = α(α − 1)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−2
h
(1)(1 − ϕ) − (−1)ϕ
(1 − ϕ)2
= −α(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−2
h
(1 − ϕ)2
= −α(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α (1 − ϕ
ϕh
)2
h
(1 − ϕ)2
= −α(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α 1
hϕ2
= −(1 − α)pχ 1
ϕ(1 − ϕ) .
(B.109)
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pφϕ = α(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−1
h
(1)(1 − ϕ) − (−1)(ϕ)
(1 − ϕ)2
= α(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−1
h
(1 − ϕ)2
= αpφ
1 − ϕ
ϕh
h
1
(1 − ϕ)2
= αpφ
1
ϕ(1 − ϕ) .
(B.110)
pφh = α(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−1 ϕ
1 − ϕ
= αpφ
1
h
.
(B.111)
pχh = −α(1 − α)
(
ϕh
1 − ϕ
)α−2 ϕ
1 − ϕ
= −αpχ 1 − ϕ
ϕh
ϕ
1 − ϕ
= −αpχ 1
h
.
(B.112)
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APPENDIX C
Appendix to Tracking Earnings Ability over
the Business Cycle: Implications for Wage
Statistics
C.1 Aggregate Implications of Ability Composition
C.1.1 Introduction
The simple economic environment provides a precise description of worker ows. Worker
ows determine ability composition. This section shows how composition aects labor-
market aggregates through equilibrium tightness.
The economics environment is described in sectrion 3.2.2. Section 3.2.2 establishes
the following results: 1) There is a unique equilibrium allocation. See proposition 7.
2) The distribution of ability among the employed does not aect the unemployment rate.
While a result of the one-rm-one-worker production technology in the conventional
Mortensen–Pissarides environment, this result motivates looking at the unemployment
pool in addition to the employment pool over the business cycle. 3) A worker’s reservation
wage depends on the ow benet of unemployment. The ow benet of unemployment
is modeled as weakly increasing in ability and therefore reservation wages are weakly
increasing in ability. See proposition 6.
In this section, I establish the following results: 1) Improving the ability composi-
tion of the unemployment pool lowers the unemployment rate. When rms expect the
likelihood of meeting a productive worker to increase, the value of posting a vacancy in-
creases and rms expand recruiting eort to exhaust these opportunities. Specically, a
rst-order stochastic dominance shift in the ability distribution of unemployed workers
lowers the unemployment rate. 2) A mean-preserving spread of the ability distribution
of unemployed workers lowers the unemployment rate. Because there is a reservation
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productivity level in the economy below which workers and rms agree to separate, a
mean-preserving spread increases the likelihood that a rm posting a vacancy matches
with a high-ability worker, but does not increase the likelihood of meeting a low-ability
worker who would be below the reservation productivity level. 3) The responsiveness of
the unemployment rate to aggregate productivity depends on the ability distribution of
unemployed workers, a form of state dependence.
These intuitive results are summarized in propositions 13–15. The propositions are
stated and proved in the next section.
C.1.2 Propositions and Proofs
Section 3.2.2.3 established uniqueness of the equilibrium. The equilibrium also charac-
terized the ability composition of employment. This section investigates how the ability
composition of the unemployment pool aects labor-market aggregates through equilib-
rium tightness.
Tightness, or the number of posted vacancies given u0, determines employment and
unemployment in the economy. To see how ability composition aects tightness, consider
two distributions for ability in the unemployment pool, H1 and H2, where H2(a) ≤ H1(a)
for all a ∈ [a,a]; that is, H2 dominates H1 in the rst-order stochastic sense.
Then
θ?2 − θ?1 =
(1 − sx ) (1 − η)
c
ε∫
ε

a∫
χ (1/(zε ′))
([za′ε′ − b(a)] [h2(a) − h1(a)] da′)д(ε′) dε′
 .
(C.1)
Integrating the integral in curly brackets by parts yields
[za′ε′ − b(a)] [H2(a′) − H1(a′)]
a′=a
a′=χ (1/(ε ′z))
−
a∫
χ (1/(zε ′))
[H2(a′) − H1(a′)] zε′ da′
= −
a∫
χ (1/(zε ′))
[H2(a′) − H1(a′)] zε′ da′,
where the equality uses the fact that zχ (1/(zε′))ε′−b(a) = 0 andH1(a) = H2(a) = 1. Using
this result in (C.1) along with the fact that H2(a) ≤ H1(a) for all a ∈ [a,a] establishes
θ?2 ≥ θ?1 . Improving the composition of the unemployment pool in terms of ability leads
to a tighter labor market and a lower unemployment rate. When the composition of the
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unemployment pool improves, a posted vacancy has a better chance of matching with
a higher-ability worker, which makes posting a vacancy more protable. Firms expand
recruiting eort until these gains are exhausted, which lowers the unemployment rate.
The result is summarized in proposition 13.
Proposition 13 Suppose b′(a)a/b(a) < 1. Consider two distribution functions, H1 and H2,
that describe the composition of ability in the unemployment pool. If H2 dominates H1 in the
rst-order stochastic sense, then θ?2 ≥ θ?1 .
A mean-preserving spread in the composition of the unemployment pool causes equi-
librium labor-market tightness to increase. Consider two parameterizations of the ability
distribution of unemployed agents, H1 and H1, where H2 and H1 have the same mean
and H2 dominates H1 in the second-order stochastic sense. Continuing to develop the
expression behind proposition 13 yields
θ?2 − θ?1 = −
(1 − sx )(1 − η)
c
ε∫
ε
zε′

a∫
χ (1/(zε ′))
[H2(a′) − H1(a′)]da′
 д(ε
′)dε′
= −(1 − sx )(1 − η)
c
ε∫
ε
zε′
{ a∫
a
[H2(a′) − H1(a′)]da′
−
χ (1/(zε ′))∫
a
[H2(a′) − H1(a′)]da′
}
д(ε′)dε′
=
(1 − sx )(1 − η)
c
ε∫
ε
zε′

χ (1/(zε ′))∫
a
[H2(a′) − H1(a′)]da′
 д(ε′)dε′,
where the last equality uses the fact that the integral evaluated over the entire domain is
zero. The result that θ?2 − θ?1 ≥ 0 follows from the denition of mean-preserving spread;
namely,
y∫
a
[H2(x) − H1(x)] dx ≥ 0 for all y ∈ [a,a].
An increase in “risk,” in other words, increases a rm’s incentive to post a vacancy. In
the words of Diamond and Stiglitz (1974, 338), “H2 is derived from H1 by taking weight
from the center of the probability distribution and shifting it to the tails, while keeping
the mean of the distribution constant.” The presence of the reservation productivity level
means a rm considering posting a vacancy gets to ignore shifts in weight below the
reservation productivity level while increasing the likelihood that the rm matches with
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a high-ability worker due to the shift in weight to the upper tail. The result is expanded
recruiting eort, which is summarized in proposition 14.
Proposition 14 Suppose b′(a)a/b(a) < 1. Consider two distribution functions, H1 and H2,
that describe the composition of ability in the unemployment pool. IfH2 is a mean-preserving
spread of H1, then θ?2 ≥ θ?1 .
The composition of the unemployment pool matters for how the labor market re-
sponds to aggregate productivity, a form of state dependence. Consider again two param-
eterizations of the unemployment pool, H1 and H2, where H2 dominates H1 in the rst
order stochastic sense. Then
∂
∂z
[
θ?2
] − ∂
∂z
[
θ?1
]
=
ε∫
ε

a∫
χ (1/(zε ′))
a′ [h2(a′) − h1(a′)] da′
 ε
′д (ε′) dε′.
Integrating the bracketed integral by parts yields the expression
−χ (1/(zε′)) [H2 (χ (1/(zε′))) − H1 (χ (1/(zε′)))] −
a∫
χ (1/(zε ′))
[H2(a′) − H1(a′)] da′.
Both of the terms in brackets are negative as H2(x) ≤ H1(x) for all x ∈
[
a,a
]
. Therefore
∂θ?2 /∂z ≥ ∂θ?1 /∂z.
Proposition 15 Suppose b′(a)a/b(a) < 1. Consider two parameterizations of the unem-
ployment pool, H1 and H2, where H2 dominates H1 in the rst-order stochastic sense. Then
the response of labor-market tightness to aggregate productivity is greater when the unem-
ployment pool is characterized by H2 rather than H1.
C.2 Densities of EarningsAbility over the Business Cy-
cle
This section provides a picture of how earnings ability varies over the business cycle.
I match a worker’s estimated earnings ability to their labor-market history. The result
is a dataset of repeated cross sections of earnings ability for employed and unemployed
workers.
Figure C.1 depicts estimated densities of earnings ability of employed workers by year.
The estimated densities are constructed using the May employment pools in each year
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over the 90s. Using the May samples eliminates seasonal eects. The color of the densities
corresponds to the aggregate unemployment rate that prevailed during the month. The
mean earnings ability for each month is shown in the gure with a magenta square.
According to the organized-by-earnings-ability model, these densities should exhibit
cyclical patterns. In periods of high unemployment the earnings-ability composition of
the employment pool should improve as lower-ability workers ow to unemployment. In
the context of gure C.1, the densities and their associated averages should shift to the
right when the aggregate unemployment rate is high. Yellow densities should be to the
right of navy densities.1 It is dicult to discern this pattern using the data on employed
workers.
The employment pool, however, represents a much larger stock than the pool of un-
employed workers and it may be easier to observe the pattern among the unemployed.2
Figure C.2 shows similarly estimated densities for the May pools of unemployed work-
ers. According to the organized-by-ability model, in periods of high unemployment, the
earnings ability composition of the unemployment pool should improve as previously
employed high-ability workers ow to unemployment. In the context of gure C.2, the
densities and their associated averages should shift to the right when the aggregate un-
employment rate is high.
There may be some support for this countercyclical relationship, although the visual
evidence is not overwhelming. Section 3.4.3 provides a more formal analysis within the
broader context of wage cyclicality predicted by the statistical model.
C.3 Robustness of Wage Cyclicality
This section considers alternative samples to investigate wage cyclicality. I use the sam-
ples to estimate the rst-step regression specied in (3.1). The estimates are then used to
construct the wage statistics. These wage statistics are used in the second-step regressions
specied in (3.6). Results are reported in tables C.1 through C.4.
The rst sample I consider uses all data available from NLSY79 respondents. The
sample uses data from NLSY79 survey years starting in 1979 and going through 2012.
The cross-sectional average wage,wavg,t , is constructed as the weighted average of wages
observed in year t of NLSY79 data. How the average wage varies with the business cycle
is reported in table C.1.
The average-wage column reports β̂avg from (3.6). The estimate predicts that when
1Or, at U-M, the maize densities should be to the right of the blue densities.
2Not observing the pattern in the employment pools still matters for interpretations of wage statistics.
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Figure C.1: Estimated earnings-ability densities of employed workers by year, 1990–1999.
The color of the density corresponds to the aggregate unemployment rate.
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Figure C.2: Estimated earning-ability densities of unemployed workers by year, 1990–
1999. The color of the density corresponds to the aggregate unemployment rate.
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the cyclical unemployment rate is 1 percentage point above trend,wavg procyclically falls
0.6 percent. The cyclicality column of table C.1 reports β̂cyclical. When the cyclical unem-
ployment rate is 1 percentage point above trend,wcyclical,t procyclically falls 1.162 percent.
This estimate indicates that individual-level wages are about twice as cyclical as the av-
erage wage.
This estimate masks individual wage cyclicality because dierent workers are em-
ployed over the business cycle, which aects the average. The cyclicality column of table
3.1 reports β̂cyclical. When the cyclical unemployment rate is 1 percentage point above
trend, wcyclical,t procyclically falls 1.192 percent. This estimate indicates that individual-
level wages are about twice as cyclical as the average wage.
The dierence in cyclicality between individual-level wages and the average wage is
due to the types of workers who compose employment over the business cycle. Work-
ers dier in terms of their earnings ability and their time-varying characteristics. The
time-varying characteristics column of table C.1 reports how wX ,t varies with the busi-
ness cycle. When the cyclical unemployment rate is 1 percentage point above trend, wX ,t
countercyclically increases by 0.401 percent.
Finally, a wage statistic that reects only earnings ability is wearnings ability,t . The
earnings-ability column of table C.1 reports how wearnings ability,t varies with the busi-
ness cycle. When the cyclical unemployment rate is 1 percentage point above trend,
wearnings ability,t countercyclically increases by 0.137 percent.
The countercyclical coecients forwX ,t andwearnings ability,t indicate that workers with
characteristics that predict higher earnings are disproportionately retained in recessions
and workers with characteristics that predict lower earnings are disproportionately let go
in recessions. Mechanically, because the period xed eects are constructed so that the
cross-sectional average wage hits the predicted average wage, the sum of the counter-
cyclical eects of time-varying characteristics and earnings ability, 0.401+ 0.137 = 0.538,
equals the dierence in cyclicality between individual-level wages and the average wage.
The top panel of table C.2 reports how the individual components ofwX vary over the
business cycle for the same period. The components of X t include dummies for educa-
tional attainment, major industries, and union status as well as controls for cumulative
work experience and tenure at a respondent’s current job. The rst column of the top
panel of table C.2 reports the cyclicality of time-varying characteristics. This entry is
copied over from table C.1.
The next column indicates that the cyclicality of time-varying characteristics is mostly
accounted for educational attainment. And the rest is accounted for by cyclical variation
in union status. Cyclical variation in industrial composition and experience have a small
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eect. Because the statistical model for wages in (3.1) is linear, the individual contributions
approximately sum to the cyclicality of time-varying characteristics. [The sum is not exact
because the trends in (3.6) are estimated separately.]
Cyclical variation in education, however, may be entirely driven by workers earning
college degrees in the early part of the sample, which also coincides with the 1980 and
1981–1982 recessions when the economy experienced high rates of unemployment. To
see if this is the case, the bottom panel of table C.1 restricts the sample to the period
1986–2012.
Over the 1986–2012 period, the average wage in the sample was much less cyclical.
As indicated in the rst column of the bottom panel of table C.1, when the cyclical unem-
ployment rate is 1 percentage point above trend, wavg,t procyclically falls 0.181 percent.
The amount of wage cyclicality, though, remains stable. When the cyclical unemploy-
ment rate is 1 percentage point above trend over 1986–2012, wcyclical,t procyclically falls
on average by 1.176 percent. This is nearly the same magnitude exhibited over the entire
sample.
Looking at the last two columns in table C.1, in the later period, wX ,t and
wearnings ability,t contribute more to wage cyclicality. When the cyclical unemployment
rate is 1 percentage point above trend over 1986–2012, wX ,t countercyclically increases
by 0.684 percent and wearnings ability,t increases by 0.311 percent.
Importantly, however, the components of wX ,t exhibit dierent cyclical patterns in
the later period. The middle panel of table C.2 reports the cyclical contribution of the
individual components. In the later sample, the cyclical contribution of experience is the
largest component. When the cyclical unemployment rate is 1 percentage point above
trend over 1986–2012,wX ,t countercyclically increases by 0.444 percent due to experience
alone. The increased eect of experience, in some sense, is mechanical. As the cohort
ages, a larger and larger share of earnings is a function of experience. Similarly, cyclicality
in educational attainment is small, suggesting that the earlier period was dominated by
workers earning college degrees while younger.
The other two components, union membership and industrial composition, exhibit
patterns in the later sample that are similar to patterns observed over the entire sample.
Because of the marked change in educational attainment, I estimate the statistical
model for wages in (3.1) using NLSY79 survey data from 1985 onwards,3 but do not in-
clude dummies for educational attainment. Using these estimates, I construct similar wage
statistics. The estimated cyclicalities of these statistics are reported in table 3.1. For the
most part the cyclicality measures are similar to those reported in the bottom panel of
3Which provides an estimate of period xed eects beginning in 1986.
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table C.1. Substantial wage cyclicality exists in the data, despite the average wage appear-
ing much less cyclical. The components of time-varying characteristics are reported in
the bottom panel of table C.2. The contributions of industrial composition, union status,
and experience are remarkably similar to the counterparts constructed from estimates of
the panel regression in (3.1) using controls for educational attainment and estimating the
cyclical regressions in (3.6) over the later period.
Together, the cyclical measures in tables 3.1, C.1, and C.2 show that real wages of re-
spondents in the NLSY79 are substantially procyclical. Additionally, the average wage in
the sample is much less procyclical. The dierence between the cyclical component of
wages and the average wage can be attributed to countercyclical compositional eects.
The compositional eects are due to earnings ability and time-varying characteristics.
And the inuence of time-varying characteristics is mostly due to uctuations in experi-
ence relative to a quadratic trend over the business cycle.
Table C.1: Components of wage cyclicality, full sample with educational attainment
1979–2012
Avg wage Cyclicality Characteristics Earnings ability
Cyclical UR −0.624 −1.162∗∗ 0.401+ 0.137
(0.492) (0.371) (0.237) (0.0964)
N 25 25 25 25
1986–2012
Avg wage Cyclicality Characteristics Earnings ability
Cyclical UR −0.181 −1.176∗ 0.684∗∗ 0.311∗∗
(0.640) (0.636) (0.234) (0.132)
N 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.15, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05
All these statistics rely on respondents’ wages used in the regression samples. Respon-
dents in the NLSY79 also provide detailed work histories that indicate whether a respon-
dent was employed or unemployed in any given month. Joining the monthly labor-force
status of respondents to their earnings ability oers another measure of earnings ability
over the business cycle.
In many instances, respondents report their labor-force status even though their is no
wage recorded for them in the sample. Average earnings ability according to labor-force
status is less cyclical. Tables C.3 and C.4 corroborate this claim. The bottom panel of table
C.3 repeats the contents of table 3.3 for comparison.
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Table C.2: Time-varying components of wage cyclicality
Characteristics Education Industry Union Experience
1979–2012, N = 25
Full sample 0.401+ 0.331∗∗ 0.00988 0.110+ −0.0494
(0.237) (0.117) (0.0537) (0.0668) (0.192)
1986–2012, N = 18
Full sample, after 1985 0.684∗∗ 0.0895∗ −0.00666 0.157+ 0.444∗∗
(0.234) (0.0489) (0.0364) (0.0985) (0.168)
1986–2012, N = 18
1985 sample 0.576∗∗ −0.000949 0.130+ 0.448∗∗
(0.229) (0.0345) (0.0809) (0.179)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.15, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05. The column labeled characteristics
refers to the total value of time-varying controls, X ′t β̂ . The value of individual components in X
′
t β̂ are
Education, Industry, Union, and Experience. Experience includes a worker’s tenure at their current job
and total years worked at any job.
The employed column of table C.3 indicates that, over the 1979q1–2012q4 period,
when the cyclical unemployment rate is 1 percentage point above trend, average earn-
ings ability increases 0.0438 percent among employed workers. The unemployed column
indicates that when the cyclical unemployment rate is 1 percentage point above trend,
average earnings ability increases 0.126 percent among unemployed workers. The sec-
ond panel of table C.3 drops non-NLSY79 survey years. Dropping these years does not
substantially change the average earnings ability observed in the employment and unem-
ployment pools.
Finally, the last panel of table C.3 uses data from 1985 onwards and drops educational
dummies when estimating (3.1). These results repeat the results presented in table 3.3.
This sample produces a dierent estimate. The employment column indicates that when
the cyclical unemployment rate is 1 percentage point above trend over 1986q1–2012q4,
average earnings ability increases 0.113 percent among employed workers. The unem-
ployment column indicates that when the cyclical unemployment rate is 1 percentage
point above trend over 1986q1–2012q4, average earnings ability increases 0.518 percent
among unemployed workers. Both of these estimates are precisely estimated.
Table C.4 includes non-NLSY79 survey years. There are 108 observations in this sam-
ple. The sample comprises 27 years, 1986–2012, and there are 4 quarters per year for a total
of 108 observations (27 × 4). Adding these years does not change much the conclusions
from the bottom pabel of table C.3.
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Table C.3: Cyclicality of average earnings ability for employed and unemployed
1979q1–2012q4
Employed Unemployed
Cyclical UR 0.0435∗∗ 0.126
(0.0212) (0.123)
N 136 136
Non-NLSY79
Employed Unemployed
Cyclical UR 0.0305 0.142
(0.0257) (0.145)
N 100 100
1986q1–2012q4
Employed Unemployed
Cyclical UR 0.113∗∗ 0.518∗∗
(0.0167) (0.200)
N 72 72
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p <
0.15, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05. Cross-sectional
sample weights are used in the estimation of
earnings ability.
Table C.4: Cyclicality of average earnings ability for employed and unemployed with non-
NLSY79 years
1986q1–2012q4
Employed Unemployed
Cyclical UR 0.160∗∗ 0.410∗∗
(0.0241) (0.191)
N 108 108
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.15, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05
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